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Enhancing Directed Search in
Black-box, Grey-box and White-box Fuzz Testing
Abstract
Security bugs can exist in every single software system, and software
testing aims to find these bugs ahead of attackers, who are hunting for
zero-day bugs and/or managing to exploit them for profit (e.g., by
stealing users’ credentials like credit card information) or to cause serious
problems (e.g., by attacking critical systems like nuclear power plant).
Fuzz testing (or fuzzing) techniques, which include (model-based)
black-box, coverage-based grey-box and white-box approaches, have
become prominent in software testing. However, given an inadequate test
suite they are not skillful at directing the exploration to reach given
target locations and expose bugs in large program binaries that take
highly-structured inputs. We observe that these limitations can be
circumvented by improving the directedness of fuzzing approaches.
In this thesis, we first design a directed search algorithm in Hercules, a
symbolic execution based white-box fuzzing engine working directly on
large multi-module (stripped) program binaries. The directedness of
Hercules is attributed to its ability to steer the exploration towards target
locations using the module dependency graph and control flow graph
lifted directly from application binaries. Moreover, by exploiting the
results produced by SMT constraint solver (e.g., minimal unsatisfiable
core), Hercules systematically navigates the search between non-crashing
paths and crashing ones. White-box fuzzing tools like Hercules excel at
reasoning about values of data fields but it could easily get “stuck” at
synthesizing the whole (optional) data block (a.k.a data chunk) which
may not exist in an inadequate test suite of highly-structured inputs like
viii
PNG, WAV and PDF files. To tackle this problem, we develop MoBWF
— a novel combination of model-based black-box fuzzing (as embodied by
Peach fuzzer) and white-box fuzzing (as embodied by Hercules). In this
combination setup, Hercules can inform Peach about where it gets stuck.
Peach takes this information and leverages the input model to generate
and transfer the missing data block to the current input of Hercules,
helping Hercules get unstuck and continue its directed exploration. Apart
from expensive symbolic analysis based approaches, the directedness can
also be achieved by augmenting coverage-based grey-box fuzzing (CGF),
a more lightweight technique. We build AFLGo, a directed CGF, by
integrating Simulated Annealing global search algorithm into the fuzzing
process so that the testing is steered towards target locations with a
higher probability than other locations.
The experimental evaluations on two applications of directed fuzzing –
crash reproduction and patch testing for vulnerability detection – show
that Hercules, MoBWF and AFLGo effectively guide the search and
successfully reproduce crashes in large real-world (binary) programs (e.g.,
Adobe Reader, Windows Media Player, OpenSSL) taking
highly-structured file formats (e.g., PNG, WAV, PDF). Notably, AFLGo
can expose the famous HeartBleed vulnerability almost four (4) times
faster than the state-of-the-art AFL fuzzer. In addition, AFLGo has
discovered 14 zero-day vulnerabilities in the widely-used Binutils toolset.
All the vulnerabilities have been confirmed and fixed by Binutils’
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Computing devices are omnipresent in our everyday life. As of October
2014, there were about 2 billion of personal computers (including PCs and
Macs) and more than 7 billion of handheld devices in use worldwide [12].
This figure will be much bigger if we also count the embedded devices
in this era of internet of things (IoT). Millions of software applications
are running to control the devices and provide utilities to end users. In
this situation, any bug/defect in a (critical) software can lead to costly
remedial actions. A software application can have different types of bugs.
A bug can be simple and harmless like the one which only affects user
experiences (e.g., incorrect font or improper display screen size). More
seriously, a logical bug can cause programs to output unexpected results.
From a security perspective, most severe bugs stop a software system from
running properly (e.g., denial of service) or pave the ways for attackers
to install and execute malicious code which can steal users’ confidential
data (e.g., credit card information). For example, the Heartbleed bug [103]
in the popular OpenSSL cryptographic software library caused secret key
leak, and allowed anyone on the Internet to steal data directly from the
compromised services. Even worse, malicious code can control the whole
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software and physical system. In December 2015 a malware, which has
recently been dubbed “Crash Override” 1, showed its ability to control the
Ukraine power grid and disrupt electricity supply to the end consumers.
The cyberattack left 230 thousands people without electricity in several
hours[13].
To achieve high level of correctness and security in software applications,
software manufacturers should continuously conduct three steps – testing,
debugging and fixing through the whole life of their software products,
during development process and even after the software is released. In
these three steps, testing plays a key role to produce test cases proving the
presence of software defects. Once such a test case is generated, developers
can debug the buggy program, find its root cause and fix it.
Software testing can be done manually, semi-automatically or
automatically. Even though manual testing is still a common practice in
software development and maintenance process, it is a time and human
resource consuming task. Nowadays software systems are getting larger
and more complicated, and it makes manual testing much more
challenging. Hence, (semi) automatic testing has been in high demand
especially when computing resources are getting more accessible and
cheaper than ever as a result of significant advances in Cloud computing
technology.
Several automatic testing techniques have been proposed, and we can
categorize them into static and dynamic approaches. Static techniques
include static analysis [20, 6, 64] and software model checking
[55, 38, 18, 37]. While static analysis tools perform without executing the
program under test (PUT), model checkers work on a model of the PUT.
Although static approaches have shown their effectiveness in finding
1https://dragos.com/blog/crashoverride/
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program bugs, they can only indicate potential buggy locations and
produce program traces to these locations – they cannot produce concrete
test cases to trigger the bugs. Consequently, developers/testers still need
to spend substantial time and efforts to check whether the reported bugs
(i.e., alarms from static analysis tools) are real bugs. Indeed, static
approaches suffer from high false positive rate, that is, they usually raise
lots of false alarms because of lacking run-time information or the
imprecision of the program model. In contrast, dynamic approaches (e.g.,
Fuzz testing [9, 4, 5, 35, 51, 8, 101]) execute the PUT and generate
concrete test cases as witnesses for program bugs. There is minimal to no
effort needed by developers to validate the bugs reported by dynamic
tools.
In the scope of this thesis, we focus on dynamic approaches particularly
fuzzing techniques and their combinations. Fuzz testing or fuzzing was
first proposed by Miller et al. in 1990 [83] to understand the reliability
of UNIX tools. This is known as black-box fuzzing technique because it
does not require any structural information of the PUT; in fact the PUT
is viewed as a black box. Basically, black-box fuzzing randomly mutates
selected program inputs (i.e., modify part(s) of them) to produce other
inputs which hopefully can trigger some abnormal behaviors of the program
like crashes and hangs. Due to its lack of program understanding, inputs
generated by black-box fuzzing are likely to be rejected by input sanitizer
component (e.g., parser code). To address the problem, the work of [50]
proposed white-box fuzzing technique (a.k.a concolic execution) that runs
PUT both symbolically and concretely. This work explores into how PUT
is running (e.g., control flows, data flows, CPU and memory states), and
traverses deep paths that are unlikely to be reached by black-box approach.
Although white-box fuzzing is more systematic, its scalability is limited due
3
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Figure 1-1: Control flow graphs of (a) a program having multiple branches
and (b) a program with loop
to the well-known path explosion problem. In a program having multiple
conditional branches and/or unbounded loops (as depicted in Figure 1-1),
the number of program paths can grow exponentially.
Many research works have been done to maximize the effectiveness
and efficiency for both black-box and white-box fuzzing techniques by
intelligently control their search space. For instance, model-based
black-box fuzzing [9, 11] and grammar-based white-box fuzzing [49]
exploit input data model and input grammar to add more constraints to
input data and hence prevent fuzzing engines from generating totally
invalid inputs. BuzzFuzz [45] was designed to use taint analysis to
identify parts of the input that control critical locations (e.g., system
calls) and sensitive data so they focus modifying these parts instead of
treating all parts equally. TaintScope [101] moved one step further to
handle checksum integrity checks in highly-structured inputs. ESD [107]
and KATCH [81] systematically direct symbolic exploration towards some
specific location using control flow graph extracted from program source
code. In addition, several powerful symbolic execution frameworks
supporting smart search heuristics and ability to work with real-world
(binary) applications have been developed such as BitBlaze, SAGE,
Mayhem, KLEE and S2E [51, 28, 95, 35, 33], to name a few.
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Coverage based grey-box fuzzing (grey-box fuzzing for short) [4, 5, 8]
has gained lots of attention from both academia and industry. Unlike
black-box fuzzing, grey-box fuzzing has access to some internal program
structure like branch coverage information. Unlike white-box fuzzing,
grey-box fuzzing uses lightweight instrumentation to determine control
flow coverage – no heavy program analysis and no control flow graph
extraction are needed. The technique turns out to be effective and
efficient in finding bugs, especially security related ones. Recently,
Stephens et al. [96] have combined grey-box fuzzing and white-box
fuzzing in a framework named Driller to leverage the best of both worlds.
All of the aforementioned research has significantly improved fuzzing
techniques; however, they still have several drawbacks. Grammar based
white-box fuzzing only works with context free grammar and cannot
handle integrity checks which are very common in highly-structured file
format like PNG, WAV and PDF. The directed search algorithms in ESD
and KATCH are smart but they work on subjects where source code is
available, and hence more precise structural information is available.
Taint analysis directed fuzzing approaches like BuzzFuzz and TaintScope
implicitly assume they have seed inputs to reach critical functions. It
means they ignore handling reachability analysis which is extremely
challenging in program binaries. Meanwhile, coverage-based grey-box
fuzzing is still undirected – given a specific target location, it cannot be
directed towards quickly generating seeds that can reach the target.
Due to the pointed limitations, given an inadequate test suite , the
current fuzzing techniques are not skillful at directing the exploration to
reach certain locations and expose errors in large program binaries
that take highly-structured file inputs.
5
1.1 Thesis Overview
In this thesis, we propose techniques to enhance the directed search
algorithms in major types of fuzzing – black-box, grey-box and white-box
fuzzing. Our algorithms take into account the inadequacy of given test
suite, the complex structures of program inputs (e.g., the presence of
optional data chunks, integrity checks like checksum), the incompleteness
of program structure (e.g., control flow graph) lifted from binaries, and
also the complexity of the program under test (e.g., multi-module design).
Our final goal is to develop a fuzzing-based automated testing framework
that scales well to large real-world (binary) programs. Moreover, being
aware of the overwhelming number of failing tests could be generated
during fuzzing process, we also develop a fine-grained bucketing technique
to effectively manage and group the tests to ease the debugging phase.
To this end, we first design a directed search algorithm in Hercules, a
symbolic execution based white-box fuzzing that works directly on
(stripped) program binaries. Given a target location l and a set of benign
inputs T in which none of them reaches l, Hercules can generate concrete
test case(s) to reach l and satisfy given certain condition (e.g., crash
condition). The directedness of Hercules is attributed to its ability to
bound the exploration space using the module dependency graph and
control flow graph lifted directly from application binaries. Moreover,
once Hercules reaches location l but the given condition is not satisfiable,
it leverages the minimal unsatisfiable core produced by SMT constraint
solver to first extract the reason of contradiction (in form of branch
condition(s)). Afterwards, based on the reason of the contradiction
Hercules can identify which conditional IF statement caused the
contradiction and hence backtrack to it, negate the branch and follow the
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opposite program path towards location l.
Hercules requires a satisfactory test suite having benign test input to
explore paths towards some control location which is close enough to the
target location l. For example, the control location can be an entry point of
the module (e.g., shared library) that contains l. However, the assumption
may not always work in programs taking highly-structured file formats such
as PNG, WAV and PDF because in these file formats, there are several
optional data chunks which normally do not exist in an inadequate test
suite. In fact, the existence of optional data chunk(s) at certain place(s)
in a file input can decide whether a control location of the consuming
programs can be reached. To tackle the problem, we propose MoBWF, a
novel combination of model-based black-box fuzzing (as embodied in Peach
Fuzzer[9]) and directed white-box fuzzing (as implemented in Hercules)
to exploit the best of both worlds. We implement in Peach a so-called
“data chunk transplantation” capability to generate and insert missing data
chunk under guidance of Hercules while Hercules effectively explores the
value space of data bytes in the newly inserted chunk to drive the search
towards the target location.
MoBWF significantly improves effectiveness and efficiency of
model-based black-box fuzzing and white-box fuzzing in large program
binaries taking highly-structured file inputs. Nevertheless, it is still a
heavyweight technique because it involves complicated program analysis
and constraint solving. In contrast, coverage-based grey-box fuzzing
(CGF) is a lightweight technique that has impressive records in
discovering (security) bugs. However, its limitation is the lack of
directedness. Recently, Bo¨hme et al. [5] have found that CGF can be
modeled as Markov chain. The finding opens a chance to integrate
Markov Chain Monte Carlo meta-heuristics into CGF and make it
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directed. To realize the observation, we build AFLGo – a directed CGF
by integrating into it the Simulated Annealing [65] – a Markov Chain
Monte Carlo approach. Simulated annealing allows AFLGo to regulate
the so-called “fuzzing energy”, which decides how much time should be
allocated to fuzzing a selected seed, for a seed input based on its path
distance to provided target location(s) and the current “temperature”.
The reader can refer to Section 6.4.1 for a full definition of path distance.
The novel combination allows AFLGo to focus on mutating more
“interesting” seeds but still take into account less “interesting” seeds and
hence increase the chance to discover program bugs – which is equivalent
to the global optimum in original Simulated Annealing.
A fuzzing tool could generate an overwhelming number of failing test
cases where many of the tests are likely to fail due to same “reason” and
hence it wastes developers’ time and efforts. So bucketing – a technique
to effectively group the failing tests – would be extremely useful. So far,
people have only used pretty coarse grained run-time information like point-
of-failure or stack trace to do the grouping. In this thesis, we propose
a new symbolic analysis-based clustering algorithm that uses a semantic
“reason” behind failures to group failing tests into “meaningful” clusters.
The reason is defined as the constraint introduced by the branch at which
the failing execution path deviates from the nearest correct path. The
experimental results show that our technique is effective at producing more
fine grained clusters as compared to the point-of-failure based and call-
stack-based clustering schemes. As a side-effect, our technique also provides
a semantic characterization of the fault represented by each cluster – a
precious hint to guide debugging.
The main contributions of this thesis are as follows.
• Unsat-core guided search algorithm in white-box fuzzing.
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The search algorithm in Hercules detects reasons for infeasibility of
non-crashing paths and directs concolic execution towards target
location until the location is reached and the crash condition is
satisfied. The algorithm is supported by program structure
information (e.g., module dependency graph and control flow graph)
lifted directly from program binaries and several heuristics working
on loops and string manipulation functions.
• Leveraging input model to handle inadequate test suite of
highly-structured input files. Input model is used to glue
model-based black-box fuzzing (as embodied by Peach Fuzzer [9])
and directed white-box fuzzing (as embodied by Hercules) together
to handle missing data chunk problem due to inadequate test suite.
We design a so-called “data chunk transplantation” technique that
can “transplant” missing data chunk(s) into an input under the
guidance of white-box fuzzing and some input model. While
white-box fuzzing informs Peach about what and where to
transplant, input model helps Peach to decide how to transplant.
• Directed coverage-based grey-box fuzzing. We integrate
Simulated Annealing – a Markov Chain Monte Carlo approach into
coverage-based grey-box fuzzing to direct the exploration towards a
given set of target locations. To the best of our knowledge, we
develop the first multiple-target search-based software testing
technique where the single objective is to generate an input that
exercises as many of the given targets as possible.
• Fuzzing framework and evaluation. We have developed three
fuzzing systems, which are Hercules, MoBWF and AFLGo, and
evaluated them on two main applications – patch testing for
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vulnerability detection and crash reproduction. These toolset
successfully reproduce crashes in large real-world (binary) programs
(e.g., Adobe Reader, Windows Media Player, OpenSSL, Binutils etc
) taking highly-structured file formats (e.g., PDF, PNG, WAV etc).
Notably, AFLGo can expose the well-known HeartBlead
vulnerability in OpenSSL library almost four (4) times faster than
the state-of-the-art AFL fuzzer. AFLGo has discovered 14 zero-day
vulnerabilities in Binutils’ utilities; all of them have been confirmed
and fixed by Binutils’ maintainers. Five (5) CVEs have been
assigned to critical vulnerabilities.
• Fine-grained failing tests bucketing technique. We leverage
symbolic analysis and symbolic execution tree to identify semantic
“reasons” behind failures and group failing tests into “meaningful”
clusters. The semantic reason makes our approach more fine-grained
compared to off-the-self point-of-failure and call-stack-based
approaches.
Impact on current state of practice. Our proposed techniques can
be applied to various applications; some applications will be shown in this
thesis such as crash reproduction of field-failures, vulnerability detection,
patch testing and debugging. Using our techniques, developers can do
fuzz testing on large real-world (binary) programs taking highly-structured
inputs in the presence of inadequate test suites. Our crash reproduction and
vulnerability detection techniques need minimal to no help from developers
– all information can be extracted automatically from software version in
patch testing or little information about call stack needs to be provided.
Our bucketing method can significantly reduce number of failing tests to
be analyzed and hence save substantial time and efforts of developers.
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1.2 Thesis Organization
The remainder of this thesis is organized as follows. We first discuss
about prerequisite knowledge and related work in Chapter 2 and Chapter
3. In Chapter 4, we present our directed search algorithm for white-box
fuzzing to reach target location. Chapter 5 shows the combination of
model-based black-box fuzzing and directed white-box fuzzing. In
Chapter 6, we describe how we make coverage based grey-box fuzzing
directed. Chapter 7 shows the symbolic analysis based bucketing
technique and Chapter 8 concludes this thesis as well as discuss about




Based on the awareness about structure of the program under test we can
categorize fuzz testing techniques into three main types – black-box, grey-
box and white-box fuzzing. While black-box technique has no information
about program structure, the white-box one has access to both control
flows and data flows of the PUT. Grey-box fuzzing lies in between, it might
have some (partial) information about program control flows (e.g., branch
coverage) or about data flows (e.g., via taint analysis). In this chapter we
explain how different fuzz testing techniques work in details and indicate
their advantages and disadvantages in software testing.
2.1 Running Example
To make a clear explanation and comparison between black-box, grey-box
and white-box fuzzing, we design an example which could challenge all
the three techniques. Listing 2.1 shows the example in which a simple
structured file is read. As depicted in Figure 2-1, the file starts with a
signature (a.k.a a magic number) having value of 0x41424344 in
hexadecimal or “ABCD” string in ASCII followed by the number of data
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blocks (a.k.a data chunks), and all data blocks. Each data block start
with its data size followed by the block’s data and a checksum value
calculated on the data for integrity assessment. This simple file format
resembles several widely-used files such as PNG, PDF and WAV. The
program will crash (at line 16 in Listing 2.1) if the file is valid – its
signature and the checksum values calculated on blocks’ data are correct
– and the value returned by processing content of some block’s data





Size Data CRC32 ...
4 bytes 4 bytes Data block 1
Size Data CRC32
Data block N




3 file_t *file = read_file ();
4 if (file ->signature != 0x41424344) {
5 puts(‘‘Unsupported file format ’’);
6 return 1;
7 }
8 for (int i = 0; i < file ->block_size; i++) {
9 block_t *block= get_next_block(file);
10 if (block ->crc32 != calculate_crc32(block ->data
)) {
11 puts(‘‘Bad checksum value’’);
12 return 2;
13 }
14 int result = process_block_data(block ->data);






Listing 2.1: Example program which processes a structured file
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2.2 Black-box Fuzzing
Miller et al. pioneered the idea of fuzzing in 1991 [83] to examine the
reliability of UNIX command line utilities. The first fuzzing technique
is known as Black-box Fuzzing because no structural information of the
program under test is required. It randomly mutates/modifies selected
program inputs (i.e., seed inputs) using several mutation operators (e.g.,
bit-flip, boundary value substitution, block deletion and duplication) to
generate massive number of new inputs before feeding them to PUT. Then,
the PUT is executed and monitored to capture abnormal behaviors like
program crashes or hangs. The effective yet simple technique paved the
way for later research on automated software testing. However, since the
traditional black-box fuzzing technique (as embodied by zzuf[76]) does not
take into account the structures of program inputs (i.e., file formats or
network protocols), it is very likely that a large portion of the generated
inputs are rejected by the PUT’s parser since they do not conform to the
structure of expected input. The early rejection prevents traditional black-
box fuzzing from digging into deep paths of the program to find persistent
bugs.
Refer the the running example in Listing 2.1, a traditional black-box
fuzzing could easily get stuck at generating some input having correct
signature to bypass the very first check (at line 4). In fact, the chance for
a single try to randomly generate a specific 32-bit value is extremely slim,
just one out of four billions. If an adequate corpus of valid benign seed
inputs is provided, the fuzzer should be able to pass the first check and
continue mutating the main contents of the seeds. However, the inputs
generated by mutating a valid seed still have almost no chance to trigger




2 <Number name="Sign" size="32" value="0x41424344
"/>
3 <Number name="BlockSize" size="32">
4 <Number size="32" signed="false">
5 <Relation type="count" of="Blocks" />
6 </Number >
7 </Number >
8 <Block name="Blocks" maxOccurs="10000">
9 <Number name="Size" size="32"/>
10 <Blob name="Data"/>
11 <Number name="Crc32" size="32">
12 <Fixup class="Crc32Fixup">




17 </DataModel > 
Listing 2.2: Peach data model for the sample file format
To address this problem, Model-based Black-box Fuzzing technique was
proposed and implemented in several fuzzing frameworks like Peach and
Spike[9, 11]. Essentially, the technique leverages information of input’s
structure to mutate program input (e.g., input file or network message)
in a smarter way; it only modifies “mutable” part(s) of the input and
makes the whole input valid “enough” respect to the defined structure.
The technique improves the validity of generated inputs and hence it is
more likely to reach deeper and critical program statements before exposing
program bugs. Listing 2.2 presents how the sample structured file depicted
in Figure 2-1 can be modeled using Peach modeling language. The Peach
modeling language allows to specify a file format as Peach Pit [10]. It
uses primitive data types (e.g., number and flag) and composite ones (e.g.,
string, block, blob) to describes data blocks and data fields. Moreover, it
can model the relationships (e.g., size-of, count-of, offset-of) between data
blocks and data fields. Peach also supports “fixups” and “transformers”.
While fixups allow to repair related data fields like checksums, transformers
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Figure 2-2: Architecture of Peach as a File Fuzzer
are used for encoding, decoding and compression.
Figure 2-2 shows the architecture of Peach fuzzer. One unique
component of Peach is the Cracker. Given a set of seed inputs and the
written input model, Peach uses Cracker to decompose each seed input
into smaller data parts based on the input format specified in the model.
Once the seed is decomposed, Peach applies several mutation strategies to
modify data parts before reassembling them to create new complete
inputs and sending the inputs to PUT. All data parts are mutated with
the support of input model so the generated inputs are valid respect to
the model. As a result, the inputs are more likely to be accepted by the
parser code in the PUT and they could lead to deeper paths to expose
hidden program bugs. Specifically, in the example code in Listing 2.1,
Peach would easily generate inputs to reach the processing code part
(lines 14-17) and it could generate some data block to satisfy the crash
condition to trigger program crash (line 15).
In several cases generating such crashing data block would challenge
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even the model-based black-box fuzzers like Peach. Peach would be good
at generating data fields that have some boundary values (i.e. maximum
and minimum of a data type); however due to its randomness, it is difficult
to produce some specific value especially in case the values are calculated on
several distinct data fields. Moreover, Peach requires input models which
could be tough to construct especially in case of proprietary file formats or
protocols – no specification is available.
2.3 White-box Fuzzing
2.3.1 Symbolic Execution
Symbolic execution is a powerful program analysis technique invented by
King in 1976 [63]. Even though it was introduced long time ago, the
technique has only been widely used in software testing recently because
of the advancements in computer architecture and constraint solver.
Unlike normal program execution (a.k.a concrete execution), symbolic
execution does not take concrete values as inputs. Instead, it starts with
symbolic inputs (i.e., the inputs can take any value in the value ranges of
corresponding data types) and (theoretically) explores all feasible
program paths. To this end, at each conditional IF statement it collects
condition(s) of feasible branch(es), namely branch condition(s), and
encodes the condition(s) in logical formula(s). The conjunction of all
branch conditions along a specific program path pi forms path
constraint/path condition which captures the set of all inputs executing
pi. The feasibility of a path is decided by invoking a constraint solver like
Z3 [40].
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[PC: True] x = β
[PC: True] β == 0?
[PC: β == 0] [PC: β != 0] β < 0?





Figure 2-3: Symbolic execution tree of get sign program
 
1 int get_sign(int x)
2 {
3 if (x == 0) {
4 return 0;
5 } else if (x <0 ) {
6 return -1;




Listing 2.3: Example program get sign of an integer number
Listing 2.3 shows a simple example we use to demonstrate how
symbolic execution works. The program takes an integer number as input
and returns a value representing the sign of the input. It has three
distinct paths where x equals to zero, x is smaller than zero and x is
bigger than zero. Figure 2-3 is the so-called symbolic execution tree of the
example program. Symbolic execution starts by substituting the concrete
program input (variable x in the example) by a symbolic value β. At each
program statement, symbolic execution maintains a program state called
symbolic state; a symbolic state keeps the current path condition, which
is the conjunction of all preceding branch conditions and a symbolic
memory state that manages the symbolic variables and its propagation
during program execution. The initial symbolic state is created when the
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program starts and the path condition is set to true. When a conditional
statement is executed, symbolic execution requests the integrated
constraint solver to check the feasibilities of both two branches. For each
feasible branch, it updates the symbolic state (i.e., path condition and
memory state) and follows the branch to explore deeper code part(s). For
example, at line 3 where the current path condition PC is still true,
symbolic execution checks whether β can be zero. It is obvious that both
the two branches (β equals to zero and β is different from zero) are
feasible so two new symbolic states are created with updated path
conditions and memory states – one for the True branch and one for the
False branch. Similarly, two symbolic states are created for the IF
statement at line 5. As a result, all three paths of the example program
have been explored, and the constraint solver can be invoked to generate
three concrete values of the symbolic variable β for these paths
accordingly.
2.3.2 Symbolic Execution based White-box Fuzzing
Symbolic execution is a systematic program analysis technique and it can
complement the randomness of black-box (and even grey-box) fuzz
testing. In 2005, [50] and [30] independently proposed ideas to leverage
symbolic execution for systematic testing by running symbolic execution
along with concrete execution. The technique is now known as Symbolic
Execution based White-box Fuzzing (white-box fuzzing for short) or
concolic execution. In DART [50], it first runs the test program on one
random input and symbolically gathers constraints at decision points
(e.g., conditional IF statements) that use input values. Then, DART
negates these symbolic constraints one by one to generate new test cases.
The process is repeated so that DART can explore large number of
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program paths deviating from the path followed by the selected random
input. In EGT [30], rather than running the test code with concrete input
which can be manually written or generated by random testing, EGT
runs it on symbolic input that is initially allowed to be “anything”. As
the code executes and processes the input, at each branch point EGT
“fork” the execution for feasible path(s) – create new symbolic state(s)
and update the path condition(s). Once a concrete value is needed (e.g.,
to interact with outside network interface and external libraries or to get
a concrete test case) EGT uses constraint solver to solve the
corresponding path constraint.
Using symbolic analysis and constraint solver, both DART and EGT
are effective at reasoning about specific values. As a result, they can
easily generate input to pass the first check (magic number check at line
4) and the crash condition (the check at line 15) of the running example
at Listing 2.1 which are challenging for (model-based) black-box fuzzing.
However, they would get stuck at reasoning about the loop condition (at
line 8) and the checksum validation (at line 10) due to the path explosion
problem. That is, in large programs or even in small programs having
several conditional branches and/or loops, the number of program paths
can grow exponentially increase so that the computing resources can
quickly get exhausted. Several studies have been conducted to tackle the
problem, we will discuss them in details in Chapter 3.
In more than ten years, since 2005, several white-box fuzzing tools
have been developed based on the core ideas of DART and EGT such as
SAGE, KLEE, BitBlaze, S2E, Mayhem [51, 28, 95, 35, 33], to name a few,
some are closed-source (SAGE, Mayhem) while others are open access.
These tools have shown successful applications in both industry and
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academia. Very recently, Microsoft have released its Springfield1
fuzzing-as-a-service project in which SAGE is a key component. In this
thesis, we have extensively used two open-source symbolic execution
engines KLEE and S2E for implementing our proposed ideas. Thus we
discuss here the architectures of the tools in more details to ease the
understanding of our implementations.
Cadar et al [28] first introduced KLEE at the OSDI conference in 2008.
KLEE is implemented as a virtual machine working on LLVM bytecode
[67] instead of machine code. The original version of KLEE supported
LLVM-2.9, and now in its newest version KLEE already supports LLVM-
3.4. KLEE takes LLVM bytecode as input, executes the bytecode to explore
different program paths, and uses run-time checkers (e.g., memory access
violation checker) to detect program bugs and generate test cases for both
benign and buggy paths. KLEE has shown its ability to automatically
generate test inputs to get high code coverage and find deep bugs in the
Coreutils and BusyBox toolset.
Figure 2-4 shows the architecture of KLEE. Like other symbolic
execution engines, a major component in KLEE is the interface with
constraint solver. In current version, KLEE supports metaSMT interface
to provide a handful of choices including STP, Boolector and Z3 solver.
Another important component of KLEE is its set of search strategies.
KLEE provides a rich set of search strategies for different objectives –
random search, explore deeply (Depth first search), explore widely
(Breadth first search), maximize code coverage and the interleaving
between them. It also supports a clean interface for developing new
search strategy for specific requirements.
1Springfield service: https://www.microsoft.com/en-us/springfield/
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Figure 2-4: Architecture of KLEE
 
1 void main() {
2 uint32 x,y;
3 fread(stdin , &x, sizeof(x));
4 make_symbolic (&x, sizeof(x));
5 make_symbolic (&y, sizeof(y));
6 y = f_env(x);
7 if(y == 0) abort;
8 } 
Listing 2.4: Environment interaction in KLEE
In Figure 2-4, one notable component of KLEE is symbolic
environment. The advantages of the component are threefold. First, it
allows KLEE to mitigate path explosion problem using simplified versions
of external libraries (e.g., standard libc). Second, KLEE can model
closed-source libraries based on their provided/inferred specifications to
symbolically execute programs working with these libraries. Third, KLEE
can also model specific environments like network communications [92] to
test network applications. Despite the advantages, the environment
modeling is somewhat adhoc and manual. Listing 2.4 shows a contrived
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example in which the program calls a function, namely f env and we
have no access to its source code. Based on a specification of the function,
we need to manually write a simplified version of f env and compile it to
LLVM bytecode to make KLEE work. KLEE runs and generate a test
case that triggers the crash at line 7. However, it is possible that we
cannot reproduce the crash on the binary version of f env because if in
this original version of f env there is no paths to output the value of 0 to
satisfy the crash condition. It means KLEE raises a false alarm.
Therefore, a (semi) automated environment modeling approach is in high
demand and it is still an open research problem.
In 2011, Chipounov et al [35] introduced S2E, a new symbolic
execution framework which can directly work on program binaries.
Moreover, S2E supports symbolic execution in full software stack (i.e.,
from application down to C-library, OS kernel and device drivers) and
hence unlike KLEE, S2E requires no abstractions (i.e., models) for the
operating system and external libraries. As a result, in our example listed
in Listing 2.4, S2E should not report any error because there is no feasible
path to trigger the crash. S2E is implemented by augmenting QEMU
emulator [98], specifically the dynamic binary translator, to make it work
with KLEE. The modified dynamic binary translator can translate binary
code into LLVM bytecode which can be interpreted by KLEE.
To mitigate the path explosion problem, S2E supports Selective
Symbolic Execution to choose which modules to be run in symbolic mode
and leave other modules run in concrete mode. More specifically, while
running in symbolic mode, S2E extracts and converts the current
Translation Block (i.e., a block of binary code) into LLVM bytecode and
pass it to KLEE. While running in concrete mode, S2E runs similar to
QEMU. S2E needs to switch back and forth between symbolic mode and
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concrete mode, so it has to maintain the consistency of the whole system
execution.
Figure 2-5: Architecture of S2E
The architecture of S2E is shown in Figure 2-5. It is designed in such
a way that users can easily extend its functionality. Apart from the core
of S2E, other components can be implemented as plugins to the core. A
plugin can belong to the Selector or Analyzer category depends on its
functionality. A selector plugin selects state to be run or choose which
modules to be symbolically executed. For instance, a search algorithm
can be implemented as a selector plugin. An analyzer plugin is used to
analyze the execution information; some examples are the memory
analyzer, memory checker, crash detector.
2.4 Coverage-based Grey-box Fuzzing
Coverage-based grey-box fuzzing (CGF) [4, 5, 8] leverages control flow
information of the program under test to guide random testing. For
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instance, AFL fuzzer [4], the state-of-the-art CGF fuzzing tool, has been
widely used in industry and academia to find remarkable number of
security vulnerabilities in real-world programs. To achieve the
effectiveness, AFL relies on lightweight instrumentation mechanism which
allows it to capture basic block transitions and coarse branch-taken hit
counts information in run-time.
Figure 2-6: Architecture of AFL as a File Fuzzer
Figure 2-6 displays the architecture of AFL as a file fuzzer. Note that
AFL can be used to test command line and network based applications as
well provided that some adapter needs to be designed to convert back and
forth between file and command arguments or network messages. Since
AFL has information about the edge coverage of the mutated inputs, it
can decide which one is interesting (e.g., covers new edge(s)) and should
be retained for further fuzzing phases. AFL maintains an input queue
which only keeps interesting inputs. For each fuzzing round, it iterates
through items in the input queue, mutates them and enqueues inputs that
trigger new behaviors. Since the queue is getting larger, AFL has smart
heuristics to rank items in the queue so that those have higher rank should
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be prioritized. Meanwhile, the lower ranked items can be skipped with
some probability. The input queue is designed to be easily shared between
different fuzzing engines. This feature allows us to run AFL in parallel
mode or run AFL with other test generation engines. 
1 cur_location = <COMPILE_TIME_RANDOM >;
2 map_index = cur_location ^ prev_location
3 shared_mem[map_index ]++;
4 prev_location = cur_location >> 1; 
Listing 2.5: AFL’s instrumentation.
The instrumentation can be done during compilation time or directly on
program binaries. Listing 2.5 shows the pseudo code for instrumentation
in AFL. AFL allocates a shared memory region – shared mem – to keep
track the hit counts. At each control statement (e.g., conditional jump or
call), AFL randomly generates a value for the cur location variable and
uses this value with its previous value to calculate the index to the shared
memory. The index calculation is performed in such a way that AFL can
distinguish between two basic block transitions – (A,B) versus (B,A).
In the running example shown in Listing 2.1, CGF would be more
effective than both black-box fuzzing and white-box fuzzing on handling
the loop (at line 8). Indeed, CGF only retains inputs covering new
control-flow behaviors (e.g., new branch or new number of loop
iterations), so it does not waste time to generate huge number of inputs
which might cover same behaviors like black-box approach. In addition,
since CGF only keeps the control flow transitions of “interesting” inputs,
not the full program state for each program path (i.e., registers’ state,
memory state and path condition) like symbolic-execution based
white-box fuzzing, CGF can easily explore the loop with no scalability
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problem. However, like black-box fuzzing, CGF could get stuck at
generating specific values for the file signature (line 4) and the crash
condition (line 15). Moreover, it has almost no chance to bypass the
checksum validation (line 10). In practice, one normally tries to identify
the checksum check in source code or in binary and disable it or jump out





In this chapter we present related work in improving the effectiveness and
efficiency of fuzz testing techniques. The improvements mostly come from
1) techniques to enhance the directedness of fuzz testing, 2) techniques
to tackle the path explosion problem of symbolic execution and 3) the
combination of different fuzzing approaches to leverage the best of all. Due
to the advances in fuzz testing techniques, they have been used broadly in
industry and academia to discover program defects. A common problem
is that the fuzzing tools normally generate an overwhelming number of
failing test cases where many of the tests are likely to fail due to same
“reason”. So in this chapter, we also review relevant research on bucketing
techniques which aim to group similar failing tests together to significantly
reduce number of tests to be analyzed. The results of bucketing techniques
would remarkably ease the debugging process.
3.1 Enhancing Directedness in Fuzz Testing
Since the search space to explore a real-world program could be huge, a
rich set of approaches has been proposed to make fuzzing techniques more
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targeted [46, 53, 101, 81, 107, 31, 87, 93]. That is, the approaches focus on
exploring “critical” program locations (e.g., system calls, memory access
instructions, code changes etc) instead of treating all code parts equally.
BuzzFuzz [46], TaintScope [101], Flax [93] and Dowser [53] leverage
the taint analysis to localize the program input should get be stress
tested. Basically, they first run the test program with some input and use
taint analysis to locate which part(s) of the input can control critical
program locations. Afterwards, they spend much more effort to “mutate”
the located the input part(s) to discover program bugs. The mutation can
be done in black-box manner using mutation operators or in white-box
way using constraint solver. TaintScope [101] can automatically identify
integrity checks (e.g., checksums) in program binaries and bypass the
checks. Flax [93] uses dynamic tainting on client web applications and
directed fuzzing to discover client-side validation (CSV) vulnerabilities.
Dowser uses taint analysis to identify program inputs that influence
memory accesses and uses concolic execution with partially symbolic
inputs for learning about pointer access patterns [53]. Using this
information, Dowser steers fuzzing technique towards complex pointer
calculations in the program.
Debugging approaches such as ESD [107], BugRedux [58] and patch
testing approach KATCH [81] systematically direct symbolic exploration
towards a specific program location. ESD and KATCH utilize the program
source code to extract system information including inter-procedural CFG
to inform the techniques and apply data flow analysis. Both approaches
analyze data-flows to identify reaching definitions responsible for taking
critical control-dependent edges and steer symbolic execution towards these
intermediate goals using proximity metric. BugRedux also requires source
code because it needs to instruments program under test before deploying
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it to the user side. Once a field failure happens, all execution data (e.g.,
point of failure, stack trace etc) is collected. First, BugRedux uses the
execution data from the field to identify a set of intermediate goals that
can guide the exploration of the solution space. Second, it uses a heuristic
based on distance to select which states to consider first when trying to
reach an intermediate goal during the exploration.
Approaches that work on program binaries focus on resolving
sufficient system information using static and dynamic
analyses [17, 36, 32]. Approach by Babic´ et al. uses static analysis to
guide automated dynamic test generation [17]. Dynamic analysis resolves
indirect jumps with seed tests, and the static analysis helps symbolic
execution directing exploration towards vulnerabilities based on the
shortest paths and loop pattern heuristics. MACE by Cho et al.
combines symbolic and concrete execution to build and refine an abstract
finite state model of the system-environment interaction and use it to
guide the program exploration [36]. HI-CFG by Caselden et al. generates
hybrid information- and control-flow graph of a program to direct stages
of backwards symbolic execution. Brumley et al. [26] lift control flow
graph from the intermediate representation of the program and compute
a “chop” of the graph which includes only those program paths which
may reach the vulnerability point. The approach prunes paths that might
not be relevant to reaching the target location.
In summary, to make fuzz testing more directed previous research
requires source code to extract precise program structure. Some can work
directly on program binaries but cannot handle highly-structured inputs
or assume the availability of adequate test inputs to reach critical
locations. In Chapter 4 and Chapter 5, we show that our directed
white-box fuzzing approach and its closed-loop combination with
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model-based black-box fuzzing work directly on (stripped) program
binaries in the presence of inadequate test suite of highly-structured file
formats. In Chapter 6, we present directed coverage-based grey-box
fuzzing in which no taint analysis is involved.
3.2 Improving Scalability of Symbolic
Execution
Path explosion is the main problem which limits the scalability of symbolic
execution. A lot of research has been done to tackle and mitigate the
problem.
Loops and string manipulation functions are two main causes of path
explosion. Many techniques have been proposed to handle loops and
strings in symbolic execution [68, 27, 106]. Larson and Austin
characterize and track bounds and null termination of string variables for
dynamically checking validity of program inputs [68]. Bucur et al.
associate high-level execution paths of the program to some low-level
execution paths during symbolic execution of python programs [27]. Xie
et al. [106] propose a classification of multi-path loops to understand the
complexity of the loop execution and use a path dependency automaton
(PDA) to capture the execution dependency between the paths.
The idea of summarizing functions or problematic behavior in
symbolic execution have been investigated earlier. Godefroid proposed a
compositional approach to capture and reuse function summaries to scale
dynamic symbolic execution [48]. Brumley et al. describe vulnerability
signatures as weakest preconditions [23]. Several approaches have
explored similar intuition for summarizing and reasoning about
problematic behavior in a backwards fashion to find program inputs that
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trigger such behavior [25, 80, 37, 32].
Kuznetsov et al. introduced dynamic state merging and query count
estimation [66]. By estimating the impact of symbolic variables on solver
queries their approach merges states balancing between the number of
generated states and the complexity of the queries to the solver. Mayhem
by Cha et al. combines online and oﬄine symbolic execution and models
symbolic memory at the binary level [34]. Built on Mayhem, Veritesting
enhances dynamic symbolic execution with static symbolic execution [16].
Grammar-based Whitebox Fuzzing (GWF) [49] generates inputs that
are valid w.r.t. a context-free grammar G. By that, it can prune paths
leading to invalid inputs and hence reduce the exploration space. We use




3 char getNextToken () {
4 return input[i++];
5 }
6 bool isSorted () {
7 int prev_digit = 0;
8 if (’{’ == getNextToken ()) {
9 do {
10 char token = getNextToken ();
11 if (’,’ == token) continue;
12 if (’}’ == token) return true;
13 int digit = asInt(token);
14 if (prev_digit > digit) return false;
15 prev_digit = digit;




Listing 3.1: isSorted() returns true if the input is a sorted list of single
digit numbers
The context-free grammar G may be written as
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G → {Numbers} (3.1)
Numbers→ Numbers,Numbers (3.2)
Numbers→ Digit (3.3)
Digit→ 0 | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 | 7 | 8 | 9 (3.4)
which encodes that valid inputs start with an open curly bracket
followed by a comma-separated list of (at least one) digits and a closing
curly bracket. GWF encodes a path condition as regular expression such
that a context-free constraint solver can generate an input that is
accepted by both, the grammar and the regular expression. For input
{1,2}, GWF yields the following constraint R to explore the alternative
branch where the input does not end in a curly bracket. Notice that to
ease the explanation, we show R in a user-friendly representation; GWF
has a customized representation called regular path constraint.
token1 = { (3.5)
∧ token2 = Digit (3.6)
∧ token3 = , (3.7)
∧ token4 = Digit (3.8)
∧ token5 6= } (3.9)
where Digit is a symbolic variable. Using a context-free constraint
solver, it is possible to derive an array with three digits that is accepted
by both G and R (e.g., {0,0,0}). However, since the regular expression
cannot express the arithmetic relationship between token2 and token4 (i.e.,
1 < 2), a completely different path might be exercised. This renders GWF
both unsound and incomplete. Moreover, the context-free language which
encodes the file format cannot express integrity constraints such as the
checksum or the size of a data chunk. Functions computed over the data in
a data field, such as a compression algorithm, cannot be expressed either.
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In summary, previous techniques to tackle path explosion problem
vary from function summary, path merging, loop analysis to grammar
based white-box fuzzing. In Chapter 4 and Chapter 5, we will present our
practical techniques to bound the loop iterations and group high-level
paths of string manipulation functions to manage the increase of
execution paths. We also leverage input models to prune most paths that
are exercised by invalid inputs. Unlike grammar-based white-box fuzzing,
our input models allow to specify integrity constraints and compression
algorithms. Moreover, our technique maintains full path conditions as
SMT formulas so it retains the soundness and completeness of symbolic
execution.
3.3 Hybrid Fuzz Testing
Since no fuzzing technique is perfect, designing hybrid approaches to
amplify the power and mitigate the weakness of each composing
technique is a promising direction [86, 96].
[86] first proposed the idea of hybrid fuzz testing in 2012. In this
approach, symbolic exploration is utilized to find “frontier nodes” and
then fuzzing is invoked to execute the program with random inputs,
which are preconstrained to follow the paths leading to a frontier node.
Recently, Stephens et al. [96] released Driller – a hybrid fuzzing
framework which combines the efficiency of coverage-based grey-box
fuzzing and the effectiveness of symbolic execution based white-box
fuzzing. White-box fuzzing is effective at reasoning about specific values
while coverage-based grey-box fuzzing can efficiently explore program
paths in a scalable way. In Driller, grey-box fuzzing initiates the fuzzing
progress and it only seeks help from symbolic execution when it gets
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stuck (i.e., grey-box fuzzing cannot discover new interesting paths)
because it cannot generate some specific value (e.g., magic number).
Symbolic execution takes a seed input from grey-box fuzzing, executes the
program with the seed to collect path condition and negates constraints
in the path condition to generate new inputs. Grey-box fuzzing takes
some input which contains the required specific value and continues its
fuzzing process. The hybrid approach provides an innovative way to
leverage the advantages of both two worlds - grey-box and white-box
fuzzing. However, the criteria to detect whether grey-box fuzzing is
getting stuck is still very naive. Moreover, the power of symbolic
execution is not fully exploited in this approach. Further research is
needed to address these problems.
In Chapter 5, we present our approach to combine model-based
black-box fuzzing and directed white-box fuzzing (MoBWF) to amplify
the best of both worlds and target on programs taking highly-structured
inputs. Driller does not primarily target such programs; in this respect,
our approach is orthogonal to Driller. Driller can benefit from MoBWF
when testing programs processing highly structured inputs.
3.4 Bucketing Failing Tests
One related line of research involves clustering crash reports or bug
reports. This line of research is well-studied with several techniques have
been proposed [39, 47, 62, 84, 91]. All of these techniques perform
clustering based on the run-time information of programs. The Windows
Error Reporting System (WER) [47] tries to place crash reports into
various clusters using several heuristics involving module names, program
versions, function offsets and other attributes. An improvement of the
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bucketing in WER - ReBucket [39] - bases the clustering on specific
attributes such as the call stack in an crash report. Crash Graph [62] uses
graph theory (in particular, similarity between graphs), to detect
duplicate reports. It builds a graph named crash graph for each crash
report and detects the duplicate report by checking the similarity between
two crash graphs. In terms of duplicate bug report detection,
Runeson [91] proposed a technique based on natural language processing
to check similarity of bug reports.
Another relevant work involves clustering program failing traces. Liu
and Han [77] proposed the technique to use results of fault localization
methods for clustering failing traces. Given two set of failing and passing
traces which are collected from instrumented predicates of software
program, they statistically localize the faults and two failing traces are
considered to be similar if the pointed fault locations in the two traces are
the same. Podelski et al.[89] cluster failure traces by building symbolic
models of their execution (using model checking tools) and use
interpolants as signatures for clustering tests. Due to the cost of symbolic
model-checking, their technique seems to suffer from scalability issues as
in their experiments, even their intra-procedural analysis times out (or
the interpolant generator crashes) on a large number of methods.
Although the above-mentioned lines of research are relevant to our
work, we target our research on clustering failing tests — instead of crash
reports, bug reports or failing traces. Specifically, we work on failing tests
obtained during symbolic exploration of software programs or provided by
test teams.
To the best of our knowledge, all popular symbolic execution engines
like KLEE, SAGE and MergePoint [29, 51, 16] only borrow and slightly
change the techniques that have been proposed for clustering crash reports
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to cluster their generated failing tests. The clustering approach can be as
simple as using point of failure and error type in KLEE [29] or using call
stack information in SAGE [51] and MergePoint [16].
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Chapter 4
Directed Search in White-box
Fuzzing
In this chapter, we present a directed method for generating inputs which
reach a given “potentially crashing” location. Such potentially crashing
locations can be found by a separate static analysis (or by gleaning crash
reports submitted by internal / external users) and serve as the input to
our method. The test input generated by our method serves as a witness
of the crash.
4.1 Introduction
Complex software systems are released and deployed with faults. Some
faults trigger application crashes that elevate system security risks and are
difficult to trace, analyze and reproduce. The problem of finding crashing
paths has been addressed by previous research, however, few techniques
cope with large real-world binaries. Real-world binaries present challenges
for program analysis techniques due to their size, complexity, and multitude






































Figure 4-1: An overview of our approach and Hercules tool
of programs in a stripped binary is incomplete when collected statically,
while recovering such information dynamically is often infeasible.
Reproducing crashes in multi-module systems requires targeted
exploration. The search space of potential crashing paths is too large to
be exhaustively checked path by path (for instance, using symbolic
execution); the complexity of program inputs is too high for exhaustive
set of inputs to be generated combinatorially or randomly (for instance,
using fuzzing). The space of program paths is intractable for modern
analysis techniques – a novel targeted exploration is needed.
Given a real-world program binary with a crash report, our approach
Hercules tackles the problem of finding program paths and corresponding
program inputs that cause a crash in a given program location. The core
idea behind our approach is to systematically detect, bound and explore a
subset of program paths necessary and sufficient for reaching and triggering
a given program crash.
The approach builds upon concolic exploration and propagates a
necessary, but minimal subset of input data in symbolic form, while
keeping the remaining input data concrete. The exploration uses targeted
search strategy that helps to explore as few as possible paths, while
resolving enough information about program structure for finding the
crashing path.
Our approach works in three main steps (Figure 4-1). Each step
progressively more precisely establishes program and input structures
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that are relevant to reproducing the crash. The approach starts with a
preprocessing step for initial reconstruction of a program structure and
selection of input files (Step 1 ) followed by two passes of concolic
exploration. Application of two passes of concolic exploration is a distinct
feature of the approach. Each pass serves different purpose: the first pass
(Step 2 ) establishes a relationship between program input and relevant
program structures, and provides an input to the second pass (Step 3) – a
focussed fine-granularity search for a crashing path. Our search strategy
infers the reasons for infeasibility of specific non-crashing paths, thus
helping us to avoid exploring large numbers of paths that are
non-crashing for the same reason, and to direct the search towards the
paths that will crash the system.
We call our tool and method as Hercules, largely because of the
Herculean task (of finding crashing inputs) it accomplishes in a
reasonable time-frame. This is because of smart search heuristics and
structuring of the search into phases. Our approach builds upon selective
symbolic execution technique S2E [35], extends it, and makes a number
of technical contributions, namely -
• Targeted search strategy implements our targeted search algorithm
that detects reasons for infeasibility of non-crashing paths and directs
concolic execution.
• Approximation of string functions scales concolic execution by
bounding exploration of string manipulation functions that
generally cause path explosion.
• Analysis of loop-controlled crash instructions enables automatic
synthesis of loop-dependent crash conditions.
• Dynamic module selection adds flexibility to the S2E technique –
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in the process of selective concolic execution our technique allows
dynamic selection of program structures for concolic execution (state
forking).
• Dynamic CFG refinement. In addition to the standard S2E
functionality our technique builds and dynamically refines program
control flow graph (CFG) and uses it for reachability analysis to
inform concolic exploration.
Assumptions The few significant assumptions we make concern
availability of a test suite (a set of non-crashing benign input files)
TestSuite and indication of a crash location CL in a crashing module
CrashingModule, where execution of at least one test case in TestSuite
reaches CrashingModule. We optionally assume availability of a list of
modules invoked during crashing execution ModuleList, call stack and
values of the program registers at the moment of crash that form a crash
condition CC. If available, the knowledge about input file structure and
layout may aid seed file selection and generation of hybrid symbolic
inputs. The required information is external to the approach and can be
often produced by a separate static/dynamic analysis.
4.2 Motivating Example
We illustrate the pertinent aspects of the approach using data from a
vulnerability CVE-2010-0718 in Windows Media Player – a
buffer-overflow that triggers a system crash in a divide-by-zero exception.
Figure 4-2 shows fragments of information used by our approach in the
search for crashing input. According to the crash report, the list of





  (Concat w32 (Read w8 0x0 v3_sym_byte_3)
    (Concat w24 (Read w8 0x0 v2_sym_byte_2)
      (Concat w16 (Read w8 0x0 v1_sym_byte_1)    
(Read w8 0x0 v0_sym_byte_0)))))
Constraint (Eq false
  (Eq (w32 0x44494d52)
    (Concat w32 (Read w8 0x0 v11_sym_byte_11)
       (Concat w24 (Read w8 0x0 v10_sym_byte_10)
         (Concat w16 (Read w8 0x0 v9_sym_byte_9) 
(Read w8 0x0 v8_sym_byte_8))))))
...
RetAddr   Module
7490232d  quartz+0xf2224
74901d96  quartz+0xf232d
...       ...
748340a2  quartz!DllGetClassObject+0x404c
7483df85  quartz!DllGetClassObject+0xa36 





Path constraint at 0x74834010
Input file
Crashing module -- quartz.dll
...
.text:74834010 lpCriticalSection= dword ptr  8
.text:74834010 arg_4           = dword ptr  0Ch
.text:74834010 arg_8           = dword ptr  10h
.text:74834010                 mov     edi, edi
.text:74834012                 push    ebp




.text:7490221D           shr     ebx, 1
.text:7490221F           add     eax, ebx
.text:74902221           adc     edx, 0
.text:74902224           div     ecx
.text:74902226           shld    edx, eax, 10h
.text:7490222A           pop     ebx
.text:7490222B           pop     ebp
...
  eax=00000000 ebx=00000000 ecx=00000000 
  edx=00000000 esi=00138078 edi=00000001
  eip=74902224 esp=0167f6c0 ebp=0167f6c4 
  iopl=0         nv up ei pl zr na po nc
  cs=001b  ss=0023  ds=0023  es=0023  
  fs=003b  gs=0000  efl=00000246
Register dump
...
4D 54 68 64 00 00 00 06 00 01 00 0B 00 F0 4D 54   MThd.........ðMT















Figure 4-2: Crash analysis information for CVE-2010-0718
main module wmplayer.exe (out of total 84 modules loaded by the
program).1 The module quartz.dll crashes at the program location
0x74902224, instruction ‘div ecx‘. A set of benign inputs does not
reach this location.
In Step 1 of the approach we reconstruct the structure of a system
with static analysis and dynamically, by exploring the system with benign
input files. The result of this step is an incomplete program structure
incorporating module dependence and control flow information. Step 1
also selects benign inputs that trigger execution in the modules involved in
the crash. For CVE-2010-0718, Step 1 identifies a benign input that reaches
the crashing module at an entry point (internal function 0x74834010), but
does not reach the crash location. A fragment of the benign file is shown
in Figure 4-2.
In Step 2, we use concolic exploration as an apparatus for precise taint
1We refer to a module to denote an executable file (main module) and any library
it loads, while for the entry points of a module we consider both exported and internal
functions.
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tracking and identifying input fragments relevant to reaching the crashing
module. From these data we generate hybrid symbolic inputs that maintain
correct input file structure.2 For CVE-2010-0718, Step 2 collects a path
constraint with a symbolic version of the benign input. The path constraint
indicates symbolic bytes from the input file that are propagated to the
module entry point 0x74834010 (arrows between the path constraint and
the input file in Figure 4-2). These input portions are relevant to reaching
crashing module and we mark them symbolic in a hybrid symbolic file.
Generation of hybrid symbolic inputs addresses two main issues in
symbolic execution for real-world program binaries. First, hybrid
symbolic inputs prompt less constraint solving in concolic exploration and
result in smaller symbolic formulae. Second, exploration with structurally
correct hybrid inputs has higher chances of bypassing the parser
component that incorporates multitude of conditions that cause state
explosion in symbolic execution and prevent it from reaching deep
program paths.
In Step 3, we apply a targeted search strategy (second pass of concolic
execution) to explore the system in a directed fashion systematically
eliminating groups of paths from analysis and generate crashing input.
The strategy stems from the observation that groups of non-crashing
paths often have the same cause for which they do not crash the system.
The main intuition behind our strategy is that we can detect a reason
of infeasibility of a certain path and eliminate from consideration in
concolic execution groups of paths that do not crash for the same reason.
A contrived example of a shared cause for non-crashing paths is shown in
Figure 4-3. Paths through nodes highlighted in yellow (horizontal bars)
cannot crash the system because they are guarded by the condition (x>0)
2We refer to hybrid symbolic inputs as files containing fragments of symbolic and
concrete data, in contrast with fully symbolic files that contain only symbolic data.
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that does not satisfy the crashing condition (x<0 ∧ y!=0).
To detect the reason of infeasibility of non-crashing paths, we conjoin
the path constraint φ for a path that reaches crashing module with the
symbolic summary Σ of a crashing module with respect to crash location.
Intuitively, terms in path constraint φ that contradict terms in symbolic
summary Σ are the reasons of infeasibility of a complete path from program
























Figure 4-3: Schematic module dependence graph with paths to crashing
module highlighted
Practically, the conjoining of φ and Σ amounts to two steps. First, to
check the satisfiability of formula φ ∧ Σ. And second, if the formula is
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not satisfiable (the path does not crash the system), to extract a minimal
unsat core that contains contradicting terms T . The contradicting terms
correspond to the causes of the infeasibility of a given non-crashing path.
Our search algorithm keeps track of each term in path constraint
formula and corresponding program location the term is being
introduced. Consequently, a contradicting term indicates a point on a
program execution path to which our search algorithm proceeds to pursue
alternative paths and avoids executing paths that do not crash for the
same identified reason.
Crash reports often contain the values of program registers at the
moment of crash (register dump in Figure 4-2). A constraint on these
values is a crash condition. In case crash condition is available, we can
detect the reasons of infeasibility of a path with respect to specific crash
condition CC in the same way as described above, by extracting terms in
unsat core from an unsatisfiable formula φ ∧ Σ ∧ CC.
Depending on a type of a crash, crash conditions are easier or more
difficult to extract. For instance, crash due to division by zero could appear
in crash report as instruction ‘div ecx‘, where the value of ecx=00000000
as shown in Figure 4-2. Consequently crash condition is (ecx==0). Some
crash conditions can be less evident and require additional effort for being
captured as we discuss in Section 4.5.1.
4.3 Preprocessing and Generating Hybrid
Symbolic Files
The first two steps of our approach prepare information for the third step
– a targeted search for a crashing path (Section 4.4). In particular, the
first step resolves incomplete information about program binaries, while
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the second step generates a structurally correct hybrid symbolic input
(Figure 4-1).
4.3.1 Recovering Program Structure and Selecting
Seed Files
We statically analyze the system with IDA Pro toolset3
(https://www.hex-rays.com/idapro/) and use analysis results to
obtain a program control flow graph (CFG) and module dependence
graph (MDG) that we dynamically refine in the next steps of the
approach. The main sources of incompleteness in program binaries are
register indirect jumps and calls, and concealed library entry points
(non-exported functions). We process the output of IDA Pro and
statically resolve jump targets for switch statements, detect function
boundaries and statically imported entry-exit points for the modules in a
list of modules involved in a crash.
We execute the system with benign input files to augment the
statically collected information with dynamically imported entry and exit
points of the modules of the system, concrete targets for branches
dependent on indirect register jumps, and resolved register indirect call
targets. A resulting aggregated inter-procedural control flow graph
connects different modules of the system along the discovered module
entry-exit points.
We select seed files from a test suite according to their relevance to the
crash and the modules involved in the crashing behavior. The main criteria
for file selection are traces of system executions with test files and file
structure information. File structure information indicates which objects
in the file are required to exercise certain functionality of the system. We
3IDA is a state-of-the-art multi-processor disassembler and debugger
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aggregate the traces of system execution with the preselected test files and
obtain a histogram for selecting files that most extensively use modules
from ModuleList. We use the selected seed files in the next steps of the
approach as the most relevant to the crashing behavior.
4.3.2 Generating Hybrid Symbolic Inputs
We use concolic execution to detect fragments of inputs that are relevant
to reaching the crashing module – input fragments that propagate data
into the crashing module. Taint tracking using concolic execution precisely
associates the fragments of program inputs and affected program locations.
It is more accurate than “vanilla” taint analysis that traces program paths
affected by program inputs, however does not establish which parts of the
input are propagated to which program locations.
In concolic execution we apply random exploration strategy – upon
branching, the next path to explore is selected randomly, with an exception
that paths generated by string functions are selected from groups of paths as
detailed in Section 4.5.2. We automatically generate fully symbolic versions
of seed files identified in the previous step of the approach and we trace
the propagation of symbolic data from these files during concolic execution;
execution stops when it reaches CrashingModule.
Given a path that reaches crashing module, a path constraint contains
symbolic input bytes (taint sources) relevant for reaching this module.
Together with the knowledge of input file structure, this information
serves to automatically generate hybrid concolic input file that maintains
the original file layout.
We prevent random exploration from “drifting” outside modules in
ModuleList and dynamically refine CFG of the system extending it with
information from concolic exploration. Concolic exploration discovers new
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paths if it produces new concrete data to take these paths. In particular,
if concolic executor reaches register-indirect jump instruction
‘jmp [eax]‘ with a new concrete value in eax, then it may explore a
new path spanning from a new jump target. A maximum number of
resolved indirect jumps and calls is thus proportional to the number of
new paths we can explore with the concolic data. To prepare CFG for the
targeted search, we prune it with respect to crash location in crashing
module and with respect to exit points that connect modules in
ModuleList. A schematic module dependence graph with pruned paths is
shown in Figure 4-3, where pruned paths are marked with X.
4.4 Unsat-core Directed Search Strategy
In the third step of the approach we apply targeted concolic execution to
find crashing paths – program paths that crash the system in
CrashingModule. The targeted exploration works on a pruned version of
CFG and hybrid concolic inputs generated in the previous step of our
approach. The three phases of the exploration are: (1) replay,
(2) summarization, and a main phase – (3) targeted search. Figure 4-4
illustrates transitions between these phases schematically.
The targeted exploration starts by deterministically replaying one of the
observed paths to the crashing module with hybrid concolic input (replay).
Consecutive symbolic exploration symbolically summarizes the crashing
module from module entry point to the crashing location using symbolic
data propagated to the module from the program input (summarization).
Finally, a targeted search phase selects and traverses alternative program
paths in search for crashing paths.



















Figure 4-4: Phases of targeted exploration
respect to the crashing module summary and detects the reasons of
infeasibility of the non-crashing path as terms in the unsat core of the
conjunction of the path constraint and module summary. The algorithm
uses the program states that introduced the infeasibility reasons as
anchors to select alternative states to which to proceed. As a result, the
search is directed away from groups of infeasible paths. Search proceeds
until it finds a feasible crashing path or terminates after a user-specified
timeout or upon exhausting the memory.
4.4.1 Replay
Algorithm 1 outlines the key elements of each of the phases. The search
algorithm is general and can be implemented on top of any dynamic
symbolic executor. We illustrate the algorithm for a generic language
with instructions identified by their location l. For simplicity we
distinguish two types of instructions: (1) branches identified by branch(l)
predicate with branch condition cond(l), and (2) non-conditional
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instructions. The target location of a branch instruction is identified by
target(l), while for all instructions the next location is next(l).
Program state s is represented by a triple (l, φ,m), where l is a program
location, φ is a path constraint, and m is a symbolic store. Symbolic
store maps program variables to concrete values or expressions over input
variables. The initial program state is (l0, true,m), where l0 is a program
entry point, path constraint is set to true, and m is initialized with symbolic
variables for each program input variable.
Targeted exploration replays the path to one of the crashing module
entry points e ∈ E. Given a set of states Se (list of states for reaching e
from l0), the replay is a concolic exploration where upon branching the
states for execution are selected from Se (line 8). During replay the
searcher takes snapshots of the alternative states and stores them in a
map µ with constraints introduced in the executed state condition(s)
(line 9). Figure 4-4 schematically shows state s1 and its alternative state
s2 that the algorithm stores in the map µ. Replay terminates after
traversing all the states in Se in a state reaching entry point e of the
crashing module.
Note that in our implementation of the algorithm, Se list is lightweight.
It does not store the complete state representation as used by S2E, but
only the forking program locations.
4.4.2 Summarizing Crashing Module Symbolically
Upon reaching entry point of the crashing module, the algorithm
commences symbolic summarization (line 11, lines 28–44). The summary
is an aggregate of path constraints for each path reaching crash location
from the module entry point using symbolic data that is propagated to
the module entry point. Symbolic store m holds the propagated symbolic
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Algorithm 1 Targeted search
Input: l0 – initial location; χ – crash location; E – list of module entry points; Se –
list of states for reaching e ∈ E from l0;
// REPLAY PHASE:
1: s ← (l0, true,m) . Initialize current state
2: while Se 6= ∅ do
3: if ¬branch(l) then s ← (next(l), φ,m〈v, e〉)
4: if branch(l) then
5: if (SAT(cond(l) ∧ φ) ∧ SAT(¬cond(l) ∧ φ)) then
6: s1 ← (next(l), cond(l) ∧ φ,m)
7: s2 ← (target(l),¬cond(l) ∧ φ,m)
8: s ← {s1, s2} ∩ Se . Pick next state from Se
9: µ ← µ〈condition(s), ({s1, s2} \ s)〉 . Snapshot
10: Se ← Se \ s
11: Σ ← SymbSummary(s) . Location of the last state in Se is e
// MAIN PHASE:
12: X ← ∅
13: while ¬SAT(φ ∧ Σ) do
14: τ ← UNSAT CORE(φ ∧ Σ)
15: t ← pickTerm(τ, µ) . Pick contradicting term using strategy
16: X ← X ∪ {t}
17: s ← µ[t] . Select alternative state
18: while l /∈ E do . Until reached any of entry points
19: if ¬branch(l) then s ← (next(l), φ,m〈v, e〉)
20: if branch(l) then
21: if (SAT(cond(l) ∧ φ) ∧ SAT(¬cond(l) ∧ φ)) then
22: s1 ← (next(l), cond(l) ∧ φ,m)
23: s2 ← (target(l),¬cond(l) ∧ φ,m)
24: s ← pickNextState(s1, s2)
25: µ ← µ〈condition(s), ({s1, s2} \ s)〉 . Snapshot
26: if l /∈ Echecked then Σ ← SymbSummary(s)
27: OUT ← (φ, X) . We can continue search by proceeding to the remaining
alternative states from line 15.
// SUMMARIZATION
28: procedure SymbSummary(s) . Explore paths from s to χ
29: Require: location(s) ∈ E
30: Echecked ← Echecked ∪ location(s)
31: s ← (l, true,m) . Reset path constraint
32: W ← {s} . Initialize worklist
33: while W 6= ∅ ∨ timeout do
34: if ¬branch(l) then W ← W ∪ (next(l), ϕ,m〈v, e〉)
35: if branch(l) then
36: if (SAT(cond(l) ∧ ϕ) ∧ SAT(¬cond(l) ∧ ϕ)) then
37: W ← W ∪ (next(l), cond(l) ∧ ϕ, m)
38: W ← W ∪ (target(l), ¬cond(l) ∧ ϕ, m)
39: if l == χ then Σ ← Σ ∨ ϕ
40: W ← W \ s
41: s ← pickNextState(W )




data as expression over symbolic program inputs. The summary is
independent of the path constraint φ used for reaching the crashing
module and the corresponding path constraint is reset to true (line 31). A
module summary Σ is a disjunction of path constraints ϕi for each path
reaching crashing location χ from a given module entry point:
∨n
i=1 ϕi.
Summarization procedure uses the pruned CFG to inform selection of
the next states in symbolic exploration. States extending outside CFG
are not pursued as they do not reach crashing location. This is
implemented in procedure pickNextState() that uses CFG to select
successors for branching instructions (line 41). This way the algorithm
ensures selection of states for paths that reach crashing location.
The symbolic summary collected with our approach may be incomplete.
Symbolic data in symbolic execution can be injected only from the input
of the system – it is not be generated in the process of symbolic execution.
Concolic exploration may not reach the module with symbolic data for
all of its inputs, some of the inputs may be reached with concrete data
resulting in an incomplete summary.
Symbolic data may not reach the module for a number of reasons.
First, seed input files may be inadequate or deficient with respect to the
functionality of a crashing module, input file may lack data structures
that affect certain input of a crashing module. Second, an input of the
module may be independent of the program input. And third, a symbolic
input may be concretized during concolic execution and propagated to
the module input as a concrete data.
Given a crash condition CC, a module summary Σ is a precondition
with respect to reaching crashing location, where Σ(CrashingModule, CC)
is a logical formula over the module input which is true for all inputs that
cause crashing module to reach a final state satisfying CC. Since CFG of
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crashing module is pruned, module final state is in the crashing location
χ. The algorithm extends module summary Σ with crash condition CC in
the last step of summarization (line 42).
The summary Σ concisely captures a precondition for reaching crashing
location.
4.4.3 Searching for a Crashing Path
Targeted search phase starts from the point when concolic executor have
reached the crashing module in the replay phase and consequently
collected symbolic summary Σ of the module in the summarization phase.
Targeted search phase identifies program states that do not introduce
infeasible constraints in the paths reaching crashing module and directs
exploration through these states in the search for feasible crashing paths.
Provided that the initial path selected for reaching the crashing
module in the replay phase does not crash, the conjunction of path
constraint and symbolic summary φ ∧ Σ is unsatisfiable. To detect the
reasons of unsatisfiability the algorithm queries SMT solver for minimal
unsat core that contains a list of contradicting terms from both path
constraint φ and summary Σ. The algorithm extracts from unsat core a
list of terms τ (line 14). These terms correspond to the reasons for
infeasibility that originate from the specific program states on the path
reaching crashing module. In the schematic example in Figure 4-3 the
cause for the path infeasibility is located by the contradicting term (x>0)
from the path constraint.
To continue the search for a crashing path, the algorithm selects
alternative program states that do not introduce the identified
infeasibility reasons. The algorithm selects alternative states indicated by
the list of contradicting terms τ using the map of constraints and
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alternative state snapshots µ captured during replay phase. In particular,
a procedure pickTerm(τ, µ) selects one term t from the list τ and this
term is then used to query the map µ to select the alternative state
(lines 15–17).
In pickTerm(τ, µ) we select a term introduced in the top-most program
location and a corresponding alternative state. Such term represents a
general reason for infeasibility of multiple paths in a symbolic subtree and
thus, when selected, can dramatically reduce the search space. However,
some of the paths in that subtree may be feasible. For instance, in Figure 4-
3, a path that passes through a blue node (vertical bars) in the CFG is
feasible with respect to the crashing module summary.
Each iteration of the targeted exploration continues from the selected
alternative state until it reaches entry point of the crashing module with a
new path constraint φ.
The search algorithm can reach crashing module through an entry point
that it has not reached before (line 26). In this case the module summary
is recomputed to consider new paths to the crashing location, if they are
reachable from this entry point.
Algorithm 1 iterates until the formula φ ∧ Σ is satisfiable and hence
the crashing path is found. The output OUT of the targeted search
consists of a path constraint φ and a list of contradicting terms X used
for navigating the search. The path constraint φ can be solved to
generate a set of program inputs that exercise a particular crashing path.
The list of selected contradicting terms X serves as an additional
explanation for the crashing path highlighting the data and deviation
points (A1 and A2 in Figure 4-4) that are crucial for pursuing it.
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4.5 Tackling Limitations of Concolic
Execution
4.5.1 Synthesizing Crash Conditions for
Loop-controlled Crashes
To reproduce a crash our approach reaches a crash instruction and,
among other information, uses crash condition CC to direct the targeted
search and, ultimately, synthesize crashing input. In practice, however,
crash condition cannot be formulated symbolically in terms of symbolic
input of the program if concolic executor reaches crashing instruction
without symbolic data in the operands of the instruction. Previous
research demonstrated that this situation can be alleviated for
loop-dependent variables [94].
Hercules solves this problem by inferring a function over dependent
variables (operands of crash instruction) on a number of loop iterations.
This allows us to express the CC at the targeted crash instruction
through another condition CC ′ at the beginning of the controlling
loop(s). Saxena et al. used abstract interpretation and pattern matching
to infer the function [94]. In Hercules, we infer the function using data
fitting on runtime values in registers and memory locations during loop
exploration [44]. A similar idea has been successfully applied in the
context of segmented symbolic analysis to discover symbolic relationships
between program variables [69].
Figure 4-5 shows an example of loop-controlled crash instruction in a
crash module flvff.dll that causes a memory access violation in Real Player
due to an integer overflow vulnerability (CVE-2010-3000). In this example,
the crash function is iteratively called in a loop and the crash instruction
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...
0x61161745  mov ecx, esi
0x61161747  call ebx
0x61161749  add esi, [ebp + arg4]
0x6116174c  dec edi
0x6116174d  jnz loop
...
...
0x61161146  mov eax, ecx
0x61161148  xor ecx, ecx








Figure 4-5: Example of loop-dependent crash in Real Player
at 0x6116114a attempts to store data to the targeted memory address
that is calculated using the value of eax register. If the address is out
of bounds, the crash will occur. Hence, the CC in this example must be
expressed through symbolic data in eax as eax == eaxcrash, where the
eaxcrash value comes from the register dump in the crash report. However,
symbolic execution reaches the crash instruction with a concrete value in
eax preventing the approach from formulating a symbolic crash condition.
We apply inter-procedural data flow analysis to establish whether the
crash instruction is loop-controlled and, if so, to detect data dependencies
between the operands of the instruction and the variables within the loop.
In the example, we discover a data dependency between eax and ecx in
the crash function (‘mov eax, ecx‘ at 0x61161146) and between ecx and
esi in the call site (‘mov ecx, esi‘ at 0x61161745). Inside the loop, esi
is incremented by a concrete value (passed through a function argument)
at each iteration. The value of eax in crash instruction depends on the
value of esi register inside the loop and in turn, the value of esi depends
on the number of loop iterations.
Using data fitting, Hercules infers a relationship between esi and a
loop count it: esi = esi0 + it*0x23. In the example, the number of
loop iterations is controlled by the value of register edi that holds symbolic
data (instructions at 0x6116174c and 0x6116174d). In other words, the
value of eax in crash instruction is indirectly controlled by the symbolic
input data in edi.
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As a result, we transform the concrete constraint CC on eax at the
crash instruction to a symbolic constraint CC ′ on the value of edi before
the start of the loop. With this data we can synthesize crashing input by
solving the formula φ′ ∧CC ′, where φ′ is the path constraints to reach the
loop.
4.5.2 Path Grouping in String Manipulation
Functions
To avoid path explosion during concolic execution of real-world binaries our
approach tackles its most prevalent sources – loops and string manipulation
functions. To tackle path explosion in loops we bound a number of loop
iterations in which concolic executor forks new feasible states. Beyond the
bound the executor does not fork new states in a loop. Recent research
shows that bounding loop iterations is a practical and effective solution in
the context of symbolic execution [105].
String manipulation functions are more difficult to tackle than loops.
In essence these functions are sophisticated loops over string data that
are modelled with bit-vectors and processed as unbounded data causing
generation of infinitely many symbolic states. Yet, symbolic exploration
with string data is important, a large class of crashes in software is caused
by buffer- and heap-overflows when programs operate on string data.
We define a heuristic that leverages string length estimation and
approximation of standard string manipulation functions to help concolic
execution in generating states with realistic string data while reducing the
risk of path explosion. The intuition behind our heuristic comes from the
following observations: there are many concrete strings encoded in the
program code and thus many string length bounds can be obtained based
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on operations between symbolic and concrete strings. Moreover, there are
practical limitations on the size of strings such as function stack frame
size and input file layout that provide estimates of string lengths. Finally,
semantics of several standard string manipulation functions can be
abstracted to the level of groups of paths and inform symbolic execution.
For functions like strlen(sym) we bound concolic exploration in the
function according to the length estimate of a symbolic string parameter
sym that we gather dynamically from a number of sources. A length
estimate for strings allocated on stack should not exceed a current stack
frame size, while file layout and object boundaries (boundaries between
symbolic and concrete input data) indicate upper bounds for lengths of
strings derived from input file data.
For other standard string functions that operate on pairs of strings we
approximate these functions by mapping their few semantically different
high-level paths to a multitude of low-level paths. One example of groups
of high-level paths for a function stricmp(str1,str2) would be: (1)
strings are equal, (2) strings are equal length and differ in content, and
(3) strings differ in both length and content. These three groups map to
thousands of feasible low-level paths stemming from two reasons. First, in
LLVM based symbolic execution engine – S2E in our case – the string
function is converted to LLVM bitcode that has larger number of branch
instructions that in source code or binary. For stricmp(str1,str2)
function the number of branches in LLVM bitcode is 13 versus 3 in source
code. Second, the number of paths is also controlled by the number of
loop iterations that depends on the length of the input strings. We define
the high-level semantics of the string functions as a logical formula over
function input, output and properties of the input, such as length of a
string argument.
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To avoid path explosion, during concolic execution we bound the
exploration of these functions until paths from all semantically different
path groups are generated, while controlling the number of generated
paths. Consecutively, we prioritize groups of paths and select single paths
from each group for further concolic exploration. For instance, for
stricmp() function we give a higher priority to the path producing equal
strings which covers the highly relevant case.
An experimentation with Orbital Viewer case study (CVE-2010-0688)
highlights the degree of reduction in path numbers our technique achieves
for concolically exploring a standard string function. S2E with depth-
first search configuration would need to fork (213) ∗ 18 ≈ 150K paths to
fully concolically explore stricmp(str1,str2) function with one symbolic
string argument and one concrete string of length 18.
With our heuristic concolic executor only needs to explore 8K paths
to populate elements for three high-level groups of total 19 paths that we
keep: one path (strings are equal), one path (strings of equal length and
differ in content), and 17 paths (strings differ in both length and content).
Each path in the third group corresponds to the strings being unequal in
any of the first 17 characters. We only need to keep 19 paths to cover all
of the three high level paths of the stricmp(str1,str2) function, while
the remaining low-level paths can be removed from exploration. Overall,
we generate few paths that cover all high-level paths of a function in a
balanced way and produce realistic strings.
4.6 Implementation
Our approach Hercules builds upon and extends the selective symbolic



























Figure 4-6: Components of the Hercules toolset
components of our toolset. The main components of our system are built
as custom S2E plugins. In addition, Hercules provides tools for control
flow graph processing outside S2E and data flow analysis built on BAP.
4.6.1 CFG Refinement and Path Pruning
Functionality
Hercules implements analyses for post-processing the output of IDA Pro
toolset and obtaining the static and the dynamic program structure
information. We build CFG for each selected module of the system using
the static program structure information (direct jumps, direct calls, jump
tables) and the dynamic information (indirect register jumps and calls).
We refine the CFG whenever the dynamic program structure is updated,
while exploring the program under test in Steps 2 and 3 of our approach.
A PathPruner module implements a pruning algorithm similar to the
algorithm for computing “chop” by Brumley et al. [23]. PathPruner
indicates every path that does not lead to interesting targets in a module
dependency chain. In the crashing module, this tool will prune the paths
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that do not reach the crash location. The output of the tool will be used
as the input of a plugin EdgeKiller that will kill a S2E state in runtime if
it executes an undesirable path.
4.6.2 Extensions of the S2E Core
STP, the SMT solver in S2E, does not compute unsat cores. To get the
unsat core of a symbolic expression we integrate Z3 with S2E and pass
symbolic constraints between them in SMT2 format. Our framework
augments S2E to output symbolic formulae in SMT2 format and
implements a wrapper function to invoke Z3 solver from S2E.
Another S2E core update takes snapshots of S2E states in the targeted
search. We make snapshots of symbolic states at each branch location
during concolic execution to enable backtracking of concolic executor. This
functionality is implemented on top of cloning functionality of KLEE used
by S2E and our version supports state cloning at an arbitrary execution
point.
4.6.3 Analysis and Search Plugins
An ExecutionTracker plugin outputs important runtime information. It
handles signals emitted by S2E core plugin when it executes an instruction
or a basic block. In addition, it detects the Process ID of the program
under analysis to keep track of the information it produces and excludes
information produced by other programs that use shared libraries.
A DynamicCodeSelector plugin enables flexible runtime selection of
modules executed concolically (with forking enabled). The original S2E
CodeSelector plugin is less flexible and only supports static configuration
of a list of modules in which S2E selectively enables forking. Our
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TargetedSearcher plugin heavily relies on DynamicCodeSelector for
dynamically switching different search stages each having different
configurations of forking-enabled modules.
To synthesize crash conditions for loop-controlled crash instructions,
we have developed three components. First, ConditionSynthesizer is built
as S2E plugin. It outputs runtime values of all registers and updated
variables at each iteration inside the controlling loop. Second, a
light-weight data flow analysis is built on Binary Analysis Platform
(BAP) [24]. Its output supports user in selecting registers/variables
having relationship with a number of loop iterations. Third, a tool to
interface with the R statistical package to invoke its regression models
and infer function on dependent registers/variables and the number of
loop iterations [90]. Hercules infers functions for simple and nested loops
and covers three function forms – linear, polynomial, and exponential –
by using simple linear and multiple linear regression models with
logarithm and variable substitution transformations.
StringFunctionInterceptor controls the exploration inside string
functions. It intercepts every call to the list of standard string library
functions such as strlen, strcpy, strcmp, stricmp, strcat, strchr and
strstr using handling signals emitted by the FunctionMonitor plugin of
S2E (onFunctionCall and onFunctionRet signals). For each of the
functions we implement a special structure to define groups of
semantically distinct high-level paths (Section 4.5.2). Each group is
defined as a logical expression over function input, lengths of manipulated
strings and function output. Finally, the module dynamically extracts the
stack frame size of the caller to estimate string length bounds.
A TargetedSearcher plugin is a combination of the three searchers (1)
PathReplaySearcher, (2) SymbolicSummarization and (3)
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Table 4.1: Experimental setup and results
CVE IDs 2014-2671 2010-0718 2010-0688 2011-0502 2010-2204 2010-3000
Application WMP v9.0 WMP v9.0 OV v1.04 MAM v0.35 AR v9.2 RP SP 1.0
Selected /
total modules
4 / 84 3 / 86 2 / 49 1 / 51 2/78 2/129
Size of crash.
module
1.22 MB 1.22 MB 538 KB 368 KB 2.32 MB 60 KB
Test suite –
No. of files
10 15 10 10 5 6
Test suite – file
size
2–137K 2–54K 3–5K 2–5K 55–307K 87–654K
S2E (Random
search)
8 (>12 hr) 8 (>12 hr) 8 (>12 hr) 4 (2 min) 8 (>12 hr) 8 (>12 hr)
S2E (DFS
search)
8 (>12 hr) 8 (>12 hr) 8 (mem exh.) 8 (>12 hr) 8 (>12 hr) 8 (>12 hr)
PeachFuzzer 8 (>24 hr) 8 (>24 hr) 4 (10 hr) 4 (10 min) 8 (>24 hr) 8 (>24 hr)
Hercules 1 5 min 5 min 2 min 1 min 5 min 5 min
Hercules 2 45 min 90 min 120 min ∼0 sec 120 min 120 min
Hercules 3 4 (15 min) 4 (60 min) 4 (40 min) 4 (30 sec)* 4 (60 min)* 4 (45 min)
EntryPointTargetedSearcher. Each searcher implements the dedicated
phases of the targeted search algorithm defined in Section 4.4. The plugin
switches between the searchers in the process of concolic execution using
several signals emitted by the S2E Core plugin (onStateFork,
onStateSwitch, onExecuteInstruction) and signals from our custom
plugins. In particular, onStringFunctionStart and
onStringFunctionEnd signals generated by the StringFunctionInterceptor
plugin are used for state grouping and prioritization for string
manipulation functions. TargetedSearcher populates the groups of states
defined for each string function, prioritizes these states and removes
redundant ones.
A CrashDetector module detects application crash by tracking
Windows error reporting service invocation and calls S2E API to solve
path constraint and generate crashing input.
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4.7 Experimental Evaluation
We evaluated our approach experimentally on real-world application
binaries. In this section we present the results of the evaluation that
demonstrate that Hercules successfully reproduced six distinct crashes in
five applications: Adobe Reader (AR), Windows Media Player (WMP),
Real Player (RP), Orbital Viewer (OV) and Music Animation Machine
(MAM) Player. Table 4.1 summarizes the results for the effectiveness of
our approach as compared to the original S2E technique and widely used
industrial black-box fuzzing tool PeachFuzzer
(http://peachfuzzer.com). Hercules generated test inputs and
reproduced all six crashes, whereas baseline techniques failed or took
considerably more time to succeed.
4.7.1 Experimental Setup
We conducted all of the experiments on a computer with a 3.4 GHz Intel
Core i7-2600 CPU and 8 GB of RAM. The host OS is Ubuntu 12.04
64-bit. The guest OS are Windows 7 Enterprise 32-bit SP1 and
Windows XP 32-bit SP3. Our approach is implemented on S2E version
from May 2, 2014 obtained at https://github.com/dslab-epfl/s2e.
We used freeware IDA Pro 5.0 to disassemble binaries. In Table 4.1, case
studies marked with (*) have been tested on both Windows XP and
Windows 7.
The case studies cover vulnerabilities of the four prevalent types (buffer
overflow, integer overflow, memory access violation and division-by-zero)
from http://cve.mitre.org/ and operate on five distinct structured file
formats. For the OV case study we used a developer test suite obtained
at http://www.orbitals.com/orb/ov.htm. For the Adobe Reader case
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study, we used Microsoft Word 2010 to create pdf files with embedded
fonts. For the other four case studies, we obtained test suites on the Internet
from a random sample of benign files of an appropriate format. Table 4.1
highlights the test suite composition with numbers of benign files and their
variation in size. We enabled forking in a subset of modules indicated by
the crash reports as shown in Table 4.1.
The toolset was configured for a timeout after twelve hours of
exploration and run without parallelization of the execution process. For
Hercules, we have fixed a loop bound of three iterations and state timeout
of 30 seconds to prevent the exploration from “drifting” (Section 4.3).
Table 4.1 shows execution times for the CFG construction (Step 1 ),
concolic (Step 2 ) and the targeted (Step 3 ) exploration by Hercules as
per Figure 4-1 (correspondingly marked 1 , 2 , 3 in the table). For Step 1,
our automated scripts construct CFG from the output of IDA Pro within
few minutes. We used a practical time limit of two hours for exploration
in Step 2. For the five case studies (except CVE-2011-0502), Hercules
(Step 2 ) explored, resolved dynamic information and reached a crashing
module within two hours, while the case study on MAM (CVE-2011-0502)
did not require exploration phase to reach the crashing module. Finally, for
all the case studies targeted search (Step 3 ) reproduced the crashes within
an hour.
4.7.2 Reproducing Crashes
Our approach reached and reproduced crashes CVE-2014-2671 and
CVE-2010-0718 in Windows Media Player (Quartz library).
CVE-2014-2671 is a vulnerability in Windows Media Player version 9.
Attackers can exploit this vulnerability to cause a denial of service via a
crafted .wav file. CVE-2010-0718 is a buffer overflow vulnerability in
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Windows Media Player version 9. It allows attackers to cause a denial of
service via a crafted .mpg or .mid file that triggers a system crash due to
a divide-by-zero exception. Hercules successfully reproduced the two
crashes using the targeted search. In both cases, Hercules avoided state
explosion by bounding loop iterations, while no string function analysis
was required. Hercules reproduced CVE-2010-0718 using as little as 1%
of input data in symbolic form.
CVE-2010-0688 is a crucial stack-based overflow in Orbital Viewer, a
tool for visualization of atomic and molecular orbitals. By using a crafted
.orb or .ov file, attackers can trigger a system crash in Memory Access
Violation exception or execute arbitrary code. The vulnerability comes
from the code for reading data from input file using a known vulnerable
function fscanf. OV does not correctly check the data size before writing
it into stack buffers. The crash happens when the overwritten data section
is accessed by OV after a series of function calls, including calls to string
manipulation functions. Hercules successfully bridged the distance between
the location where crashing data is introduced and the crashing location
by leveraging our heuristic for exploring string functions (Section 4.5.2),
and reproduced the crash.
CVE-2011-0502 is a vulnerability in MAM MIDI Player that allows
attackers to easily cause a denial of service via a crafted .mid file that
crashes the program with a null pointer dereference. This is the most
“simple” case study in our experiments that Hercules reproduced within
30 seconds. Furthermore, Hercules does not require loop bounding nor
string function analysis to reproduce the crash.
CVE-2010-2204 is an vulnerability in Adobe Reader 9.0–9.3 that
allows attackers to cause a denial of service or execute arbitrary code.
CVE-2010-3000 is an integer overflow vulnerability in RealPlayer SP 1.0
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that allows attackers to execute arbitrary code. For both cases Hercules
can reach crash instructions by symbolically executing the programs with
benign inputs, however, the programs do not crash, because the crash
instructions are loop-controlled. With the loop-controlled crash condition
analysis (Section 4.5.1) Hercules can identify the loop and infer a
relationship between crash instructions and the controlling loops. As a
result, Hercules can successfully synthesize symbolic crash conditions on
the number of loop iterations and use them to reproduce both crashes.
4.7.3 Comparing with the Baseline
We demonstrate the effectiveness of Hercules by comparing it with the
baseline S2E and black-box fuzzing tool PeachFuzzer on the same six
case studies. We have run S2E with the input files that Hercules used to
successfully reproduce the crashes, while PeachFuzzer used all the files in
each test suite.
The results shown in Table 4.1 demonstrate that S2E can reproduce
the “simple” crash (CVE-2011-0502) and fails to reproduce the other ones.
Non-directed search of the baseline S2E prevents it from reaching relevant
program locations in a given time and state space constraints. When run
with a depth first search (DFS) exploration, S2E digs itself in a single
path, while for the OV case study (CVE-2010-0688) it gets path explosion
in string manipulation functions before reaching the crash location.
We run PeachFuzzer in a fully automatic setting with infinite
iterations of random mutation strategy and without user-provided data
model (input grammar specification) for up to 24 hours. PeachFuzzer
took substantially more time than Hercules to generate crashing inputs
for two case studies. Effectiveness of the fuzzing tool critically depends on
the results of manual analysis to provide it with a correct input grammar
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specification and indicate input portions that can and must be mutated,
and portions that need to be preserved.
4.8 Chapter Summary
In this chapter, we have presented the design and evaluation of our
Hercules approach for finding test inputs which can reproduce a given
crash. Our approach is based on symbolic execution and its distinctive
features include (i) working on binaries without source code and
encompassing techniques to construct the control-flow graph directly from
binaries in the presence of register-indirect jump instructions, (ii)
combining taint tracking and symbolic execution to find which parts of
the input file must be kept symbolic, and (iii) search strategies to direct a
path towards the crashing location by analyzing why the current path
being traversed by the search cannot reach the crash. Experiments on
real-world application binaries such as Windows Media Player and Adobe






Fuzzing for Program Binaries
Many real-world programs take highly structured and complex files as
inputs. The automated testing of such programs is non-trivial. If the test
does not adhere to a specific file format, the program returns a parser
error. For symbolic execution-based whitebox fuzzing the corresponding
error handling code becomes a significant time sink. Too much time is
spent in the parser exploring too many paths leading to trivial parser
errors. Naturally, the time is better spent exploring the functional part of
the program where failure with valid input exposes deep and real bugs in
the program.
In this chapter, we suggest to leverage information about the file
format and data chunks of existing, valid files to swiftly carry the
exploration beyond the parser code. We call our approach Model-based
Blackbox and Whitebox Fuzzing (MoBWF) because the file format input
model of blackbox fuzzers can be exploited as a constraint on the vast
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input space to rule out most invalid inputs during path exploration in
symbolic execution.
5.1 Introduction
Testing file-processing programs can be challenging. Even though a
structured file is stored as a vector of input bytes, it is often parsed as a
tree where data chunks contain fields and other data chunks.
Our key insight is that certain branches in a file-processing program are
exercised only depending on i) the presence of a specific data chunk, ii) a
specific value of a data field in a data chunk, or iii) the integrity of the data
chunks. Hence, an efficient test generation technique not only sets specific
values of the fields but also adds/removes complete chunks and establishes
their integrity (e.g., checksum or size).
Fuzzers help to test such file-processing programs. Model-based
blackbox fuzzers (MoBF) [9, 11] utilize input models to generate valid
random files. The input model specifies the format of the data chunks
and integrity constraints. However, while valid, the modification is still
inherently random. Whitebox fuzzers (WF) employ symbolic execution to
explore program paths more systematically. Given a valid file, they can
generate the specific values for the data fields quite comfortably.
However, when it comes to adding or deleting data chunks or enforcing
integrity constraints, they are bogged down by the large search space of
invalid inputs [102].
Grammar-based whitebox fuzzers (GWF) can generate files that are
valid w.r.t. a context-free grammar [49]. Like WF, GWF computes path
constraints: logical formulas that are satisfied only by new files exercising
alternative paths. Unlike WF, these constraints are converted into regular
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expressions such that a context-free constraint solver can generate an input
that is accepted by both, the grammar and the expression. However, the
expression is much weaker than the path constraint. Suppose, symbolic
execution yields the path constraint ϕ ∧ (x < y). After conversion, the
regular expression cannot capture that arithmetic constraint. Moreover,
GWF cannot encode integrity constraints such as size-of, offset-of, length-
of and checksums. These integrity checks are very common in several highly
structured file formats like PNG, PDF and WAV.
In this work, we present Closed-loop Model-based Blackbox and
Whitebox Fuzzing (MoBWF), an automated testing technique for
industrial-size program binaries that process structured inputs. MoBWF
is a marriage of model-based blackbox fuzzing and whitebox fuzzing that
generates valid files efficiently and exercises critical target locations
effectively. It is a directed path exploration technique that prunes from the
search space those paths that are exercised by invalid, malformed inputs:
(i) MoBWF uses information about the file format to explore those
branches that are exercised depending on the presence of specific chunks.
To this end, MoBWF removes the referenced chunk or adds a new valid
chunk by instantiation from the input model or a process we call data
chunk transplantation — MoBWF identifies the set of input bytes
corresponding to the required chunk in a donor file and transplants them
into the appropriate location of the receiving file. (ii) MoBWF employs
selective symbolic execution [35] to explore those branches that are
exercised depending on specific values of the data fields. (iii) Lastly,
MoBWF establishes the integrity of the generated files, repairing
checksums and offsets.
Unlike MoBF, MoBWF is directed and enumerates the specific values of
data fields more systematically. Unlike WF, MoBWF does not get bogged
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Figure 5-1: The structure and the hex code of a PNG file. A data chunk
is a section in the hex code embedding one piece of information about the
image. The hex code above the light-grey boxes identifies the data chunk
type while the hex code above the dark-grey boxes protects the correctness
of the data chunk (via checksum).
down by the large search space of invalid inputs or require any seed inputs
(cf. [46, 53]). Unlike GWF, MoBWF maintains full path constraints so
it has no impact on the soundness and completeness of WF. Moreover,
MoBWF leverages a more expressive yet simple input model to handle
integrity constraints.
The input model is used to generate valid files efficiently, enforce
integrity constraints, and facilitate the transplantation of data chunks.
Since it only prunes search space, the input model does not need to be
complete. On one hand, whitebox fuzzing eventually constructs all
relevant (semi-) valid files by exploring paths that are not pruned by the
input model. On the other hand, transplanting data chunks from donors
maintains underspecified integrity constraints, such as the concrete
compression algorithm with which the image data in a PNG file must be
encoded. An input model is constructed once and can be used across all
future testing sessions. It has been shown that input models can also be
derived in an automated fashion [70, 61, 60]. Each of our input models
was constructed manually in less than a day.
The two main challenges of Traditional Whitebox Fuzzing (TWF) that
we address are:
• Path Explosion. Parser code is often a complex part of a program.
In practice, TWF gets bogged down by an exponential number of
paths in the parser that are exercised by invalid inputs [102].
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• Seed Dependendence. Most TWF approaches assume the
existence of a seed file that features all necessary data chunks – it is
only a matter of setting the correct values for the data fields to
expose an error. In practice, however, this may not be the case.
Data chunks may be missing or in the wrong order. In other cases
no seed files may be available at all.
The main contributions of MoBWF are as follows.
• Pruning Invalid Paths. The input model allows to prune most
paths that are exercised by invalid inputs. As opposed to TWF,
MoBWF is capable of negating those crucial branches that are
exercised only in the presence of certain data chunks without having
to iteratively construct the data chunk by exploring the parser code.
All generated test inputs are valid in that they adhere to the input
model. Integrity constraints are enforced. Given a 24h time budget,
our MoBWF tool exposed all of thirteen vulnerabilities in our
experimental subjects while the TWF tool exposed only six.
• Reduced Seed Dependence. The instantiation from the input
model allows to construct seed inputs from scratch. Moreover, given
a seed input that is missing a data chunk to reach a target location,
MoBWF allows to utilize other seed files as donors, transplant the
missing data chunk, and construct a new seed input that is closer
to the target location. In the absence of a donor, the missing data
chunk can be directly instantiated from the input model. Out of the
thirteen vulnerabilities in our experimental subjects our MoBWF tool
exposed nine without any seed inputs.
• Fuzzing tool. We implement our MoBWF tool as an extension of
the TWF tool, Hercules [88]. We compare our MoBWF tool not
























































1. Add/Remove Chunks 2. Explore Data Fields
3. Use as next seeds
Crash Files
Figure 5-2: Closed-loop Model-based Blackbox and Whitebox Fuzzing.
Elements marked in grey are informed by the data model.
blackbox fuzzer [9]. Given a 24h time budget, our MoBWF tool
exposed all of 13 vulnerabilities in our experimental subjects while
the both Hercules and Peach tool exposed only six.
Insights. Through our experiments we also gain insights about the
relative strengths of our technique MoBWF, symbolic execution based
traditional whitebox fuzzing (TWF), and model-based blackbox fuzzing
(MoBF) as in fuzzers like Peach/Spike [9, 11]. TWF performs well only if
there exists a seed input that features all necessary data chunks and only
certain values for data fields need to be set. MoBF performs well if the
vulnerability is exposed by putting boundary values for certain data
fields, or by removing/adding empty data chunks. Deep vulnerabilities
that require specific values are best exposed by a symbolic
execution-based approach. MoBWF performs well even in the absence of
seed inputs and swiftly generates the specific values needed to expose
even deep vulnerabilities, while also gaining the capability to add and
remove complete data chunks as in MoBF.
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5.2 Motivating Example
We motivate MoBWF based on a real, serious vulnerability in a library
that is shipped with several browsers and media players. LibPNG [97] is
the official PNG reference library; it supports almost all PNG features, and
has been extensively tested for over 20 years. The library is integrated into
popular programs such as VLC media player, Google Chrome web brower
and Apple TV.
PNGs consist of four mandatory and fourteen optional types of data
chunks. For easy parsing and error detection the file format requires to
specify the size, type, and checksum of each data chunk besides the actual
data. The particular PNG file in Figure 5-1 happens to expose a memory
access violation vulnerability (OSVDB-95632) in VLC 2.0.7 [99] which uses
LibPNG 1.5.14. To trigger the bug, the image width defined in the IHDR
chunk must take a specific value (from 0x7FFFFFF2 to 0x7FFFFFFF) and the
optional tRNS chunk must exist. The tRNS chunk specifies alpha values
to control the transparency of pixels in the image.
Figure 5-1 partially shows structure of a file that exposes the bug. The
first eight bytes identify the file as PNG. The next four bytes specify the
size of the next data chunk (0xD = hex(13) bytes), followed by four bytes
identifying the type of the chunk as IHDR (light-grey box). The next 13
bytes are data fields specifying image width and height. This is followed
by four bytes of checksum protecting the correctness of the IHDR chunk
(dark-grey box). The remaining chunks are structured similarly. The image
data in the IDAT chunk is compressed using the DEFLATE compression
algorithm [3] and the end of the PNG file is indicated by IEND chunk.
Listing 5.1 shows the pertinent code in LibPNG. In each iteration,
png read info (lines 2-27) parses information about the current chunk,
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like its size and type. Depending on the type it calls the corresponding
function to handle the current chunk and validate the checksum.
 
1 // read chunks ’ info before first IDAT chunk
2 void png_read_info(png_structp ptr)
3 {




8 // get current chunk’s information
9 uint_32 length = read_chunk_header(ptr);
10 uint_32 chunk_name = ptr ->chunk_name;
11 // mandatory chunks
12 if (chunk_name == png_IHDR)
13 handle_IHDR(ptr , length);
14 else if (chunk_name == png_IEND)
15 handle_IEND(ptr , length);
16 else if (chunk_name == png_PLTE)
17 handle_PLTE(ptr , length);
18 else if (chunk_name == png_IDAT)
19 {
20 ptr ->idat_size = length;
21 break;
22 }
23 // optional chunks
24 else if ...
25 else if (chunk_name == png_tRNS)
26 handle_tRNS(ptr , length);




31 // initialize row buffer for reading data from file




36 buf_size = calculateBufSize(ptr);
37 ptr ->row_buf = png_malloc(ptr , buf_size);
38 png_memset(ptr ->row_buf , 0, ptr ->rowbytes);
39 } 
Listing 5.1: Simplified parser code for data chunks. The code is shown
to ease the explanation; MoBWF works directly with program binaries.
These handler functions parse a chunk’s data fields and store their values
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for further image transformation and processing steps. The chunks are
parsed until the first IDAT chunk is reached (lines 18-22). The file shown
in Figure 5-1 passes all checks in the parser and chunk-handling code and
is therefore valid.
When all other chunks have been parsed, LibPNG starts reading pixel
data from IDAT chunks. For each image row, LibPNG allocates and
initializes a buffer (lines 31-38 in png read start row). This is the faulty
function. Specifically, the existence of tRNS chunk and the improper
validation of large image width leads to an integer overflow while LibPNG
is calculating buffer size for each row (as simplified in calculateBufSize at
line 35). Because of that the allocated buffer is much smaller than
required (line 36). As a consequence, a buffer overflow occurs in
png memset causing the program to crash. Notice that the third
argument for the function call memset (ptr→rowbytes) is much larger
than the size of the buffer.
5.2.1 Exposing Vulnerabilities
Traditional Whitebox Fuzzing
Given a benign PNG file having the required data chunks in Figure 5-1 and
the dangerous location in png memset, a Whitebox Fuzzing (TWF) tool can
automatically generate an input that exposes the vulnerability. However,
suppose the benign file is missing the tRNS chunk, it will be an obstacle
for TWF because it is very unlikely that TWF can correctly synthesize the
missing chunk and keep the file valid. In fact, if there is no tRNS chunk,
the true branch of the if-statement in line 25 of Listing 5.1 is not taken.
Although TWF can negate the branch and get a chunk with the name
“tRNS”, its size and content still adheres to specification of another chunk.
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Where LibPNG expects the size, data, and checksum of the new tRNS
chunk, it only finds “random noise”. So, TWF overrides perfectly encoded
image data only to spend substantial time constructing a valid tRNS chunk
in its place. Since IDAT chunk is compulsory, TWF spends even more time
navigating the space of invalid inputs to construct another IDAT chunk
until it finally constructed a valid file that contains a valid tRNS chunk
and all compulsory chunks where all integrity constraints are satisfied.
Model-based Blackbox and Whitebox Fuzzing
We propose MoBWF as a marriage of model-based backbox fuzzing and
whitebox fuzzing. The model-based approach allows MoBWF to cover the
search space of valid test inputs efficiently while the whitebox approach
in detail covers each subdomain more effectively. Both approaches are
integrated in a feedback loop that is described in Figure 5-2.
Setup. In this example, the user provides the buggy VLC binary, a
crash report, a set of existing benign PNG files (if available) and a PNG
model as shown in Listing 5.2. To implement MoBWF, we leverage a
model-based blackbox fuzzer. The Peach framework allows to specify a file
format as Peach Pit [10]. It describes the types of and relationships (size,
count, offsets) between data chunks and fields. It also supports fixups and
transformers. Fixups allow to repair related data fields, such as checksums.
Transformers are used for encoding, decoding and compression.
The PNG Peach Pit in Listing 5.2 first specifies the generic data chunk
(lines 1-14). PNG chunks all contain at least three data fields, specifying
the length, type, and checksum of the data chunk. The other data chunks
inherit these attributes (lines 15-31), fix the chunk type as enumerable
(IHDR, PLTE, tRNS, ..), and add further data fields. The whole PNG
file is specified last (lines 32-42). It starts with a specific magic number
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(Signature for PNG files), followed by a header chunk (IHDR) and upto
30,000 chunks (in flexible order) before ending up with an IEND chunk.
 
1 <DataModel name="Chunk">
2 <Number name="Length" size="32" >
3 <Relation type="size" of="Data" />
4 </Number >
5 <Block name="TypeData">
6 <Blob name="Type" length="4" />
7 <Blob name="Data" />
8 </Block >
9 <Number name="crc" size="32" >
10 <Fixup class="Crc32Fixup">




15 <DataModel name="Chunk_IHDR" ref="Chunk">
16 <Block name="TypeData">
17 <String name="Type" value="IHDR" />
18 <Block name="Data">
19 <Number name="width" size="32" />






26 <DataModel name="Chunk_tRNS" ref="Chunk">
27 <Block name="TypeData">
28 <String name="Type" value="tRNS" />




33 <Number name="Sig" value="89504e..." />
34 <Block name="IHDR" ref="Chunk_IHDR"/>
35 <Choice name="Chunks" maxOccurs="30000">
36 <Block name="PLTE" ref="Chunk_PLTE"/>
37 ...
38 <Block name="tRNS" ref="Chunk_tRNS"/>
39 <Block name="IDAT" ref="Chunk_IDAT"/>
40 </Choice >
41 <Block name="IEND" ref="Chunk_IEND"/>
42 </DataModel > 
Listing 5.2: PNG input model as Peach Pit
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Given the setup, to generate the crashing input in the motivating
example, MoBWF manages to (i) insert a tRNS chunk into proper
position in a benign PNG file, (ii) explore the paths affected by the
existence of tRNS towards crash location, and (iii) generate specific value
for the image width data field in IHDR chunk. This is achieved in four
steps.
Step 1. Seed selection and file cracking. As shown in Figure 5-2,
MoBWF first selects as initial input that file which is closest to a
potential crash location. All other PNG files are considered donors,
disassembled by the file cracker and added to the fragment pool. File
fragments can be transplanted into input files as needed. If no initial files
are provided, MoBWF instantiates the initial input from the input model.
Then, MoBWF marks as symbolic all data fields which the user specified
as “modifiable”. Only modifieable data fields are considered for the
fuzzing. In this example, all data fields (e.g., image width) are marked as
modifiable except for the chunk’s checksum and size. The resulting hybrid
symbolic PNG file (i.e., some parts are symbolic where others are
concrete) is then executed concolically by a traditional whitebox fuzzer.
Step 2. Adding and removing data chunks. Certain branches in a
file-processing program are exercised only if a certain data chunk is
absent or present. To exercise these branches during path exploration,
MoBWF removes the specific chunk or adds a new one. First, in the
execution of a given file f , MoBWF identifies those crucial if-statements
(ifs) by their dependence on a data field in f of enumerable type. In
Listing 5.1, the ifs in lines 11–26 can be considered crucial while none of
the those inside the handle **** functions are. In our experiments, we
observe that such enumerables do often uniquely identify a data chunk’s
type. First, MoBWF identifies the input bytes in f that influence the
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outcome of executed branch predicates using classical taint analysis. In
our example, MoBWF determines the relationship between the input
bytes above the grey boxes in Figure 5-1 and the ifs in Listing 5.1. Then,
MoBWF learns the type of the referenced data field using the input
model. Finally, if the data field is of enumerable type and the if is not
already executed in both directions, then the if is considered crucial and
MoBWF removes the corresponding data chunk or adds a new one
through transplantation or instantiation from the input model.
Once MoBWF identifies the type corresponding to the data chunk
being removed or added, the file stitcher coordinates the data chunk
transplantation. First, the stitcher searches the fragment pool for
candidate data chunks that are allowed (according to the input model) to
be put at the same level as the chosen chunk in the current seed file f .
Finally, the file sticher uses the input model to identify the set of input
bytes corresponding to each candidate data chunk in the pool and
transplants them into the appropriate location of the receiving file f to
generate a number of new seed files, one for each chunk. For our example,
in what follows we assume that the candidate containing the tRNS chunk
is chosen next.
Step 3. Changing data fields in inserted data chunk. Other
branches in a file-processing program are exercised only if specific values
are set in the chunks’ data fields. In our example, the vulnerability is
exposed only when the image width is in a range of certain values. To
exercise these branches by finding the specific values is the strength of
whitebox fuzzing. Selective symbolic execution explores the local search
space of semi-valid inputs starting from the negated crucial branch. This
local search is very efficient when compared to classical TWF. During
exploration, any integrity check is identified and ignored. The potentially
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invalid files are later fixed during the file repair. Once the target location
is reached, the whitebox fuzzer checks the satisfiability of the conjunction
of path constraint and crash condition (inferred from the given crash
report or provided as output of static analysis tool). If the conjunction is
satisfiable, the whitebox fuzzer generates a crashing input. Otherwise, it
uses the unsatisfiable core to guide the path exploration towards the
crash location and does the check again.
Step 4. Repeat. Data chunks can be nested in certain file formats
(such as WAV). Thus, MoBWF uses the generated files as new seeds to
continue the next iteration starting from Step 1. From the augmented
seeds (initial seeds + new seeds), MoBWF selects a file which is closest to
the crash location and moves to next steps. MoBWF executes selected file,
identifies crucial if-statements, transplants data chunks and continues path
explorations.
Summary. In this motivating example, MoBWF follows these four steps.
During concolic execution, it identifies line 25 (Listing 5.1) as crucial if-
statement. From the input model, the file stitcher infers that a tRNS
chunk is a candidate for transplantation and it is allowed after PLTE and
before the IDAT chunk. So, file stitcher transplants a tRNS chunk from
the fragment pool or directly instantiates a minimal tRNS chunk from
the input model and places it right before IDAT chunk. As a result, the
true branch of the if-statement in line 25 is taken and the tRNS chunk is
parsed before doing further processing. Once the crash location is reached,
the image-width dependent crash condition is checked and a PNG file is
produced. The resulting file is still invalid because the new value of image
width invalidates the checksum of IHDR chunk. So, the file repair tool fixes
the checksum and the vulnerability is exposed.
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5.3 Model-based Black-box and White-box
Fuzz Testing
Algorithm 2 gives an overview of the procedure of MoBWF. It takes a
program P , an input model M, a set of target locations L in P , and seed
inputs T . The objective of Algorithm 2 is to generate valid (crashing) files
that exercise L. If no target is provided, MoBWF uses static analysis to
identify dangerous locations in the program, such as locations for
potential null pointer dereferences or divisions by zero (line 1-2). The
algorithm uses the provided test cases T as seed inputs for the test
generation. However, if no seed file is provided, MoBWF leverages the
input model M to instantiate a seed file (lines 3-5).
Algorithm 2 Model-based Blackbox and Whitebox Fuzzing
Input: Program P , Input Model M
Input: Initial Test Suite T , Targets L
Output: Augmented Test Suite T ′
1: if L = ∅ then
2: L← identifyCriticalLocations(P)
3: if T = ∅ then
4: t← instantiateAsValidInput(M)
5: T ← {t}
6: while timeout not exceeded do
7: Target location l← chooseTarget(L)
8: Input file t← chooseBest(T, l)
9: Fragment Pool Φ← fileCracker(T,M)
10: Crucial ifs Λ← detectCrucialIFS(t, l,P ,M)
11: for all λ ∈ Λ do
12: Valid files Tλ ← fileStitcher(t, λ,Φ,M)
13: for all tλ ∈ Tλ that negate λ do
14: Hybrid file tˆλ ←markSymbolicVars(tλ,M)
15: Files F ← pathExploration(tˆλ, λ, l, L,P)
16: for all f ∈ F do
17: Valid file f ′ ← fileRepair(f,M)
18: T ← T ∪ f ′
19: T ′ ← T
The main loop of Algorithm 2 is shown in lines 6-18. First, MoBWF
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chooses the next target location l. If MoBWF works in crash reproduction
mode, l is the known crash location extracted from the given crash report.
Otherwise, l is picked if its average distance to all seed inputs in T is
smallest. The distance between an input t and a program location l is
specified in Definition 1. Second, MoBWF chooses the next seed file t
according to a search strategy that seeks to generate the next input with
a reduced distance to l (line 8). The remaining seed files are sent to the
file cracker to construct the fragment pool Φ in line 9. The fragment pool
takes a central role during data chunk transplantation.
Definition 1 (Input Distance to Location). Given an input t, a program
P and a program location l in P. Let Ω(t) be the set of nodes in the Control
Flow Graph (CFG) of P that are exercised by t. The distance δ(t, l) from
t to l is the number of nodes on the shortest path from any b ∈ Ω(t) to l.
Next, Algorithm 2 executes t on P to determine crucial ifs Λ
(line 10). As specified in Definition 2, a crucial if is evaluated in different
directions only depending on the type of the data chunks present in t.
Our implementation leverages M to identify crucial ifs by their
dependence on a data field in t of enumerable type. We observed that
such enumerables do often uniquely identify a data chunk’s type. Note
that we ignore executed ifs negating which does not reduce the distance
to the target location l.
Definition 2 (Crucial IF-statement). Given input t for program P and a
target location l in P, an if-statement b in P is crucial if
1) the statement b is executed by t in P,
2) only one direction of b has been taken,
3) the negation of the branch condition at b reduces the distance to l, and
4) let ϕ(b) be the branch condition at b; the outcome of ϕ(b) depends on a
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field in t that specifies the chunk’s type.
For each crucial if λ thus identified, Algorithm 2 employs the file
stitcher to negate λ’s branch condition (lines 11-12). For each stitched file
tλ that successfully negates λ, the algorithm executes selective symbolic
execution followed by file repair to fine-tune the specific values of the data
chunks and reduce the distance to l (lines 13-18). More specifically, it
marks all modifiable data fields in tλ as symbolic and starts the directed
path exploration (lines 14-15). During path exploration, MoBWF does
not collect integrity checks as branch constraints. For instance, a
checksum check might not allow to change a data field which would
otherwise lead to reducing the distance to L (cf. TaintScope [101]). Such
integrity constraints are repaired in line 17. Whenever a potential
dangerous location in L is reached, MoBWF checks if the crash condition
is satisfied and generates a crashing test case accordingly.
5.3.1 Directed Model-based Search
In order to generate inputs that expose vulnerabilities, MoBWF uses the
initial seed inputs T to reduce the distance to the provided or identified
critical location l until it is reached and the crash condition is satisfied.
Critical Locations. If no targets L are provided to the algorithm,
MoBWF identifies critical locations in the program P . A critical location
is a program location that may expose a vulnerability if exercised by an
appropriate input. There are several methods to identify such critical
locations [45, 101]. In our implementation, we use IDAPro [7] to
dissamble the program binary P and perform some lightweight analysis to
identify instructions that conform to the patterns shown in Listing 5.3.
These patterns partially cover program instructions that may trigger
divide-by-zero and null-pointer dereference vulnerabilities. Specifically, we
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focus on division and memory move instructions taking registers or stack
arguments as operands. For those instructions, the crash condition is
obvious. Once a critical location is reached during concolic exploration,
we just check whether the value of register/stack argument is zero (in
case it is concrete) or can be zero (in case it is symbolic). 
div register
div [ebp + argument_offset]
mov operand , [register]
mov operand , [ebp + argument_offset]
mov [register], operand
mov [ebp + argument_offset], operand 
Listing 5.3: Crash instruction templates
Model-based Search. To generate input that reduces the distance
to l, MoBWF first chooses the seed input t with the least distance to l
and then identifies the executed crucial ifs Λ (lines 8, 10 in Alg. 2). The
task of the subsequent data chunk transplantation and instantiation will
be to generate valid inputs that negate the branch conditions of Λ. While
other implementations are possible, we decided to implement a hill climbing
algorithm. Our implementation of chooseBest selects the input file t ∈ T
such that for selected location l ∈ L we have that the distance from t to l
is minimal. To detect crucial branches Λ, MoBWF first determines, using
taint analysis, those input bytes in t that may impact the outcome of some
b ∈ Ω(t). We recall that Ω(t) is the set of nodes in the CFG of program P
which are exercised by t. In our implementation of detectCrucialIFS,
we leverage those capabilities in a symbolic execution tool, Hercules. Next,
MoBWF uses the CFG to compute the number of nodes on the shortest
path between b and location l ∈ L. The negation of ϕ(b) may reduce the
distance to l only if b is in static backward slice of l and the branch b′
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immediately following b does not have a smaller number of nodes on the
shortest path between b′ and l. Lastly, MoBWF uses M to determine the
data field corresponding to the identified input bytes and whether the data
field specifies the chunk’s type. If all conditions specified in Definition 2
are met, then b is marked as a crucial if and added to Λ.
5.3.2 Transplantation, Instantiation, and Repair
File Cracker. “File cracking” refers to the process of interpreting valid
files according to a provided input model (i.e., the Peach Pit file). Given
the input model M and a valid file t ∈ T , the fileCracker identifies all
data chunks and their data fields in t. In model-based blackbox fuzzers like
Peach Fuzzer [9], the valid input files are cracked and fuzzed independently.
However, in MoBWF we crack all files and place their data components
inside a fragment pool. As a result, we can consider all files (and even the
input model) as donors for data transplantation. By doing that, MoBWF
can generate more (semi) valid files and improve coverage.
File Stitcher. Given a valid file t and the crucial if λ, the objective
of fileStitcher is to negate ϕ(λ) and reduce the distance to l by
adding or removing chunks from t. First, the stitcher has to determine
the chunk c in t that should be removed or before which a different chunk
should be added in order to negate ϕ(λ). Chunk c was memorized
previously when determining that the outcome of λ depends on the data
field specifying c’s type. Second, the stitcher generates a new file by
removing c from t if allowed according to M. Third, for each chunk type
C that is allowed before c in t:
i) Transplantation. If there exists a chunk c′ of type C in the pool Φ, copy
the input bytes corresponding to c′ from the donor file to the position
before c in the receiving file t.
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ii) Instantiation. Otherwise, use the specification of C in M as a template
to generate the bytes for c′ before c in t. All files thus generated that
actually negate λ will be used for the subsequent selective symbolic
execution stage.
File Repair. Given a file f and the input model M, the file repair
tool re-establishes the integrity of the file. Our implementation utilizes the
fixup and transformers that can be specified inM in the Peach framework.
5.3.3 Selective and Targeted Symbolic Execution
We reuse the targeted search strategy for symbolic exploration implemented
in Hercules [88]. Basically, to mitigate the path explosion problem, it
enables fully symbolic reasoning only in some selected modules of interest
(i.e., executable binaries like .exe and .dll files). The list of selected modules
can be inferred from the target module TM, which contains the selected
target location, and a so-called Module Dependency Graph (MDG). The
MDG is constructed by running the program under test with benign inputs
and collecting the control transfer between program modules. Using the
constructed MDG, TM and all modules on paths from entry module (main
program) to TM are selected to explore in fully symbolic execution mode.
The search strategy of Hercules is targeted in the sense that it
explores program paths towards a target location (critical locations like
crashing one) by pruning irrelevant paths. Moreover, Hercules leverages
the unsatisfiable core produced by a theory prover like Z3 [40] to guide
the exploration.
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5.3.4 Handling Incomplete Memory Modeling
The memory models of symbolic execution engines, like Hercules, KLEE
or S2E [88, 28, 35], do not support memory allocation with symbolic size.
If a symbolic size is given, it is concretized before allocating heap memory.
The concretization mechanism could prevent us from exposing heap buffer
overflow vulnerabilities. Suppose in the motivating example the image
width of the benign PNG file is very small, say 1, and it is marked as
symbolic. In the processing code, LibPNG needs to allocate a heap buffer
having symbolic size that depends on width (and other symbolic variables).
When the buffer is allocated, width is bound in PC by the constraint on
concretized value for allocated buffer size.
Once the crash location (e.g., the instruction accessing the allocated
heap buffer) is reached, Hercules checks the satisfiablity of the
conjunction between the current path constraint PC and the crash
condition CC. Suppose that to satisfy the crash condition, the image
width must be large enough. For the current file with the small image
width, the crash condition CC could contradict the path constraint PC;
PC ∧ CC is unsatisfiable. Usually, based on the unsatisfiable core1 of
PC ∧ CC, Hercules find a set of branches that can be negated to explore
neighboring paths along which the crash condition CC may be satisfiable.
However, since width is already bound, there exists no alternative path
along which the crash condition CC can be satisfied.
In our extension of Hercules, we leverage recent advances in maximal
satisfication with Z3 (MaxSMT)[19, 40]. MaxSMT allows us to select a
subset of constraints which is not required to be satisfied as “soft
constraints” while the remaining constrains (which need to be satisfied)
1Given an unsatisfiable Boolean propositional formula in conjunctive normal form, a
minimal subset of clauses whose conjunction is still unsatisfiable is called an unsatisfiable
core of the original formula.
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are implicitly marked as “hard constraints”. Specifically, in our case we
set all constraints in CC as hard constraints while specifying e.g.,
constraints due to memory allocation in PC as soft constraints. To
identify which constraints in PC can be soft, first we check whether the
conjunction PC ∧ CC is unsatisfiable. If so, we extract all symbolic
variables in CC. Thereafter, we iterate through all constraints in PC and
consider them as soft constraints accordingly if they contain any symbolic
variable from CC. After all these steps, we get PC ′, the updated PC,
and we send another query to MaxSMT solver to check the maximum
satisfiability of PC ′ ∧ CC. If PC ′ ∧ CC is satisfiable (by possibly making
one or more soft constraints in PC ′ as false) – we generate a input file as
the solution to the constraints. As an additional confirmation, we validate
the generated file by feeding it to the program binary and checking
















Input Model Manipulation Enhanced Whitebox Fuzzing
Figure 5-3: Components of our MoBWF tool
Our MoBWF tool is based on several third-party tools and libraries.
We implemented our technique into the Hercules [88] directed symbolic
execution engine which itself leverages S2E [35] and the Z3 [40] satisfiability
modulo theory constraint solver. We also improved the accuracy of the
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taint analysis that is implemented in Hercules. IDAPro [7] and the Intel
Dynamic Binary Instrumentation Tool [79] (or PIN tool) were used for
static analysis to find dangerous locations in the program code executing
The PIN tools were also used i) for instruction profiling to generate the
execution trace and compute the distance of the current seed input to
the dangerous locations, and ii) for branch profiling to determine which
crucial branches are explored. The framework around the Peach model-
based blackbox fuzzer [9] allowed us to implement the input model-based
components such as File cracker, File Stitcher and File Repair. In fact, the
first was modified for our purposes and the latter two were implemented
from scratch, for instance, to support data chunk transplantation.
5.5 Experimental Evaluation
We evaluated our MoBWF technique experimentally to answer the
following research questions.
• RQ.1 How many vulnerabilities are exposed by MoBWF compared
to Traditional Whitebox Fuzzing (TWF)?
• RQ.2 How many vulnerabilities are exposed by MoBWF compared
to Model-based Blackbox Fuzzing (MoBF)?
• RQ.3 How many vulnerabilities are exposed by MoBWF if no initial
seed inputs are available?
Each technique was evaluated with a 24 hour time budget.
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Program Version Buggymodule Size Errors
Video Lan Client 2.0.7 libpng.dll 184 KB 1
Video Lan Client 2.0.3 libpng.dll 182 KB 1
Libpng Test Program 1.5.4 libpng.dll 176 KB 1
XnView 1.98 XnView.exe 4.46 MB 0 + 3
Adobe Reader 9.2 cooltype.dll 2.32 MB 1
Windows Media Player 9.0 quartz.dll 1.22 MB 2 + 1
Real Player SP 1.0 realplay.exe 60 KB 1
MIDI Player 0.35 mamplayer.exe 336 KB 1
Orbital Viewer 1.04 ov.exe 538 KB 1
Total: 9 + 4
Table 5.1: Subject Programs
5.5.1 Experimental Setup
Subjects
We selected our subjects from a pool of well-known program binaries of
video players, document readers, music players, and image editors – which
take a variety of complex file formats. Since Hercules serves as a base line
technique, we also added all five subjects on which Hercules was
evaluated originally [88] (shown with grey background). We also took the
categories of vulnerabilities into consideration. As shown in Table 5.1, we
chose eight distinct real-world applications (some with different versions):
Adobe Reader (AR)2, Video Lan Client (VLC)3, Windows Media Player
(WMP), Real Player (RP)4 and Music Animation Machine MIDI Player
(MP)5, XnView (XNV)6, LibPNG (LTP)7 and Orbital Viewer (OV)8.
Table 5.1 shows not only the subjects and their versions but also the
target buggy modules and their respective sizes. In addition, it features









case (XnView), we started without any known vulnerabilities and looked
for unknown ones. In other cases, although we targeted the known
vulnerabilities, we managed to discover new ones. Indeed, our MoBWF
tool reproduced successfully all 9 known errors and discovered 4 unknown
errors – 3 in XnView and 1 in Windows Media Player (See Section 5.5.2).
Input Modeling
To define input models of five file formats (PDF, PNG, MIDI, FLV and
ORB) from scratch, we utilized the modeling language of the Peach model-
based blackbox fuzzer. We augmented the input model for WAV files which
is provided freely by Peach Fuzzer. In particular, we modeled one common
image file (PNG), three audio and video files (MIDI, WAV and FLV), one
portable document file (PDF) and one geometry file (ORB). In Table 5.2,
we report the size of the input models which are relatively small – ranging
from 4 KB to 14 KB. It took us less than a day to write each model for a
file format.
Format Size Time spent #Files Average size
PDF 4.5 KB 12 hours 10 200 KB
PNG 8.3 KB 4 hours 10 55 KB
MIDI 13.9 KB 4 hours 10 20 KB
FLV 6.0 KB 4 hours 10 300 KB
ORB 6.0 KB 8 hours 10 4 KB
WAV∗ 7.5 KB 2 hours 10 260 KB
Table 5.2: Information on the Input Models
Initial seed files selection
To select the initial seed files, we randomly downloaded 10 files of the
corresponding format from the Internet, except ORB and PNG initial seed
files. The ORB files were downloaded from software vendor’s website9 while
9http://www.orbitals.com/orb/ov.htm
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PNG files were downloaded from the Schaik online test suite.10 The average
size of seed files in each test suite is shown in the fifth column of Table 5.2.
Infrastructure
We evaluated three tools, our MoBWF tool, the Hercules Traditional
Whitebox Fuzzer (TWF) and the Peach Model-based Blackbox Fuzzer
(MoBF). For the experiments, we used the community version of Peach
Fuzzer which is provided with its source code.11 Both model-based
techniques used the same input models. All subject programs were run on
Windows XP 32-bit SP 3. For each program, each tool was configured for
a timeout after 24 hours of execution. We conducted all experiments on a
computer with a 3.6 GHz Intel Core i7-4790 CPU and 16 GB of RAM.
5.5.2 Results and Analysis
Program Advisory ID Model Files MoBWF MoBF TWF
VLC 2.0.7 OSVDB-95632 PNG 10 4 8 8
VLC 2.0.3 CVE-2012-5470 PNG 10 4 8 8
LTP 1.5.4 CVE-2011-3328 PNG 10 4 8 8
XNV 1.98 Unknown-1 PNG 10 4 4 8
XNV 1.98 Unknown-2 PNG 10 4 4 8
XNV 1.98 Unknown-3 PNG 10 4 4 8
WMP 9.0 Unknown-4 WAV 10 4 4 8
WMP 9.0 CVE-2014-2671 WAV 10 4 8 4
WMP 9.0 CVE-2010-0718 MIDI 10 4 8 4
AR 9.2 CVE-2010-2204 PDF 10 4 8 4
RP 1.0 CVE-2010-3000 FLV 10 4 8 4
MP 0.35 CVE-2011-0502 MIDI 10 4 4 4
OV 1.04 CVE-2010-0688 ORB 10 4 4 4
Table 5.3: The vulnerabilities exposed by our MoBWF tool, the Hercules
TWF, and the Peach MoBF. Vulnerabilities from the Hercules benchmark
are marked as grey.




finding unknown ones of the three compared techniques. Overall, in the
experiments our MoBWF tool outperforms both Hercules and Peach.
While our MoBWF tool successfully generated 13 crash-inducing inputs,
neither Hercules nor Peach can produce half of them . Furthermore, our
MoBWF tool also found potential unknown vulnerabilities in Windows
Media Player and XnView. Indeed, these vulnerabilities have previously
not been reported at MITRE12, OSVDB13 or Exploit-DB.14. In addition,
the power of our MoBWF tool is also demonstrated by its ability to
expose different types of vulnerabilities including integer and buffer
overflows, null pointer dereference and divide-by-zero. In the following
sections, we have an in-depth analysis to answer the three research
questions about the effectiveness and sensitivity of our approach.
RQ.1 Versus Traditional Whitebox Fuzzing
Our experiments confirm the observations that TWF is unlikely to
synthesize missing composite data chunks. As in OSVDB-95632,
CVE-2012-5470, CVE-2011-3328 and Unknown 1-4, Hercules cannot
produce crash inputs to expose the vulnerabilities because they require
the existence of optional composite data chunks. In our experiments,
Hercules gets stuck in synthesizing such required data chunks. In
particular, the following requirments must be met to expose the 7
vulnerabilities that are not in the Hercules benchmark:
OSVDB-95632 (Buffer Overflow): It requires a PNG file with a
tRNS optional data chunk specifing either alpha values that are associated
with palette entries (for indexed-colour images) or a single transparent





field (image width) in IHDR chunk (the header chunk of PNG) must be
able to trigger an integer overflow in the LibPNG plugin in VLC 2.0.7.
CVE-2012-5470 (Buffer Overflow): It requires a PNG file with a
tEXt optional data chunk which stores text strings associated with the
image, such as an image description or copyright notice. Furthermore,
the length of the data chunk must be big enough to exceed the size of
a heap buffer allocated for the image. However, it cannot be so huge
that it prevents LibPNG from successfully allocating a heap buffer that is
supposed to store the data in tEXt chunk.
CVE-2011-3328 (Divide-by-Zero): They require a PNG file with a
cHRM optional data chunk. The cHRM specifies chromaticities of the red,
green, and blue display primaries used in the image, and the referenced
white point. Second, some data fields in cHRM chunk must have specific
values to trigger a divide-by-zero bug in the LibPNG library.
Unknown 1-3 (Memory Read Access Violation): They require
PNG files having optional data chunks (iTXt, zTXt or iCCP accordingly)
which have no content. That is, the chunks that specify a size of zero
followed by chunk name and checksum.
Unknown 4 (Divide-by-Zero): It requires a WAV file in which the
format chunk contains an optional extra composite data field and one
specific byte in the field is zero.
Unlike Hercules, our MoBWF tool leverages the input models to
transplant required data chunks from other files in the initial test suite or
generate the chunks automatically from the input model. Hence, our
MoBWF tool can successfully produce crash inputs as witnesses for the
seven vulnerabilites mentioned above.
Since our MoBWF tool is an extension of Hercules, it can successfully
reproduce all six vulnerabilites in the Hercules benchmark. As we will see
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for RQ.3, our MoBWF tool does not require seed inputs to reproduce three
out of the six vulnerabilites in the Hercules benchmark (CVE-2010-0718,
CVE-2011-0502 and CVE-2010-0688) because of its capability to generate
(semi-) valid files directly from input models.
RQ2. Versus Model-based Blackbox Fuzzing
The Peach model-based blackbox fuzzer cannot expose half of the
vulnerabilities that our MoBWF tool can expose (see Table 5.3). We note
that we conservatively assume that data chunk transplanation and
instantiation is available in Peach – even though it is not. It is worth
mentioning that supporting transplanation and instantiation in Peach
could be challenging. In fact, finding the correct chunk to transplant and
transplanting it to the correct location in the seed input is subject to
combinatorial explosion in an undirected fuzzing technique like Peach. In
constrast, MoBWF uses information about crucial IFs to direct the
transplantation.
In the experiments, we simulated Peach’s capability to do data chunk
transplanation and instantiation by augmenting the set of all 10 seed inputs
where none contains the missing data chunk with at least one seed input
where we manually transplanted the missing data chunk. In Table 5.3,
we indicate that Peach (with the simulated capability) can expose three
vulnerabilities Unknown 1-3 since these only require the existence of empty-
data optional chunks.
However, for the remaining 10 vulnerabilities, the MoBF tool Peach
cannot successfully expose 7 of 10 vulnerabilities even though we provide
inputs with the required optional data chunks. It is because of its limitation
on generating specific values. The reason lies with the inability of blackbox
fuzzing to generate the specific values for data fields that would expose
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deep vulnerabilities. For example, given a 4-byte integer data field, the
chance for a blackbox fuzzer to randomly mutate and get a specific value X
is extremely small, just only 1/232. In contrast, symbolic execution-based
whitebox fuzzing is very good at finding such values.
Meanwhile, our MoBWF tool is an enhancement of TWF (by
leveraging input models) and can tackle both the missing data chunk
problem and the limitation on generating specific input values. As a
result, it can successfully produce test cases to expose all of the 13
vulnerabilities.
RQ3. Sensitivity to the initial test suite
Program Advisory ID Model #Files MoBWF
VLC 2.0.7 OSVDB-95632 PNG 0 4
VLC 2.0.3 CVE-2012-5470 PNG 0 4
LTP 1.5.4 CVE-2011-3328 PNG 0 4
XNV 1.98 Unknown-1 PNG 0 4
XNV 1.98 Unknown-2 PNG 0 4
XNV 1.98 Unknown-3 PNG 0 4
WMP 9.0 Unknown-4 WAV 0 8
WMP 9.0 CVE-2014-2671 WAV 0 8
WMP 9.0 CVE-2010-0718 MIDI 0 4
AR 9.2 CVE-2010-2204 PDF 0 8
RP 1.0 CVE-2010-3000 FLV 0 8
MP 0.35 CVE-2011-0502 MIDI 0 4
OV 1.04 CVE-2010-0688 ORB 0 4
Table 5.4: Vulnerabilities exposed by our MoBWF tool if no initial seed
files are provided.
For this experiment, we run our MoBWF tool with no initial seed inputs
as shown in Table 5.4. By leveraging input models of PNG, MIDI and
ORB, for each file format our MoBWF automatically generates one minimal
seed file. In particular, a minimal PNG file is an 1x1 image having four
mandatory chunks – IHDR, PLTE, IDAT and IEND. In case of MIDI, it
is a single track audio file with one header chunk (MThd) and one audio
track chunk (MTrk). The minimal ORB file contains all required properties
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for rendering an orbital object. Once the files are generated, we run our
MoBWF tool on all subjects listed in Table 5.4.
The experiments show that with the minimal files, our MoBWF tool can
expose 9 of 13 vulnerabilities (which can be revealed by PNG, MIDI and
ORB files) as reported in Table 5.3. It means that our MoBWF tool exposes
70% vulnerabilites without any provided seed inputs providing evidence
that MoBWF technique reduces the dependence of TWF on selected seed
inputs.
MoBWF does not succeed in exposing the vulnerabilities in 4 of 13
vulnerabilities because they require WAV, FLV and PDF files as inputs.
However, our models for these file formats are still coarse. Although they
are enough to allow MoBWF to work with given test suites, they need to
be more complete to support directly generating (semi-) valid files. Since
these file formats are complex, on one hand we can spend more time to read
and fully understand their specifications in order to augment the input
models. On the other hand, we can reuse exhaustive models written by
software vendors or the owners of file formats. For instance, according to a
post at the official Adobe Blog,15 developers at Adobe System wrote their
model for PDF file (which was a proprietary format controlled by Adobe
until 2008) and used Peach Fuzzer to fuzz their most popular software –
Adobe Reader. Given such (partially) complete input models, our MoBWF
approach would complement MoBF tool like Peach Fuzzer to maximize the
utility of these models and hence expose more vulnerabilities.
15https://blogs.adobe.com/security/tag/fuzzing
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5.6 Threats to Validity
The main threat to external validity is the generality of our results.
MoBWF has been developed for real-world program binaries that take
complex program inputs. We choose a variety of well-known programs
from different domains where specifications of the input models are
available. While for proprietary applications such format specifications
might not be available, we believe that grammar inference techniques can
be a powerful tool to automatically derive the input model. Half of the
vulnerabilities have already been picked in earlier work [88]. To showcase
the effectiveness of MoBWF, the other half has been chosen such that an
optional data chunk is required to expose the vulnerability.16
The main threat to internal validity is selection bias during the seed
selection (see Table 5.2). We chose the seed inputs either randomly from
a benchmark or from the internet. Moreover, our experiments confirm the
reduced dependence on the available seed inputs.
The main threat to construct validity is the correctness of our
implementation. However, our tool is an extension of both Hercules and
Peach, the two baselines for our evaluation. So, our tool inherits the
incorrectness of the baseline.
5.7 Chapter Summary
In this chapter, we introduced MoBWF as an automated testing
technique for program binaries that process highly structured inputs. We
have observed that certain branches in a file-processing program are
exercised only depending on i) the presence of a specific data chunk, ii) a
specific value of a data field in a data chunk, or iii) the integrity of the
16See RQ.1. in Section 5.5.2.
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data chunks. Hence, we extend Hercules an existing traditional
whitebox fuzzing technique not only to set specific values of the fields but
also to add/remove complete chunks and re-establish their integrity
during fuzzing.
MoBWF is a promising fuzzing technique for program binaries that
process highly structured input. It is particularly helpful when no initial
seed files are available that contain the required optional data chunks.
Given the same time budget, MoBWF can generate more valid test inputs






Coverage-based Greybox Fuzzing (CGF) has shown its effectiveness in
discovering numerous vulnerabilities reported today. However, given a
specific set of target locations, say the methods in a stacktrace of an
in-field crash that an in-house developer wishes to reproduce or updated
functions in a new code commit which should be thoroughly tested to
prevent regression bugs, CGF cannot be directed towards quickly
generating seeds that can reach these targets. In this chapter, we present
our approach to integrating the capability to be directed by a set of
targets into CGF.
6.1 Introduction
Coverage-based Greybox Fuzzing (CGF) is a random testing approach
where new program inputs are generated by slightly mutating a seed
input: If the input exercises a new branch (which is not covered by the
existing seeds), it is added to the set of seeds. Light-weight
instrumentation allows to check for an increase in coverage with close to
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no overhead. CGF (as implemented in several popular fuzzing tools like
AFL and LibFuzzer [4, 8]) is a powerful automated vulnerability detection
technique, perhaps because it is both scalable as well as highly
parallelizable. It is scalable because the time to generate a test does not
increase with the program size and highly parallelizable because the
retained seeds represent the only internal state. Several CGF instances
can be run in parallel with a shared queue. A shared queue allows one
instance to access all the seeds that have been discovered by any other
instance. However, given a specific set of target locations, say the
methods in a stack trace of an in-field crash that an in-house developer
wishes to reproduce or updated functions in a new code commit which
should be thoroughly tested to prevent regression bugs, CGF cannot be
used to progressively reach these targets.
In this work, we augment CGF and make it directed towards a given
set of targets by integrating into it a global search algorithm. We leverage
the observation that CGF can be modeled as a Markov chain which
specifies the probability pij that fuzzing the seed which exercises path i
generates an input that exercises path j. In the case of AFL, j might be a
path that would exercise branch that has not been covered. Bo¨hme et al.
[22] introduce so-called power schedules to effectively navigate the
Markov chain. A power schedule assigns energy to each seed according to
some function. The energy of a seed determines how many inputs are
generated from that seed the next time it is chosen for fuzzing. Bo¨hme et
al. developed several power schedules that help to gravitate the fuzzer
towards low-frequency paths rather than “wasting” energy on
high-frequency ones. The fuzzer discovers more interesting paths per unit
time.
This inspired us to integrate a well-known Markov Chain Monte Carlo
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(MCMC) meta-heuristic into CGF by developing a suitable power
schedule. This so-called temperature-based power schedule assigns energy
depending on the seed’s distance to the set of target locations.
Specifically, we integrate Simulated Annealing (SA) as global search
algorithm where a short distance to the set of targets becomes
increasingly more important as time progresses. Intuitively, in the
beginning almost every seed is assigned the same energy to allow initially
for sufficient freedom to explore possibly less progressive paths. At a
given point of time, which we call time-to-exploitation, the search enters
the exploitation phase where seeds that are “closer” to the targets are
assigned significantly more energy than those further away. Directed CGF
is effectively a novel single-objective, multi-target search-based software
testing technique.
We implemented the technique into AFL, which is the state-of-the-art
of CGF, and call our tool AFLgo. We evaluated AFLgo as a crash
reproduction tool on the stack traces of ten vulnerabilities in LibPNG
and Binutils. Moreover, we also evaluated AFLgo as a patch testing tool
for vulnerability detection on the changes in the commit that introduced
the famous Heartbleed vulnerability [103] and on the changes in the 1600
most recent revisions of Binutils. Results are encouraging. AFLgo
reproduced the vulnerabilities in LibPNG between three (3) and five (5)
times faster than AFL and for those in Binutils usually about twice as
fast. In patch testing mode, AFLgo exposed Heartbleed in less than six
(6) hours while AFL took more than 20 hours. Notably, AFLgo
discovered 14 zero-day vulnerabilities in Binutils of which three (3)
vulnerabilities exist because of previous incomplete fixes. We filed bug
reports for the discovered vulnerabilities and all of them have been
confirmed and fixed by Binutils’ maintainers. We also got five (5) CVEs
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assigned to the most critical vulnerabilities.
This work makes the following contributions:
Path Distance. We develop a novel measure of path distance to a given
set of targets. Path distance accounts for outlier targets that are far even
from other targets. Moreover, it prefers paths that are closer to exercising
one target but further from another over paths that are equi-distant from
both targets.
Directed Fuzzing. We develop a Temperature-based Power Schedule
(TPS) that integrates the efficiency of CGF and the directedness of
Simulated Annealing global search algorithm. In our implementation,
we take care that all program analysis that is required would be
completed at compile time such that the overhead of our extension is
negligible at runtime.
Multi-Target SBST. To the best of our knowledge, we develop the first
multiple-target search-based software testing technique where the single
objective is to generate an input that exercises as many of the given
targets as possible. Previous work on Directed SBST is either on guidance
towards a single target [104, 54, 82] or on the coverage of a maximal
number of branches [43, 14].
AFLgo and Evaluation. We implemented directed CGF into AFL and
evaluated AFLgo for the applications to crash reproduction and patch
testing for vulnerability detection. In crash reproduction application,
AFLgo normally exposes known vulnerabilities from two (2) to ten
(10) times faster than AFL. AFLgo also shows its effectiveness in
patch testing by discovering 14 zero-day vulnerabilities.
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6.2 Motivating Example
We use the Heartbleed vulnerability to explain the pertinent properties of
directed coverage-based greybox fuzzing—a light-weight system-level
search-based testing generation technique. In this case, we direct the
fuzzer towards the program locations that were changed in the commit
that introduced the vulnerability. Our tool AFLgo implements the
technique into the popular coverage-based greybox fuzzer AFL [4].
Heartbleed [103] (CVE-2014-0160, ) is a serious vulnerability that
allows adversaries to decipher otherwise encrypted communication, for
instance, during online banking. The vulnerability was accidently
introduced into OpenSSL which implements the https protocol for secure
communication and is used by the majority of servers on the internet.
Heartbleed was introduced on Jan’12 when the “Heartbeats” feature was
added. It was patched two years later in Apr’14. As of April 2016, a
quarter million machines are still vulnerable [75]. One year after the
patch, Bo¨ck showed how the fuzzer AFL could have found Heartbleed
[21]. We decided to reuse his setup and see how much faster AFLgo
could have found Heartbleed if it was run for the commit that introduced
the vulnerability – merely directed towards the functions that had been
changed. OpenSSL consists of more than four thousand functions out of
which the commit that was supposed to add the Heartbeats-feature
changed twenty.1 Only after the commit one function contains a buffer
overread which would become known as the Heartbleed vulnerability.
An overview of the AFLgo architecture is shown in Figure 6-1. When
OpenSSL is compiled for AFLgo, the assembly-level instrumentation
takes the targets (here, 20 changed functions) and adds a few assembly
1There are 4439 functions including library functions. We counted the number of




















Figure 6-1: Overview AFLgo architecture.
instructions that indicate how “far” an executed seed input is from
executing these targets. To maintain the fuzzer’s efficiency, we wanted no
compromise at runtime. So, all program analysis is conducted at
compile-time such as a light-weight lifting of the call graph using the
LLVM optimization tool opt. The distance calculator script marks the
target functions and assigns to each node the distance to the targets. The
node distance is computed using a novel distance metric that we
introduce in this work. To the best of our knowledge, our metric seems to
be the first fitness function allowing for single-objective, multi-target
SBST. The AFLgo assembler then injects the computed distance into
the existing trampoline.2 While AFLgo instruments during compile
time, is straight-forward to conduct this instrumentation after
compilation [72].
When OpenSSL is fuzzed, the instrumented program informs AFLgo
about the current distance of the seed to the targets. Instead of
implementing a classical gradient descent and always preferring the seed
with the least distance to the twenty changed functions, we implemented
a global search that allows some exploration before gradually moving
2The trampoline is a piece of code injected by the AFL assembler that is executed
after each jump instruction to keep track of the covered control-flow edges.
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towards exploitation and finally degenerating to a classical gradient
descent. In the exploration phase, a seed may be chosen even if it
increases the distance to targets. In the exploitation phase, seeds with
less distance are generally more preferred.
CVE Fuzzer Successful runs µTTE Factor
AFLgo 30 5h41m 3.65
AFL 18 20h46m –
Figure 6-2: Improvement of AFLgo over AFL for Heartbleed.
In search-based software testing it is common to process individuals
(i.e., seed inputs) in the order of their fitness, or to select only the fittest
individuals. We take a different approach. We control the number of new
individuals generated from one individual during fuzzing. Formally, we
modify the power schedule of the fuzzer [22] rather than the order in which
the fuzzer selects seeds from the queue. Moreover, unlike in search-based
unit testing [42] where the goal is to generate a minimal sequence of method
invocations to achieve a maximal coverage of a given unit (e.g., the SSL-
object), AFLgo implements search-based system testing where the goal is
to generate system-level inputs (e.g., for the public interface of OpenSSL)
to quickly reach the given targets.
We implemented a so called temperature-based power schedule, which
controls the number of new individuals generated from a seed differently.
Then, we ran AFL and AFLgo with the power schedule on OpenSSL to
measure the mean Time-To-Exposure (TTE) – the average time until the
first seed is generated that exposes Heartbleed. We set a timeout for 24
hours, and repeated the experiment 30 times because fuzzing is essentially
a random process. An unsuccessful run that did not expose Heartbleed
in 24 hours is assigned a 24h TTE (rather than being unaccounted for).
Figure 6-2 shows the number of successful runs, the mean TTE (µTTE)
and how much longer the average AFL run takes to expose the error versus
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the average AFLgo run (Factor).
The results are promising. If a continuous integration platform like Jenkins
[73] had run AFLgo for merely six hours as soon as the commit was
submitted to the OpenSSL source code repository, then the vulnerability
would have been found as it was introduced. AFL would have taken three
to four times longer, almost a day.
6.3 Background
6.3.1 Simulated Annealing
Simulated Annealing (SA) is a Markov Chain Monte Carlo (MCMC)
method for approximating the global optimum in a very large, often
discrete search space within an acceptable time budget [65]. The main
feature of SA is that during the random walk it always accepts better
solutions but sometimes it may also accept worse solutions. The
temperature is a parameter of the SA algorithm that regulates the
acceptance of worse solutions and is decreasing according to a cooling
schedule. At the beginning, when T = T0, the SA algorithm may accept
worse solutions with high probability. Towards the end, when T is close
to 0, it degenerates to a classical gradient descent algorithm and will
accept only better solutions.
The simulated annealing algorithm converges asymptotically towards
the set of global optimal solutions. This set of global optimal solutions, in
our case, is the set of paths exercising the maximum number of targets. A
cooling schedule controls the rate of convergence and is a function of the
initial temperature T0 ∈ N and the temperature cycle k ∈ N. The initial
temperature T0 is provided and must be high enough so that any new
solution is accepted with a certain probability close to 1. The temperature
cycle k = {0, 1, . . .} increases with time, for instance, with the number of
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fuzzing executions. The cooling schedule computes the current temperature
Tk for cycle k. In our case, the current temperature determines the energy
assigned to a seed. Intuitively, if the temperature is still high, a seed
s10 that exercises a path with a high path distance is assigned the same
energy as a seed s0 that exercises a path with a low path distance. As
the temperature approaches zero, s0 is assigned most energy while s10 may
not be fuzzed at all. The most commonly used cooling schedule is the
exponential multiplicative:
Texp = T0 · αk (6.1)
where α is a constant smaller than the unit and typically 0.8 ≤ α ≤ 0.99.
Figure 6-3 shows a plot of the exponentia multiplicative cooling schedule


















Figure 6-3: Rate of convergence for the exponential multiplicative cooling
schedule, Tk = 0.9
k where T0 = 1.
6.3.2 Coverage-based Greybox Fuzzing
As explained in Section 2.4, Coverage-based greybox fuzzing (CGF) [22, 4]
uses lightweight instrumentation to gain coverage information. For
instance, AFL’s instrumentation captures basic block transitions, along
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with coarse branch-taken hit counts. CGF uses the coverage information
to decide which generated inputs to retain for fuzzing, which input to fuzz
next and for how long.
Algorithm 3 Coverage-based Greybox Fuzzing (adapted from [22])
Input: Seed Inputs S
1: repeat
2: s = chooseNext(S)
3: p = assignEnergy(s) // Our Modifications
4: for i from 1 to p do
5: s′ = mutate input(s)
6: if t′ crashes then
7: add s′ to S7
8: else if isInteresting(s′) then
9: add s′ to S
10: until timeout reached or abort-signal
Output: Crashing Inputs S7
Algorithm 3 shows an algorithmic sketch of how CGF works. The fuzzer
is provided with a set of seed inputs S and chooses inputs s from S in a
continuous loop until a timeout is reached or the fuzzing is aborted. The
selection is implemented in chooseNext. For instance, AFL essentially
chooses seeds from a circular queue in the order they are added. For the
selected seed input s, the CGF determines the number p of inputs that are
generated by fuzzing s as implemented in assignEnergy (line 3). This
is also where the (temperature-based) power schedules are implemented.
Then, the fuzzer generates p new inputs by randomly mutating s according
to defined mutation operators as implemented in mutate input (line 5).
AFL uses bit flips, simple arithmetics, boundary values, and block deletion
and insertion strategies to generate new inputs. If the generated input s′
is covers a new branch, it is added to the circular queue (line 9). If the
generated input s′ crashes the program, it is added to the set S7 of crashing
inputs (line 7). A crashing input that is also interesting is marked as unique
crash.
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CGF as Markov Chain. Bo¨hme et al. [22] showed that coverage-
based greybox fuzzing can be modelled as a Markov chain. A state i is
a specific path in the program. The transition probability pij from state i
to state j is given by the probability that fuzzing the seed which exercises
path i generates a seed which exercises path j. The authors found that
a CGF exercises certain (high-frequency) paths significantly more often
than others. The density of the stationary distribution formally describes
the likelihood that a certain path is exercised by the fuzzer after a certain
number of iterations. Bo¨hme et al. developed a technique to gravitate
the fuzzer towards low-frequency paths by adjusting the number of fuzz
generated from a seed depending on the density of the neighborhood. The
number of fuzz generated for a seed s is also called the energy of s. The
energy of a seed s is controlled by a so-called power schedule. Note that
energy is a property that is local to a state in the Markov chain unlike
temperature which is global in simulated annealing.
Simulated annealing is a Markov Chain Monte Carlo approach. Since
CGF can be modelled as Markov chain, it should be possible to employ
such optimization techniques on top of CGF. In this work, we explore this
possibility and develop a novel power schedule that integrates ideas from
SA to direct the fuzzer towards a given set of targets.
6.4 Directed Greybox Fuzzing
Our main objective is the development of a lightweight, search-based
vulnerability detection technique that works out-of-the-box for
large-scale, file-processing programs and libraries. We pose three
additional requirements: 1) It must be easily parallelizable, such that we
can assign computing power as and when needed. 2) It must allow to
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specify multiple target locations, like the set of changed statements in a
commit or the set of critical system calls. 3) It must not conduct any
program analysis during runtime so that all heavy-weight analysis should
be conducted at compile-time. We lay the groundwork for the technique
i) by defining measures of distance between program input and targets on
an abstraction of the program (e.g., the control-flow or the call graph),
and ii) by defining a power schedule that integrates the exponential
muliplicative cooling schedule, which is the most commonly used
schedule, from simulated annealing and the original power schedule of the
AFL CGF.
6.4.1 A Measure of Distance Between the Exercised
Path and Multiple Targets
Given a path ξ in a directed graph G where some nodes Γ are marked as
targets, we define the distance d(ξ,Γ) between path ξ and all targets Γ as
follows. Let the node distance d(n, n′) be computed as the number of edges
along the shortest path between nodes n and n′ in the directed graph G.
Let the target distance d(n,Γ) between a node n and all targets Γ in G
be computed as the harmonic mean of the logarithm of the node distance
between n and any reachable target γ ∈ Γ:
d(n,Γ) =

0 if Θ(n,Γ) = ∅[∑





where Θ(n,Γ) is the set of all targets that are reachable from n in G and
 > 1 is a constant that simply prevents the case where the parameter of
the logarithm or the divisor is zero (e.g. when d(n, γ) = 0 or when




































Figure 6-4: Difference between node distance defined in terms of arithmetic
mean versus harmonic mean. Node distance is shown in the white circles.
The targets are marked in gray.
between a node that is closer to one target and further from another and
a node that is equi-distant from both targets. The arithmetic mean would
assign both nodes the same node distance. Figure 6-4 provides an
example. The logarithm reduces the influence of very distant outlier
targets on the harmonic mean.
Let the path distance d(ξ,Γ) between path ξ and all targets Γ in G be
the arithmetic mean of the target distance between any node n ∈ ξ and Γ,




|{n | n ∈ ξ ∧Θ(n,Γ) 6= ∅}| (6.3)
Given the set of paths Λ exercised by the current set of seeds, we define
the normalized path distance d˜(ξ,Γ) as the difference between the path
distance of ξ to Γ and the minimum path distance of any path ξ′ ∈ Λ
exercised by the current set of seeds to Γ divided by the difference between
the maximum and the minimum path distance of any path ξ′ ∈ Λ exercised
by the current set of seeds to Γ. Note that the normalized path distance
114








maxD = maxξ′∈Λ (d(ξ′,Γ)) (6.6)
6.4.2 Temperature-based Power Schedule
A Temperature-based Power Schedule (TPS) assigns energy to a seed s
depending on the current temperature Tk of the simulated annealing process
and the distance of the path ξ that is exercised by s to the set of targets Γ
in the call graph G. In simple terms, a seed that exercises a path that is
“closer” to the targets is assigned more energy than a seed that exercises a
path “further away” from the targets, and this energy difference increases
as the temperature decreases. First, we normalize all measures to the range
[0, 1]. We set T0 = 1 such that Tk ∈ [0, 1] and recall that distance d˜ ∈ [0, 1].
Generic TPS. Given the current temperature Tk that is computed
according to the exponential multiplicative cooling schedule, a graph G,
targets Γ in G, and path ξ in G, we define the generic temperature-based
power schedule to assign energy p as
p(Tk, ξ,Γ) = (1− d˜(ξ,Γ)) · (1− Tk) + 0.5Tk (6.7)
3It is worth noting that a definition of normalized path distance as the arithmetic
mean of the “normalized” target distance (w.r.t. min. and max. target distance) – in
our experiments – resulted in the probability density being centered around a value much
less than 0.5 with significant positive kurtosis. This resulted in substantially reduced
energy for every seed. The definition of normalized path distance in Equation (6.4)
reduces the kurtosis and nicely spreads the distribution between zero and one.
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The behavior of the generic TPS is illustrated in Figure 6-5 for three values
of Tk and d. Notice that energy p ∈ [0, 1]. Moreover, for Tk = 1, the generic
TPS assigns the same energy to a seed exercising a path with a high path
distance as to one exercising a path with a low path distance. A path that
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Figure 6-5: Impact of path distance d˜(ξ,Γ) and temperature Tk on the
energy p(Tk, ξ,Γ) of the seed exercising path ξ.
In testing, we usually have only a limited time budget. Hence, we
would like to specify a time tx when the temperature-based power schedule
should enter exploitation after sufficient time of exploration. We let the
cooling schedule enter exploitation when Tk ≤ 0.05. The adjustment of
the generic TPS for values other than 0.05 is straightforward. Intuitively,
at time tx, the simulated annealing process is comparable to a classical
gradient descent algorithm that “rejects” almost all seeds that are too far
away from the targets. Given the exponential cooling schedule Texp = α
k, a
time bound tx when Texp = 0.05, we compute the current temperature Texp
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at the current time t as follows
0.05 = αkx for Texp = 0.05; k = kx in Eq. (6.1) (6.8)





log(α) for k =
t
tx
kx in Eq. (6.1) (6.10)
= 20−
t
tx simplifying Eq. (6.10) (6.11)
Integrated TPS. AFL already has a power schedule to decide how
many fuzz iterations it will conduct for a specific seed. This decision is made
based on the execution time and input size of s, when s has been found, and
how many ancestors s has. We would like to integrate AFL’s pre-existing
power schedule with our generic temperature-based power schedule and
define the final integrated temperature-based power schedule. Let pafl be
the energy that AFL normally assigns to a seed. We compute the integrated
TPS pˆ as
pˆ = pafl · 210·(p(Tk,ξ,Γ)−5) (6.12)
where we call f = 210(p−0.5) the temperature-based factor which controls
the increase or reduction of energy assigned by AFL’s power schedule.
Plots for the factor f for the Temperature-based Power Schedule (TPS)
and two seeds with minimal and maximal path distance, respectively, are
shown in Figure 6-6. When normalized path distance is minimal (d˜ = 0),
TPS approaches a factor of 25 = 32 as the time t increases. When the
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Distance d˜(ξ,Γ) = 0
Figure 6-6: Temperature-based power factor which controls the energy
that was originally assigned by AFL’s power schedule (tx = 40), (a) for
seed with minimal path distance to all targets (d˜ = 0) and (b) for a seed
with maximal distance to all targets (d˜ = 1). Notice the different scales on
the y-axis.
6.5 Implementation
AFLgo implements directed coverage-based greybox fuzzing and takes
program methods as targets. It is based on the AFL fuzzer (v2.35b).
AFL represents the state-of-the-art of coverage-based greybox fuzzing, is
behind hundreds of high-impact vulnerability discoveries [4], and has been
shown to generate valid image files (JPEGs) from an initial seed that is
virtually empty [71]. We modified the instrumentation at compile-time
and the fuzzing component working at runtime, specifically
assignEnergy in Algorithm 3.
6.5.1 All Program Analysis at Compile Time
During compile time, AFLgo extracts the call graph, marks the target
functions, and computes the node distance values for all functions to the
target functions. Given the names of the target methods, a python script
computes the distances for all methods that can directly or indirectly call
at least one target method. The names of the target methods can be
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extracted automatically depending on the application, for instance, from
the commit if the application is regression test generation. The call graph
is constructed both, statically and dynamically. First, LLVM opt extracts
the call graph using static analysis; opt is the LLVM optimizer which is
capable of sophisticated program analysis during compile time. However,
the extracted call graph may be incomplete, for instance, due to register-
indirect jumps. Hence, the performance profiler gprof is used to track
the method calls executed by the test suite which is provided in every
subject. This information is then used to increase the completeness of the
call graph. The nodes corresponding to the names of the target methods
are marked in the call graph. Distance values are computed for each node
in the call graph using the graph-tool package in python and according
to the formula provided in Equation (6.2).





Figure 6-7: AFL shared memory – extended layout (x86-64)
In order to make AFLgo aware of distance to targets, we extended
the standard assembler-based instrumentation of AFL in afl-as. The
assembler reads the file containing the method names and the
corresponding distance values. During instrumentation, the assembler
knows which method it is currently instrumenting and passes the current
method identifier and the corresponding distance value to the injected
“trampoline”.4 The trampoline that is injected by AFLgo’s assembler
assumes that the shared memory that is passed by AFLgo during
execution is extended by 24 bytes (Fig. 6-7). Let D be the set of distance
values corresponding to each method that is executed by the seed. The
first eight additional bytes are used to accumulate the cumulative node
4The trampoline is a piece of code injected by the AFL assembler that is executed




d∈D d) as and when the seed is executed. These are
followed by eight bytes that contain the count of accumulated distance
values (i.e., |D|). Thus, the first eight bytes allow us to compute the





/|D|). The last eight bytes contain the
identifier for the current method. The trampoline is injected at each
branching point in a function. Hence, we would accumulate more distance
values for longer functions, unnecessarily biasing the search. We use the
current method identifier in the trampoline and the previous method
identifier in the shared memory, to accumulate distance values only when
the current method actually changes.
6.5.2 Efficient Search at Runtime
In order to implement our the Temperature-based Power Schedule (TPS)
into AFLgo, we extended the AFL coverage-based greybox fuzzer. For
each execution of a generated test case (called fuzz), we pass an extended
shared memory to the program under test (Fig. 6-7) and store the
computed path distance (not yet normalized)5 together with the fuzz if it
is found interesting and added to the queue as new seed. We implemented
the TPS shown in equation (6.11) by modifying the function
calculate score in afl-fuzz. This function normalizes the path
distance and computes the time t since the fuzzer was started, before
computing the temperature and required energy according to the
exponential multiplicative cooling schedule. This function effectively
implements the method assignEnergy in Algorithm 3 which decides
how many fuzzing iterations should be executed for a seed. A more
common way to implement a meta-heuristic for search-based software
5Recall that path distance is normalized w.r.t. the minimum and maximum path
distance for the seeds currently in the queue (see Sec. 6.4.2).
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testing is to base the decision of which seed to choose next on the
distance of all seeds in the queue. However, we decided against modifying
the method chooseNext in Algorithm 3 on empirical grounds. For most
subjects in our experiments, the complete queue was fully processed in a
matter of minutes which did not warrant the required computations
needed for the re-ording of the queue.
We note that TPS can be implemented with only a few bit shifts,
division, addition, and multiplication operations. In other words, the
computation of the energy that is assigned to a seed is extremely efficient
and there is no program analysis at runtime.
6.6 Experimental Evaluation
The main objective of our empirical investigations is to determine whether
the directedness that is implemented into a coverage-based greybox fuzzer
is effective in directing the search towards inputs that can reach the target
functions. To this end, we conducted two main experiments to evaluate
the effectiveness of AFLgo in reproducing crashes and patch testing to
discover vulnerabilities. In crash reproduction experiment, AFLgo is
guided by functions in crashing stack trace while in patch testing AFLgo
is directed by the changes in a source code commit (a.k.a a patch).
AFLgo would require users to choose a specific time-to-exploitation. So,
we also investigate the sensitivity of our technique on the user-provided
parameter and to identify a superior setting. The experiments help us to
answer the following research questions.
RQ.1 Improvement of AFLgo over AFL. Is the extended power
schedule effective in guiding the fuzzer towards a specified set of
targets? More specifically, does AFLgo reproduce crashes faster
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than AFL?
RQ.2 Sensitivity to Time-to-Exploitation Setting. How does the
choice of time-to-exploitation tx impact the efficiency of directed
fuzzing? More specifically, does a particular choice of tx make
AFLgo generally faster in generating the crashing input than any
other choice?
RQ.3 Patch testing for vulnerability detection. How does directed
fuzzing perform when the objective is to reach the changed
statements in a source code commit and expose program errors?




For the crash reproduction experiment, we selected a total of 18
vulnerabilities. We chose all eight (8) vulnerabilities in Binutils that were
found by AFLfast [22] and the Top-10 most recent vulnerabilities
reported for LibPNG [97]. Binutils is a binary analysis tool and has
almost one million Lines of Code (LoC) while LibPNG is an image library
and has almost half a million LoC. Both are widely used open-source C
projects. The vulnerabilities are identified by the CVE-ID and are
discussed in more detail in the US National Vulnerability Database.
First, we needed to generate the Proof of Vulnerability (PoV) for each
CVE using undirected AFL in order to collect a test case that actually
produces the required stack trace. Notice that in practice an in-house
developer collects the stack trace from bug reports sent from users’
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machines. In order to check, whether a specific CVE has been exposed,
we executed the crashing test case on the version where that CVE is
patched. However, in several cases AFL was not able to generate a
crashing input for a vulnerability in 20 runs of eight hours.6 The
remaining CVEs for which we could collect the stack trace are shown in
Figure 6-8.
Program CVE-ID Type of Vulnerability
LibPNG [97] CVE-2011-2501 Invalid Read
LibPNG [97] CVE-2011-3328 Division by Zero
LibPNG [97] CVE-2015-8540 Invalid Read
Binutils [22] CVE-2016-4487 Invalid Write
Binutils [22] CVE-2016-4488 Invalid Write
Binutils [22] CVE-2016-4489 Invalid Write
Binutils [22] CVE-2016-4490 Write Access Violation
Binutils [22] CVE-2016-4491 Stack Corruption
Binutils [22] CVE-2016-4492 Write Access Violation
Binutils [22] CVE-2016-6131 Write Access Violation
Figure 6-8: Subjects for Crash Reproduction.
For the patch testing for vulnerability detection experiment, we used
AFLGo to test 1600 most recent revisions of Binutils7, from the one which
incoporated the fixes for eight (8) vulnerabilities found by AFLfast8 [22]
to the newest version on trunk. In this experiment, AFLGo was guided by
code changes in each revision. We first ran a script to filter out all commits
that have no code change. Afterwards, we ran one instance of AFLgo
for each program in a Binutils revision - no shared queue was used. It
is worth noting that in this experiment, we wanted to test not only how
a program handles input file but also how it parses and processes input
arguments. To this end, we used a tool named afl-argv developed by our
team. Essentially, afl-argv defines a simple file structure to keep data for
6Eight hours of fuzzing might not be enough for many vulnerabilities that are
notoriously hard to discover. Running 20 instances of AFL for 8 hours, we could not
generate a PoV for LibPNG CVEs: 2011-3026, 2011-3048, 2011-3464, 2012-3386, 2013-
6954, 2014-0333, 2014-9495, 2015-8126, or for Binutils CVE 2016-2226.
7Git repository at git://sourceware.org/git/binutils-gdb.git
8Its commit hash is fa3fcee7b8c73070306ec358e730d1dfcac246bf
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both input arguments and input file(s). Once AFLgo produces a test case,
afl-argv interpretes the test case and decomposes it into arguments and
files based on the defined structure and send them to the program under
test.
6.1.2. Settings
Almost all vulnerabilities in Binutils are exposed in less than eight hours
[22]. So, we set a timeout for eight (8) hours and the default time to
exploitation tx to seven (7) hours. We ran a single instance of AFLgo
along with a single instance of AFL (i.e. no shared queue) and measured
the time to exposure (TTE). We repeated this experiment 20 times to gain
statistical power.
The fuzzer instances for Binutils are seeded with an empty input. Thus,
the fuzzer constructs the required binaries completely on its own. The
fuzzer instances for LibPNG are seeded with all (4) valid PNG files from
the corresponding AFL test suite.9
Recall that Time-To-Exploitation (tx) is an independent variable that
defines the time when the schedule should enter exploitation (i.e., Tk =
0.05). In the crash reproduction experiment, we investigate the impact
of the choice of tx on the efficiency of the technique. Specifically, we ran
the experiment using the default value (seven (7) hours) and five (5) other
values of tx which are 1 minute, 10 minutes, 100 minutes, 1000 minutes
and 1000 minutes.
6.1.3. Measures
In the crash reproduction experiment we used the following measures to
evaluate the improvement of AFLGo over AFL.
9Test suite folder: afl/testcases/images/png/*.png.
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Time-to-Exposure (TTE) is a dependent variable that measures the
time taken from the start of the fuzzer until generating the first test case
that exposes a given error. We determine which error a test case exposes
by executing the failing test case on the set of fixed versions, where each
version fixes just one error. If the test case passes on a fixed version, it is
said to witness the corresponding error. If it is the first such test case, it
is said to expose the error. We repeat each experimental setting 20 times
and only report the mean time to exposure (µTTE ) as the average over all
measured TTE values for a specific setting.
Factor Improvement (Factor) is a measure of effect size and is
defined as the µTTE of AFL divided by the µTTE of AFLgo for a given
error. For instance, a Factor of 2 means that the average fuzzing
campaign of AFL takes twice as long to expose a given error as the
average fuzzing campaign of AFLgo. Values of Factor > 1 indicate that
AFLgo outperforms AFL.
Vargha-Delaney statistic (Aˆ12) is a non-parametric measure of effect
size [100]. It is also the recommended standard measure for the evaluation
of randomized algorithms in software engineering [15]. Given a performance
measure M (such as TTE) seen in m measures of X (such as AFLgo) and
n measures of Y (such as AFL), the Aˆ12 statistic measures the probability
that running algorithm X yields higher M values than running algorithm
Y . We use the VD.A function from the effsize package in R to compute
the Aˆ12 statistic. Values of Aˆ12 > 0.5 indicate that AFLgo outperforms
AFL.
6.1.4. Infrastructure
We executed all experiments on machines with an Intel Xeon CPU E5-
2620v3 processor that has 24 logical cores running at 2.4GhZ with access
125
to 64GB of main memory and Ubuntu 14.04 (64 bit) as operating system.
We always utilized exactly 22 cores to keep the workload compareable and
to retain two cores for other processes. Running our experiments on 20
machines with this equipment allowed us to run our experiments in four
days that would normally take more than one year even on a recent PC
with four logical cores.
6.6.2 Results and Analysis
CVE Fuzzer Successful runs µTTE Factor Aˆ12
2011-2501 (LibPNG)
AFLgo 20 0h06m 2.81 0.79
AFL 20 0h18m – –
2011-3328 (LibPNG)
AFLgo 20 0h40m 4.48 0.94
AFL 18 3h00m – –
2015-8540 (LibPNG)
AFLgo 20 0m26s 10.66 0.87
AFL 20 4m34s – –
2016-4487 (Binutils)
AFLgo 20 0h02m 1.64 0.59
AFL 20 0h04m – –
2016-4488 (Binutils)
AFLgo 20 0h11m 1.53 0.72
AFL 20 0h17m – –
2016-4489 (Binutils)
AFLgo 20 0h03m 2.25 0.68
AFL 20 0h07m – –
2016-4490 (Binutils)
AFLgo 20 1m33s 0.64 0.31
AFL 20 0m59s – –
2016-4491 (Binutils)
AFLgo 5 6h38m 0.85 0.44
AFL 7 5h46m – –
2016-4492 (Binutils)
AFLgo 20 0h09m 1.92 0.81
AFL 20 0h16m – –
2016-6131 (Binutils)
AFLgo 6 5h53m 1.24 0.61
AFL 2 7h19m – –
Figure 6-9: Improvement of AFLgo over AFL in crash reproduction
application. We run this experiment 20 times and highlight statistically
significant values of Aˆ12 in bold. A run that does not reproduce the vuln.
within 8 hours receives a TTE of 8 hours. CVEs 2016-4491 and 2016-6131
are difficult to find even in 24 hours [22].
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RQ.1 Improvement of AFLgo over AFL
To reproduce the CVEs in LibPNG, AFLgo is three (3) to 18 times faster
than AFL. More details are shown in Figure 6-9. For CVE-2015-8540,
AFLgo needs only a few seconds to reproduce the vulnerability while
AFL requires almost five minutes. For CVE-2011-3328, AFLgo spends
merely half an hour while AFL requires three hours. For the remaining
CVE (2011-2501), AFLgo can reproduce the crash in only six minutes
while AFL takes more than three times as long.
To reproduce the CVEs in Binutils, AFLgo is usually between 1.5 and
2 times faster than AFL. There are two CVEs that are difficult to expose
(2016-4491 and 2016-6131). In fact, both AFLgo and AFL took several
hours in average to discover the CVEs. In case of CVE-2016-6131, AFLgo
shows a clear improvement: AFLgo reproduces the crash for three times
more runs and requires about one hour less time. AFL seems to exhibit
better performance in only two CVEs (2016-4490 and 2016-4491). For
CVE-2016-4490 it is exposed in a few seconds and at this scale the external
impact is not negligible. For CVE-2016-4491, AFLgo and AFL are almost
on par. However, it is worth noting that the results shown in Figure 6-9
are for a single time-to-exploitation setting (7 hours or 420 minutes). The
sensitivity analysis in Figure 6-10 shows that there exist two settings (10
minutes and 100 minutes) which make AFLgo superior in case of CVE-
2016-4491.
RQ.2 Sensitivity to Time-to-Exploitation Setting
On the average, AFLgo is not particularly sensitive to the choice of
time-to-exploitation tx. However, for each vulnerability there seems to be
an optimal value for time-to-exploitation. In Figure 6-10-a, we show the
time-to-exploitation tx on a logarithmical scale. On the average, the
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Figure 6-10: Sensitivity to the time to exploitation tx. We show the
individual improvement for each vulnerability.
improvement of AFLgo over AFL is not much different if tx = 1 minute
versus tx = 10000 min ≈ 1 week. For Binutils, the best choice should be
around tx = 100 minutes. In fact, the improvement of AFLgo is 10
percentage points at tx = 100 min than in our default experimental
setting (tx = 420 min = 7 hours) that is discussed in RQ.1. However,
Figure 6-10-b, depicts clearly that each vulnerability has a superior value
for tx. For the LibPNG vulnerability CVE-2011-3328, the optimal
time-to-exploitation seems to be beyond 16 hours. For the Binutils
vulnerability CVE-2016-4491, instead, the optimal time-to-exploitation
seems to be between 1 and 2 hours. After the optimum the
Vargha-Delaney measure drops by 20 percentage points. We investigated
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whether hard-to-discover errors require a longer time-to-exploitation but
found no obvious relationship.
Interpretation. Without further knowledge about the difficulty of
reaching the targets, all choices tx would be similarly effective. A priori,
any choice is reasonable. However, there is clearly a sensitivity on these
parameters for each error in particular. We believe that a suitable
hyper-heuristic could adjust the choices of tx during search process itself
[56, 57]. Moreover, AFLgo allows to run several instances in parallel,
where each instance can share the seeds found with the other instances
via a shared queue. If sufficient computing resources are available, we
suggest to run the several AFLgo instances with different choices for tx
to increase the chance that one is more efficient than the others.
RQ.3 Patch testing for Vulnerability Detection
In the motivating example, we have shown that AFLgo guided by the
code changes in the commit rather than the stack trace (as used in crash
reproduction application) successfuly exposes the famous Heartbleed
vulnerability more than three times faster than AFL. In fact, AFLgo
takes less than six (6) hours while AFL takes more than 20 hours.
Moreover, AFLgo is much more deterministic than AFL; while AFLgo
can expose Heartbleed in all of 30 runs, AFL succeeds in only 18 runs.
AFLgo not only exposes well-known vulnerablities like Heartbleed.
By doing patch testing on 1600 revisions of Bintuils AFLgo discovers 14
zero-day vulnerabilities in three different utilities in Binutils; all these
utilities (Readelf, Nm and Objdump) are widely used by security
practitioners and software engineers to analyze program binaries. We
have received (5) CVEs assigned to the most critical vulnerabilities
among 14 discovered bugs. Moreover, several bugs are deeply hidden in
129
shared libraries (e.g. BFD and DWARF) which are part of several
real-world applications such as Valgrind and GDB. Figure 6-11 lists all
the 14 vulnerabilities10 covering a variety types of bugs including
heap-based buffer over-read, heap-based buffer over-write, use-after-free
and NULL pointer dereference. While invalid write, use-after-free and
NULL pointer dereference vulnerabilities are more likely to be
exploitable, invalid read ones could lead to serious information leaks like
Heartbleed or cause denial of service.
Program Bug-ID CVE-ID Type of Vulnerability
Readelf PR-21135 CVE-2017-7209 NULL pointer dereference
Readelf PR-21137 CVE-2017-6965 Heap-based buffer over-write
Readelf PR-21139 CVE-2017-6966 Use-after-free
Readelf PR-21147 - Heap-based buffer over-read
Readelf PR-21148 - Heap-based buffer over-read
Readelf PR-21149 - Heap-based buffer over-read
Nm PR-21150 - Heap-based buffer over-read
Objdump PR-21151 - Heap-based buffer over-read
Readelf PR-21155 - Memory Access violation
Readelf PR-21156 CVE-2017-6969 Heap-based buffer over-read
Objdump PR-21157 CVE-2017-7210 Heap-based buffer over-read
Objdump PR-21158 - Heap-based buffer over-read
Readelf PR-21159 - Heap-based buffer over-read
Objdump - - Heap-based buffer over-read
Figure 6-11: Discovered zero-day vulnerabilities.
More interestingly, 12 out of 14 zero-day vulnerabilities can be
attributed to the directedness of AFLgo. By manually investigating the
code commits, the stack traces traversing by crashing inputs and the bug
fixes written by Binutils’s maintainers we found interesting statistics:
three (3) out of 14 bugs are in target functions of AFLgo, nine (9) bugs
are in so-called “critical” paths from entry functions (i.e. main functions
of the test programs) to target functions. The remaining two (2) bugs are
in functions which are invoked directly by some functions in the
corresponding critical paths – their distances to critical paths are only
10The last bug in Objdump does not have Bug-ID because it is relevant to the critical




The experiment on patch testing also indicates that AFLgo can
effectively detect bugs caused by incomplete bug fixes. Specifically, three
bugs (PR-21155, PR-21156 and PR-21159) exist because Binutils’
maintainers fixed incompletely our earlier reported bugs (PR-21137,
PR-21156 and PR-21135 respectively. Notice that we reported two bugs
in PR-21156, both the initial one and the one due to incomplete fix, so we
got only one bug ID). Especially, for PR-21137 the maintainer had to
submit three different bug fixes to fully resolve the problem.
The encouraging results in patch testing for vulnerability detection suggests
that directed CGF technique (as implemented in AFLgo) can be integrated
into continuous integration/testing platforms like Jenkins [73] or Google
OSS-Fuzz [74] to prevent bugs introduced by code changes in the evolution
of software systems.
6.7 Threats to Validity
The choice of subjects constitutes a threat to external validity. We select
three real-world open-source programs (OpenSSL, LibPNG and Binutils)
which are widely used and deployed. The choosen vulnerabilities represent
a large variety of exploitable types of bugs. However, results may vary for
different vulnerabilities, closed-source programs, programming languages,
or architectures. We choose two applications of directed fuzzing to crash
reproduction and regression test generation. Results may vary for other
applications.
A common threat to internal validity for fuzzer experiments is the
selection of initial seeds. However, since AFL and AFLgo are started
with the same set of initial seeds (the empty seed or from the official AFL
test suite), both fuzzers gain the same (dis-)advantage. Moreover,
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AFLgo may not faithfully implement directed coverage-based greybox
fuzzing as presented in this article, introducing a threat to construct
validity. However, we make the source code and documentation of
AFLgo available to the artifact evaluation committee and later to the
general public for their scrutiny.
6.8 Chapter Summary
In this chapter, we have presented directed coverage based grey-box
fuzzing (CGF) which allows us to direct the search to specific functions in
the program, such as critical system calls, changed functions in a commit,
or the methods in the stack trace of an unknown input. We demonstrate
this directedness ability empirically by generating inputs which follow a
given stack-trace, thereby also providing an efficient and effective solution
for crash reproduction and by discovering zero-day vulnerabilities in
patch testing which focuses on functions in code commits. The
directedness is achieved by integrating an effective meta-heuristic search
with the power schedule of a coverage-based greybox fuzzer where the
power schedule decides how many inputs are generated from a seed that
is a certain distance from the target functions.
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Chapter 7
Bucketing Failing Tests via
Symbolic Analysis
A common problem encountered while debugging programs is the
overwhelming number of test cases generated by automated test
generation tools like fuzzing, where many of the tests are likely to fail due
to same bug. Some coarse-grained clustering techniques based on point of
failure (PFB) and stack hash (CSB) have been proposed to address the
problem. In this chapter, we present a new symbolic analysis-based
clustering algorithm that uses the semantic reason behind failures to
group failing tests into more “meaningful” clusters.
7.1 Introduction
Software debugging is a time consuming activity. Several studies [28],
[39], [47], [51], [85] have proposed clustering techniques for failing tests
and proven their effectiveness in large-scale real-world software products.
The Windows Error Reporting System (WER) [47] and its improvements
such as ReBucket [39] try to arrange error reports into various “buckets”
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or clusters. WER employs a host of heuristics involving module names,
function offset and other attributes. The Rebucket approach (proposed as
an improvement to WER) uses specific attributes such as the call stack in
an error report.
Although the techniques have been applied widely in industry, there
are three common problems that they can suffer from (as mentioned
in [47]). The first problem is “over-condensing” in which the failing tests
caused by multiple bugs are placed into a single bucket. The second
problem is “second bucket” in which failing tests caused by one bug are
clustered into different buckets. The third one, “long tail” problem,
happens if there are many small size buckets with just one or a few tests.
For example, using failure type and location (as used in KLEE [28]) for
clustering tests are more likely to suffer from both over-condensing and
second bucket problems as they would group all tests that fail at the same
location, completely insensitive to the branch sequence and the call-chain
leading to the error. Call stack similarity for clustering tests also suffers
from the “over-condensing” and “second bucket” problems because it is
insensitive to the intraprocedural program paths (i.e. the conditional
statements within functions). One of the main reasons why techniques in
[28], [39], [47], [51], [85] suffer from these problems is that they do not
take program semantics into account.
In this work, we propose a novel technique to cluster failing tests via
symbolic analysis. Unlike previous work that drive bucketing directly from
error reports, we adapt symbolic path exploration techniques (like KLEE
[28]) to cluster (or bucket) the failing tests on-the-fly. We drive bucketing
in a manner such that tests in each group fail due to the same reason.
Since we use symbolic analysis for clustering, our technique leads to more
accurate bucketing; that is (a) tests for two different bugs are less likely
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to appear in the same bucket, and (b) tests showing the same bug are
less likely to appear in different buckets. We experimentally evaluate our
semantics-based bucketing technique on a set of 21 programs drawn from
five repositories: IntroClass, Coreutils, SIR, BugBench and exploit-db. Our
results demonstrate that our symbolic analysis based bucketing technique
is effective at clustering tests: for instance, the ptx program (in our set
of benchmarks) generated 3095 failing tests which were grouped into 3
clusters by our technique. Similarly, our tool clustered 4510 failing tests of
the paste program into 3 clusters.
In addition to bucketing failures, our tool provides a semantic
characterization of the reason of failure for the failures in each cluster.
This characterization can assist the developers better understand the
nature of the failures and, thus, guide their debugging efforts. The
existing approaches are not capable of defining such an accurate
charaterization of their clusters (other than saying that all tests fail at a
certain location or with a certain stack configuration).
While our algorithm is capable of bucketing tests as they are generated
via a symbolic execution engine, it is also capable of clustering failures in
existing test-suites by a post-mortem analysis on the set of failures.
The contributions of this work are as follows:
• We propose an algorithm to efficiently cluster failing test cases,
both for the tests generated automatically by symbolic execution as
well as tests available in existing test-suites. Our algorithm is based
on deriving a culprit for a failure by comparing the failing path to
the nearest correct path. As we use semantic information from the
program to drive our bucketing, we are also able to derive a
characterization of the reason of failure of the tests grouped in a
cluster. The existing approaches are not capable of defining such
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characterization for the clusters they produce.
• We implement a prototype of the clustering approach on top of the
symbolic execution engine KLEE [28]. Our experiments on 21
programs show that our approach is effective at producing more
meaningful clusters as compared to existing solutions like the point
of failure and stack hash based clustering.
7.2 Overview
We illustrate our technique using a motivating example in Listing 7.1. In
the main() function, the code at line 27 manages to calculate the value of
(2x +x! +
∑y
i=0 i) in which x and y are non-negative integers. It calls three
functions, power(), factorial() and sum(), to calulate 2x, x! and sum of
all integer numbers from 0 to y. While sum() is a correct implementation,
both power() and factorial() are buggy.
In the power() function, the programmer attempts an optimization
of saving a multiplication: she initializes the result (the integer variable
pow()) to 2 (line 2) and skips the multiplication at line 5 if n equals 1.
However, the optimization does not handle the special case in which n is
zero. When n is zero, the loop is not entered and the function returns 2:
it is a wrong value since 20 must be 1. Meanwhile, in the factorial()
function the programmer uses a wrong condition for executing the loop at
line 13. The correct condition should be i ≤ n instead of i < n. The
incorrect loop condition causes the function to compute factorial of n − 1
so the output of the function will be wrong if n ≥ 2.
We can use a symbolic execution engine (like KLEE) to generate test
cases that expose the bugs. In order to do that, we first mark the variables
x and y as symbolic (line 25) and add an assert statement at line 28. The
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assertion is used to check whether the calculated value for 2x + x! +
∑y
i=0
(as stored in val) is different from the expected value which is fetched from
golden output().
The specification oracle golden output() can be interpreted in many
ways depending on the debugging task: for example, it can be the previous
version of the implementation when debugging regression errors, or the
expected result of each test when run over a test-suite. For the sake of
simplicity, we add an assume() statements at line 26 to bound values of
symbolic variables x and y.
 
1 unsigned int power(unsigned int n) {
2 unsigned int i, pow = 2;
3 /* Missing code: if (n == 0) return 1; */
4 for(i=1; i<=n; i++) {
5 if(i==1) continue;




10 unsigned int factorial(unsigned int n) {
11 unsigned int i,result = 1;
12 /* Incorrect operator: < should be <= */
13 for(i=1;i<n;i++)
14 result = result*i;
15 return result;
16 }
17 unsigned int sum(unsigned int n) {
18 unsigned int result = 0, i;
19 for (i=0; i<=n; i++)
20 result += i;
21 return result;
22 }
23 int main() {
24 unsigned int x, y, val , val_golden;
25 make_symbolic(x, y);
26 assume(x<=2 && y<=2);
27 val = power(x)+factorial(x)+sum(y);
28 assert(val == golden_output(x, y));
29 return 0;
30 } 





































Figure 7-1: Symbolic execution tree for motivating example
Figure 7-1 shows the symbolic execution tree that KLEE would explore
when provided with this example. In this work, we use the term failing
path to indicate program paths that terminate in error. The error can be
assertion violation or run-time error detected by symbolic execution engine
such as divide-by-zero or memory access violation (as supported in KLEE).
In contrast, the term passing path indicates paths that successfully reach
the end of the program (or the return statement in the intraprocedural
setting) with no errors.
As shown in Figure 7-1, KLEE explores 9 feasible executions and detects
6 failing paths; the paths are labeled from 1 to 9 in the order tests are
generated while following the Depth-First-Search (DFS) search strategy. If
we apply failure location based or call-stack based bucketing techniques,
both of them will place all 6 failing tests in a single cluster as there is
only one failure location at line 28, and the call stacks are identical when
the failure is triggered. Hence, both the techniques suffer from the “over-
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condensing” problem as the failures are due to two different bugs (in the
power() and factorial() functions).
Let us now present our approach informally: given a failing test t
encountered during symbolic exploration, our algorithm compares the
path condition of t with the path condition of a successful test t′ that has
the longest common prefix with t. The branch b at which the execution of
t and t′ differ is identified as the culprit branch and the branch condition
at b which leads to the failing path is identified as the culprit
constraint—the “reason” behind the failure of t. Intuitively, the reason
behind blaming this branch for the failure is that the failing path t could
have run into the passing execution t′—only if this branch b had not
misbehaved!
Table 7.1: Clustering result: Symbolic analysis
Path Culprit Clus.
ID Test Case Path Condition Constraint ID
1 x=0, y=0 (0 ≤ x, y ≤ 2)∧(x < 1)∧(y ≤ 0) (x < 1) 1
2 x=0, y=1 (0 ≤ x, y ≤ 2)∧(x < 1)∧(y > 0)∧(y ≤ 1) (x < 1) 1
3 x=0, y=2 (0 ≤ x, y ≤ 2)∧(x < 1)∧(y > 0)∧(y > 1)∧(y ≤ 2) (x < 1) 1
4 x=1, y=0 (0 ≤ x, y ≤ 2)∧(x ≥ 1)∧(x < 2)∧(y ≤ 0) NA NA
5 x=1, y=1 (0 ≤ x, y ≤ 2)∧(x ≥ 1)∧(x < 2)∧(y > 0)∧(y ≤ 1) NA NA
6 x=1, y=2 (0 ≤ x, y ≤ 2)∧(x ≥ 1)∧(x < 2)∧(y > 0)∧(y > 1)∧(y ≤ 2) NA NA
7 x=2, y=0 (0 ≤ x, y ≤ 2)∧(x ≥ 1)∧(x ≥ 2)∧(y ≤ 0) (x ≥ 2) 2
8 x=2, y=1 (0 ≤ x, y ≤ 2)∧(x ≥ 1)∧(x ≥ 2)∧(y > 0)∧(y ≤ 1) (x ≥ 2) 2
9 x=2, y=2 (0 ≤ x, y ≤ 2)∧(x ≥ 1)∧(x ≥ 2)∧(y > 0)∧(y > 1)∧(y ≤ 2) (x ≥ 2) 2
Table 7.1 presents the result produced by our clustering algorithm (refer
to Figure 7-1 for the symbolic execution tree). The failing tests 1-3 fail due
to the bug in the power() function. The culprit constraint or “reason” for
these failures is attributed as x < 1, since it is the condition on the branch
where these failing tests diverge from their nearest passing test (Test 4),
after sharing the longest common prefix ((0 ≤ x ≤ 2)∧(0 ≤ y ≤ 2)).
Hence, we create the first cluster (Cluster 1) and place tests 1-3 in it, with
the characterization of the cluster as (x < 1). Similarly, the failing tests
7-9 (failing due to the bug in factorial()) share the longest common
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prefix ((0 ≤ x ≤ 2)∧(0 ≤ y ≤ 2)∧(x ≥ 1)) with Test 4; thus, the culprit
constraint for tests 7-9 is inferred as (x ≥ 2). Hence, these tests are placed
in Cluster 2 with the characterization (x ≥ 2). Note that the culprit
constraints (x < 1) and (x ≥ 2) form a neat semantic characterization of
the failures in these two clusters.
Summary. In this example, our semantic-based bucketing approach
correctly places 6 failing tests into 2 different clusters. Unlike the two
compared techniques, it does not suffer from the “over-condensing”
problem, and therefore, yields a more meaningful clustering of failures.
Moreover, we provide a semantic characterization for each cluster that
can assist developers in their debugging efforts. In fact, the
characterization for Cluster1 (x < 1) exactly points out the bug in
power() (as x is non-negative integer, x < 1 essentially implies that x
equals zero). Likewise, the characterization for Cluster2 (x ≥ 2) hints
the developer to the wrong loop condition in the factorial() function
(as the loop is only entered for x ≥ 2). We, however, emphasize that our
primary objective is not to provide root-causes for bugs, but rather to
enable a good bucketing of failures.
7.3 Reasons of Failure
The path condition ψp of a program path p is a logical formula that
captures the set of inputs that exercise the path p; i.e. ψp is true for a
test input t if and only if t exercises p. We say that a path p is feasible if
its path condition ψp is satisfiable; otherwise p is infeasible. We record the
path condition ψp for a path p as a list of conjuncts lp. Hence, the size of
a path condition (|ψp|) is simply the cardinality of the list lp. We also
assume that as symbolic execution progresses, the branch constraints
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(encountered during the symbolic execution) are recorded in the path
condition in order. This enables us to define prefix(i, ψp) as the prefix of
length i of the list lp that represents the path condition ψp. Hence, when
we say that two paths p and q have a common prefix of length i, it means
that prefix(i, ψp) = prefix(i, ψq).
Inference of suitable reasons behind failures is central to clustering of
failing tests: if the reasons inferred are too strong (i.e., they are not general
enough), tests that fail due to the same reason may form different clusters;
we refer to the same as under-clustering or the second bucket problem. On
the other hand, if constraints in the reason are too weak, then test cases
that correspond to different reasons of failure may get clustered together; we
refer this as over-clustering or over-condensing problem. We attribute the
“reason of failure” of a failing path to a branch condition along the failing
path such that there exists a passing path sharing the longest possible
prefix with the failing path.
Definition 1 (Culprit Constraint). Given a failing path pif with a path
condition ψf (as a conjunct b1 ∧ b2 ∧ · · · ∧ bi ∧ . . . bn) and an exhaustive
set of all feasible passing paths Π, we attribute bi (the i-th constraint where
i ranges from 1 to n) as the culprit constraint if and only if i − 1 is the
maximum value of j (0 ≤ j < n) such that prefix(j, ψf ) = prefix(j, ψp)
among all passing paths p ∈ Π.
We use the culprit constraint (as a symbolic expression) as the reason
why the error path “missed” out on following the passing path; in other
words, the failing path could have run into a passing path, only if the
branch corresponding to the culprit constraint had not misbehaved. Our
heuristic of choosing the culprit constraint in the manner described above
is primarily designed to achieve the following objectives:
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• Minimum change to Symbolic Execution Tree: Our technique
targets well-tested production-quality programs that are “almost”
correct; so, our heuristic of choosing the latest possible branch as
the “culprit” essentially tries to capture the intuition that the
symbolic execution tree of the correct program must be similar to
the symbolic execution tree of the faulty program. Choosing the
latest such branch as the culprit is a greedy attempt at encouraging
the developer to find a fix that makes the minimum change to the
current symbolic execution tree of the program.
• Handle “burst” faults: In Figure 7-1, all paths on one side of the
node with [PC : 1 ≤ x ≤ 2; 0 ≤ y ≤ 2] fail. So, the branching
predicate for this node, x ≥ 2, looks “suspicious”. Our heuristic of
identifying the latest branch as the culprit is directed at handling
such scenarios of “burst” failures on one side of a branch.
7.4 Clustering Framework
7.4.1 Clustering Algorithm
Algorithm 4 shows the core steps in dynamic symbolic execution with
additional statements (highlighted in grey) for driving test clustering.
The algorithm operates on a representative imperative language with
assignments, assertions and conditional jumps (adapted from [16], [66]).
A symbolic executor maintains a state (l, pc, s) where l is the address of
the current instruction, pc is the path condition, and s is a symbolic store
that maps each variable to either a concrete value or an expression over
input variables. At line 3, the algorithm initializes the worklist with an
initial state pointing to the start of the program (l0, true, ∅): the first
instruction is at l0, the path condition is initialized as true and the initial
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Algorithm 4 Symbolic Exploration with Test Clustering
1: procedure SymbolicExploration(l0, W )
2: C ← {}; passList← [ ]; failList← [ ] . initialization for bucketing
3: W ← {(l0, true, ∅)} . initial worklist
4: while W 6= ∅ do
5: (l, pc, s)← pickNext(W )
6: S ← ∅
7: switch instrAt(l) do . execute instruction
8: case v := e . assignment instruction
9: S ← {(succ(l), pc, s[v → eval(s, e)])}
10: case if (e) goto l′ . branch instruction
11: e← eval(s, e)
12: if (isSat(pc ∧ e) ∧ isSat(pc ∧ ¬e)) then
13: S ← {(l′, pc ∧ e, s), (succ(l), pc ∧ ¬e, s)}
14: else if (isSat(pc ∧ e) then
15: S ← {(l′, pc ∧ e, s)}
16: else
17: S ← {(succ(l), pc ∧ ¬e, s)}
18: case assert(e) . assertion
19: e← eval(s, e)
20: if (isSat(pc ∧ ¬e)) then
21: testID ← GenerateTest(l, pc ∧ ¬e, s)




26: S ← {(succ(l), pc ∧ e, s)}
27: case halt . end of path
28: testID ← GenerateTest(l,pc,s)
29: pc′ ← ConvertPC(pc)
30: AddToList(passList,(testID,pc′))
31: if failList 6= [ ] then
32: ClusterTests(C,passList,failList)
33: failList← [ ] . empty failing list
34: continue
35: W ←W ∪ S . update worklist
36: if failList 6= [ ] then
37: ClusterTests(C,passList,failList)
38: end procedure
store map is empty.
The symbolic execution runs in a loop until the worklist W becomes
empty. In each iteration, based on a search heuristic, a state is picked
for execution (line 7). Note that to support failing test bucketing, the
search strategy must be DFS or an instance of our clustering-aware strategy
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(clustering-aware search strategy discussed in Section 7.4.2). A worklist S
(initialized as empty) keeps all the states created/forked during symbolic
exploration.
Algorithm 5 Clustering failing tests
1: procedure ClusterTests(Clusters,passList,failList)
2: for (failID, failPC) ∈ failList do
3: maxPrefixLength← 0
4: for (passID, passPC) ∈ passList do
5: curPrefixLength← LCP (failPC, passPC)







13: for r ∈ Clusters.Reasons do
14: if isValid(reason⇒ r) then
15: Clusters[r].Add(failID)
16: return




21: AddCluster(Clusters, reason, failID)
22: end procedure
If the current instruction is an assignment instruction, the symbolic
store s is updated and a new state pointing to the next instruction is
inserted into S (lines 8− 9). A conditional branch instruction is processed
(line 10) via a constraint solver that checks the satisfiability of the branch
condition; if both its branches are satisfiable, two new states are created and
inserted into S. If only one of the branches is satisfiable, the respective state
is added to S. For assert instructions, the symbolic execution checks the
assert condition, and if it holds, a new program state is created and the state
is added to S. If the condition does not hold, it triggers an assertion failure,
thereby, generating a failing test case (we call the respective test case a
“failing test”). Some symbolic execution engines (like KLEE [28]) perform
run-time checks to detect failures like divide-by-zero and memory access
violations; in this algorithm, the assert instruction is used to represent the
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failures detected by such checks as well. On encountering a halt instruction,
the symbolic execution engine generates a test-case for the path (we refer
to such a test case as a “passing test”). The halt instruction represents
a normal termination of the program.
To support clustering of tests, we define two new variables, passList
and failList, to store information about all explored passing and failing
tests (respectively). For each test, we keep a pair (testID, pathCondition),
where testID is the identifier of the test generated by symbolic execution,
and pathCondition is a list of branch conditions (explained in Section 7.3).
We also introduce a variable C that keeps track of all clusters generated
so far; C is a map from a culprit constraint (cluster reason) to a list of
identifiers of failing tests. The bucketing functionality operates in two
phases:
Phase 1: Searching for failing and passing tests. The selected search
strategy guides the symbolic execution engine through several program
paths, generating test cases when a path is terminated. We handle the
cases where tests are generated, and update the respective list (passList
or failList) accordingly. In particular, when a failing test case is generated,
the path condition (pc) is converted to a list of branch conditions (pc′). The
pair comprising of the list pc′ and the identifier of the failing test case form
a representation of the failing path; the pair is recorded in failList (lines
23–24). The passList is handled in a similar manner (lines 31–32).
Phase 2: Clustering discovered failing tests. Once a passing test is
found (lines 35–37) or the symbolic execution engine completes its
exploration (lines 42–43), the clustering function ClusterTests will be
invoked. The procedure ClusterTests (Algorithm 5) takes three
arguments: 1) all clusters generated so far (Clusters), 2) all explored
passing tests (passList) and 3) all failing tests that have not been
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clustered (failList). In this function, the culprit constraints of all failing
tests in failList is computed (lines 2–9) and, then, the function Update is
called (line 10) to cluster the failing tests accordingly.
The Update function (Algorithm 5) can place a failing test into an
existing cluster or create a new one depending on the culprit constraint
(reason) of the test. We base our clustering heuristic on the intuition that
the reason of failure of each test within a cluster should be subsumed by
a core reason (rc) represented by the cluster. Hence, for a given failing
test f (with a reason of failure rf ) being clustered and a set of all clusters
Clusters, the following three cases can arise:
• There exists c ∈ C such that rc subsumes rf : in this case, we
add the test f to the cluster c (line 18);
• There exists c ∈ C such that rf subsumes rc: in this case, we
generalize the core reason for cluster c by resetting rf as the general
reason for failure for tests in cluster c (lines 21–22);
• No cluster reason subsumes rf , and rf subsumes no cluster
reason: in this case, we create a new cluster c’ with the sole failing
test f and attribute rf as the core reason of failure for tests in this
cluster (line 26).
7.4.2 Clustering-aware Search Strategy
It is easy to see that Algorithm 4 will yield the correct culprit constraints if
the search strategy followed is DFS: once a failing path fi is encountered,
the passing path that shares the maximum common prefix with fi is either
the last passing path encountered before the failure, or is the next passing
path after fi (i.e. ignoring all failures in the interim). Hence, a depth-
first traversal of the symbolic execution tree will always find the culprit
constraints by constructing the largest common prefix of the failing paths
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Figure 7-2: A Branching Tree
with at most two passing paths (the passing executions just before and just
after encountering the failures).
However, DFS has a very poor coverage when used with a time-budget.
Hence, we require search strategies different than DFS (like the Random
and CoverNewCode strategies in KLEE) to achieve a good coverage. In
fact, during our experiments, we could not trigger most of the failures in
our benchmarks with DFS within reasonable timeouts.
We design a new clustering-aware search strategy (CLS) that is capable
of discovering the precise culprit constraint while achieving a high coverage
at the same time. CLS is built on a crucial observation that we only
require DFS on a failing test to guide the search to its nearest passing
test; on a passing test, the next test can be generated as per any search
heuristic. Hence, one can implement any combination of suitable search
strategies (to achieve high code coverage) while maintaining the use of
DFS on encountering a failure (to identify the culprit constraint precisely).
We leverage a so-called branching tree, a data structure maintained
by many symbolic execution engines (like KLEE) to record the symbolic
execution tree traversed in terms of the branching/forking history (KLEE
refers to it as the process tree). Let us illustrate as to how we combine
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an arbitrary search strategy (SS) with DFS exploration to implement an
instance of CLS using the branching tree in Figure 7-2. In the tree, i1–i7
are internal nodes while p1–p8 are leaf nodes. Note that in the following
paragraphs, we will use the term (leaf) node and path interchangeably.
Basically, CLS works in two phases:
Phase 1: SS searches for a failing test. The search heuristic SS searches
for a failure using its own algorithm. Suppose SS first detects a failing
path p5, it returns control to CLS that now switches to the DFS heuristic
(to locate the “nearest” passing test, i.e. the one that has the longest
common prefix with p5).
Phase 2: DFS looks for “nearest” passing test. Continuing with our
example (Figure 7-2), by the time SS detects the failing path p5, assume
that we have explored three paths p1, p2, p7 and successfully put the failing
path p2 into its correct cluster. So, now only four active paths remain:
p3, p4, p6 and p8. At this point, our CLS seach strategy uses another
crucial observation: since p7 is a passing path and i4 is the closest common
ancestor node of p5 and p7, the nearest passing path for p5 must be p7 or
another passing path spawned from intermediate nodes i5, i6 or i7. Hence,
we can reduce the search space for finding the nearest passing path for p5
from the space represented by outer blue triangle to the inner (smaller)
triangle (as p7 is a passing path, it must be the nearest passing path if no
“nearer” passing path is discovered in the subtree rooted at i4). We omit
the details of how it is acheived for want of space.
If the symbolic execution is run with a timeout setting, the timeout
can potentially fire while CLS is searching for the nearest passing path to
a failing execution. In this case, we simply pick the nearest passing path
to the failing execution among the paths explored so far to compute the
culprit constraint.
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Our technique is potent enough to cluster an existing test-suite by
running the symbolic execution engine needs to run in a mode that the
exploration of a path that is controlled by the failing test (like the “seed”
mode in KLEE [29]). During path exploration, the first passing test
encountered in a depth-first traversal seeded from the failing test t would
necessarily be the passing test that has the longest common prefix with t.
Thus, we can compute the culprit constraint accordingly, and use it to
form a new cluster or update an existing cluster.
7.4.3 Generalize Reasons for Failure
Consider Listing 7.2: the program checks if the absolute value of each
element in the array is greater than 0. The buggy assertion contains >
comparison instead of ≥), which would cause 10 failing test cases ∀ i ∈
{0..9}. Since each array element is modeled as a different symbolic variable,
all 10 cases are clustered separately.
 
1 int main() {
2 int arr[10], int i;
3 make_input(arr , sizeof(arr));
4 for (i = 0; i < 10; i++) {
5 if (a[i] < 0) a[i] = -a[i];
6 assert(a[i] > 0); // a[i] >= 0
7 }
8 } 
Listing 7.2: Generalization for arrays
In such cases, we need to generalize errors that occur on different indices
but due to the same core reason. For example, if the reason is: arr[4] >
0 ∧ arr[4] < 10, we change this formula to ∃x (arr[x] > 0 ∧ arr[x] < 10).
Note that this is only a heuristic, and our implementation allows the user
to disable this feature.
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7.5 Experimental Evaluation
We evaluated our algorithm on a set of 21 programs: three programs from
IntroClass [52] (a micro benchmark for program repair tools) and the
remaining eighteen real-world programs taken from four
benchmarks-suites: eleven programs from Coreutils[1] version 6.10, three
from SIR[41], one from BugBench[78] and three from exploit-db[2]. The
three subject programs from exploit-db (downloaded them from the
project’s website) were used in [59]. The bugs in IntroClass, Coreutils,
exploit-db and BugBench programs are real bugs, whereas the ones in
SIR are seeded.
We manually inserted assert statements in the programs taken from
the IntroClass benchmark to specify the test oracle, while all remaing 18
real-world programs were kept unchanged. During symbolic execution, the
failing test cases are generated due to the violation of embedded assertions
or triggering of run-time errors (captured by KLEE) like divide-by-zero and
invalid memory accesses.
We compared our symbolic-analysis based (SAB) test clustering method
to two baseline techniques: call-stack based (CSB) and point-of-failure
based (PFB) clustering. While SAB refers to the implementation of our
algorithm within KLEE, we implemented CSB and PFB on top of KLEE
to evaluate our implementation against these techniques. Specifically, our
implementation first post-processes the information of test cases generated
by KLEE to compute the stack hash (on function call stack) and extract
failure locations. Based on the computed and extracted data, they cluster
the failing tests.
We conducted all of the experiments on a virtual machine created on
a host computer with a 3.6 GHz Intel Core i7-4790 CPU and 16 GB of
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Table 7.2: Test Clustering: number of clusters
Program Repository Size(kLOC) #Fail. Tests #Clus.(PFB) #Clus.(CSB) #Clus.(SAB)
median IntroClass 1 7 1 1 5
smallest IntroClass 1 13 1 1 3
syllables IntroClass 1 870 1 1 5
mkfifo Coreutils 38 2 1 1 1
mkdir Coreutils 40 2 1 1 1
mknod Coreutils 39 2 1 1 1
md5sum Coreutils 43 48 1 1 1
pr Coreutils 54 6 2 2 4
ptx Coreutils 62 3095 16 1 3
seq Coreutils 39 72 1 1 18
paste Coreutils 38 4510 10 1 3
touch Coreutils 18 406 2 3 14
du Coreutils 41 100 2 2 8
cut Coreutils 43 5 1 1 1
grep SIR 61 7122 1 1 11
gzip SIR 44 265 1 1 1
sed SIR 57 31 1 1 1
polymorph
BugBench 25 67 1 1 2
xmail Exploit-db 30 129 1 1 1
exim Exploit-db 253 16 1 1 6
gpg Exploit-db 218 2 1 1 1
RAM. The virtual machine was allocated 4 GB of RAM and its OS is
Ubuntu 12.04 32-bit. For our experiments, we use the clustering-aware
search strategy (CLS), enable array generalization and use a timeout of one
hour for each subject program. KLEE is run with the --emit-all-errors
flag to enumerate all failures.
7.5.1 Results and Analysis
Table 7.2 shows the results from our experiments on selected programs.
Size provides the size of the program in terms of the number of LLVM
bytecode instructions. #Fail Tests provides the number of failing tests.
The rest of the columns provide the number of clusters (#C) for Point-of-
failure (PFB), Stack Hash (CSB) and our Symbolic Analysis (SAB) based
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Table 7.3: Test clustering: overhead
Program #Pass. paths #Fail. paths Time (sec) Overhead (%)
median 4 7 5 ∼0
smallest 9 13 5 ∼0
syllables 71 870 1800 4.35
mkfifo 291 2 3600 ∼0
mkdir 326 2 3600 ∼0
mknod 72 2 3600 ∼0
md5sum 62449 48 3600 0.42
pr 540 6 3600 ∼0
ptx 9 3095 3600 2.04
seq 445 72 1800 0.73
paste 3501 4510 3600 16.17
touch 210 406 3600 0.84
du 44 100 3600 0.81
cut 38 5 3600 ∼0
grep 169 7122 3600 34.13
gzip 5675 265 3600 0.7
sed 3 31 3600 0.03
polymorph 3 67 3600 14.36
xmail 1 129 3600 0.06
exim 178 16 3600 0.03
gpg 10 2 3600 ∼0
methods. Note that #C(PFB) also records the number of failing locations.
As KLEE symbolically executes the LLVM bitcode, we show the size of the
program in terms of the total lines of the LLVM bitcode instructions.
In several programs (like ptx, paste, grep) SAB places thousands of
failing tests into managable number of clusters. Compared to CSB, in
12 out of 21 subjects (∼57%), our method produces more fine-grained
clustering results. Compared to PFB, our technique expands the number
of clusters to get a more fine-grained set in 10/21 subjects. However, our
method also collapses the clusters in case the program has failures that
are likely to be caused by the same bug but the failures occur at several
different locations (like ptx and paste).
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RQ1. Does our technique produce more fine-grained clusters?
In the experiments, we manually debugged and checked the root causes of
failures in all subject programs. Based on that, we confirm that our SAB
approach does effectively produce more fine-grained clusters. For instance,
as shown in Figure 7.4, the buggy smallest program, which computes the
smallest number among four integer values, does not adequately handle the
case in which at least two of the smallest integer variables are equal. For
example, if d equals b, none of the four conditional statements (at lines 7,
9, 11 and 13) take the true branch; the result is incorrect as the variable
















15 getoptarg (optarg , ’n’, ...);
16 break; 
Listing 7.3: Code snippet from ‘pr’
As shown in Listing 7.4, we instrumented the program to make it work
with KLEE. During path exploration, KLEE generated 13 failing tests for
this program and the CSB technique placed all of them into one cluster as
they share the same call stack. However, our SAB approach created three
clusters with the following reasons: (Cluster 1) d ≥ b, (Cluster 2) d ≥ c
and (Cluster 3) d ≥ a. The reasons indeed show the corner cases that can
trigger the bugs in the program. We observed similar cases in median and
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syllables programs (see Table 7.2).
In the subject program pr (a Coreutils utility), we found that 6 failing
tests due to two different bugs are placed in two clusters on using stack
hash similarity. Meanwhile, our approach placed these 6 failing tests into 4
different clusters: one cluster contained 3 failing tests corresponding to one
bug, and the other three clusters contain three failing tests of the second
bug. Listing 7.3 shows a code snippet from pr that shows three call sites
for the buggy function getoptarg() (at lines 3, 9 and 15). In this case,
because all of the three call sites are in one function, so the stack hash
based technique placed the three different failing paths in the same cluster.
Similar cases exist in the exim and du applications. 
1 int a, b, c, d, smallest;
2 make_symbolic(a, b, c, d);
3 assume(a>=-10 && a <=10);
4 assume(b>=-10 && b <=10);
5 assume(c>=-10 && c <=10);
6 assume(d>=-10 && d <=10);
7 if (a < b && a < c && a < d)
8 smallest = a;
9 if (b < a && b < c && b < d)
10 smallest = b;
11 if (c < b && c < a && c < d)
12 smallest = c;
13 if (d < b && d < c && d < a)
14 smallest = d;
15 assert(smallest == golden_smallest(a,b,c,d)); 
Listing 7.4: Code snippet from ‘smallest’
RQ2. Can our clustering reasons (culprit constraints) help users
to look for root causes of failures?
One advantage of our bucketing method compared to CSB and PFB
approaches is its ability to provide a semantic characterization of the
failures that are grouped together (based on the culprit constraint). The
existing techniques are only capable of capturing syntactic information
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like the line number in the program or the state of the call-stack when the
failure is triggered.
Table 7.4: Sample culprit constraints
Program Culprit constraint
mkfifo (= (select arg0 #x00000001) #x5a)
pr (= (select stdin #x00000009) #x09)
Table 7.4 shows a few examples of the culprit constraints that our
technique used to cluster failing tests for mkfifo and pr. In mkfifo, the
culprit constraint can be interpreted as: the second character in the first
argument is the character ‘Z’. This is, in fact, the correct characterization
of this bug in mkfifo as the tests in this cluster fail for the “-Z” option.
In case of pr, the culprit constraint indicates that: the tenth character of
the standard input is a horizontal tab (TAB). The root cause of this
failure is due to incorrect handling of the backspace and horizontal tab
characters.
RQ3. What is the time overhead introduced by our bucketing
technique over vanilla symbolic execution?
As shown in Table 7.3, in most of the subject programs the time overhead
is negligible (from 0% to 5%), except in some programs where the overhead
is dominated by the constraint solving time.
7.5.2 User Study
A user study was carried out with 18 students enrolled in a Software
Security course (CS4239) in the National University of Singapore (NUS)
to receive feedback on the usability and effectiveness of our bucketing
method. Among the students, there were 14 senior undergraduate and 4
masters students. Before attending the course, they had no experience on
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Table 7.5: Responses from the user study.
Techniques









Point of failure (PFB) 8 8 2 0 0 7 11
Stack hash (CSB) 3 13 2 0 3 8 7
Symbolic analysis (SAB) 1 9 7 1 2 4 12
applying bucketing techniques.The students were required to run the
three bucketing techniques (our method and two others based on
call-stack and point of failure information) to cluster the found failing
tests, and (primarily) answer the following questions:
Q1. Rate the level of difficulty in using the three techniques for bucketing
failing tests.
Q2. To what extent do the bucketing techniques support debugging of program
error?
Q3. Are the numbers of clusters generated by the bucketing techniques
manageable?
The users’ responses for Q1 & Q2 are summarized in Table 7.5; for
example, the first cell of Table 7.5 shows that 8 of the 18 respondents
found the PFB technique “Easy” for bucketing. In response to Q3, 14 out
of the 18 respondents voted that the number of clusters generated by our
technique is manageable.
In terms of usefulness as a debugging aid, our technique is ranked “Very
Useful” by 12 of the 18 respondents. It gains a high rating for its usefulness
as it provides a semantic characterization for each bucket (in terms of the
culprit constraint), that can help users locate the root cause of failure.
At the same time, we found that the main reason that they found our
technique harder to use was that this characterization was shown in the
form of logical formula in the SMT-LIB format—a format to which the
students did not have enough exposure. We list some of the encouraging
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feedback we got:
• “I believe it is the most powerful of the three techniques, letting me
understand which assert are causing the crash or how it is formed.”
• “It is very fine grain and will allow us to check the path condition to see
variables that causes the error.”
7.6 Chapter Summary
In this chapter, we have presented our symbolic analysis based bucketing
method. We leverage the symbolic execution tree built by a symbolic
execution engine to cluster failing tests found by symbolic path
exploration. Our approach can also be implemented on symbolic
execution engines like S2E [35] for clustering tests for stripped program
binaries (when source code is not available). Unlike many other prior
techniques, our technique should be able to handle changing of addresses
when Address Space Layout Randomization (ASLR) is enabled as





Fuzz testing techniques have become prominent for security vulnerability
detection. For instance, SAGE white-box fuzzer [51] was used in testing of
Windows 7 prior to its release, and AFL grey-box fuzzer [4], as shown in its
homepage 1, has been used to discover more than 300 vulnerabilities in 148
large programs and libraries such as OpenSSL, PHP and Mozilla Firefox
browser. However, given an inadequate test suite they are not skillful at
directing the exploration to reach given target locations and expose program
bugs in large program binaries that take highly-structured file inputs. In
this thesis, we propose algorithms to circumvent the limitations. To this
end, we design algorithms to enhance directed search in black-box, grey-
box and white-box fuzzing techniques. Our algorithms take into account
the inadequacy of given test suite, the complex structures of program inputs
(e.g., the presence of optional data chunks, integrity checks like checksum),
the incompleteness of program structure (e.g., control flow graph) lifted
from binaries, and also the complexity of the program under test (e.g.,
1AFL homepage: http://lcamtuf.coredump.cx/afl/
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multi-module design). Moreover, being aware of the overwhelming number
of failing tests could be generated during fuzzing process, we also develop a
fine-grained bucketing technique to effectively manage and group the tests
to ease the debugging phase.
In particular, we have made the following contributions in this thesis.
• Directed search algorithm in white-box fuzzing. Given a
(potentially) crashing location, our algorithm, which is composed by
several heuristics, systematically directs the search towards the
location and reasons about the crash condition to generate
crash-triggering input(s). The algorithm works with real-world
multi-module (stripped) binary programs like Adobe Reader and
Windows Media Player.
• Combination of model-based black-box and directed white-
box fuzzing. Such novel combination allows to exploit the best
of both worlds – model-based black-box is good at generating whole
chunk(s) of data while white-box fuzzing is skillful at reasoning about
values of data fields – to handle missing data chunk problem in the
presence of inadequate test suite.
• Directed coverage-based grey-box fuzzing. The integration of
Simulated Annealing – a Markov Chain Monte Carlo approach –
into coverage-based grey-box fuzzing (CGF) allows CGF to direct
the exploration towards a given set of target locations without any
expensive program analysis at run-time. Required analysis is done
at compile time. To the best of our knowledge, we develop the first
multiple-target search-based software testing technique where the
single objective is to generate an input that exercises as many of the
given targets as possible.
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• Fuzzing framework and evaluation. The evaluations on two
applications of directed fuzzing – crash reproduction and patch
testing for vulnerability detection – show the effectiveness and
efficiency of our techniques. Hercules, MoBWF and AFLGo
successfully reproduce crashes in large real-world (binary) programs
(e.g., Adobe Reader, Windows Media Player, OpenSSL, Binutils etc
) taking highly-structured file formats (e.g., PDF, PNG, WAV etc).
Notably, AFLGo can expose the well-known HeartBleed
vulnerability in OpenSSL library almost four (4) times faster than
the state-of-the-art AFL fuzzer. AFLGo has discovered 14 zero-day
vulnerabilities in Binutils’ utilities; five (5) CVEs have been
assigned to the most critical vulnerabilities.
• Fine-grained failing tests bucketing technique. We leverage
symbolic analysis and symbolic execution tree to identify semantic
“reasons” behind failures and group failing tests into “meaningful”
clusters. The semantic reason makes our approach more fine-grained
compared to off-the-shelf point-of-failure and call-stack-based
approaches.
8.2 Future work
Our novel combination of model-based black-box fuzzing and directed
white-box fuzzing has shown its effectiveness in handling
highly-structured inputs. However, input model – the key input of the
technique has been manually written. One possible opportunity is
construct the input model automatically from a set of benign inputs.
There is a rich set of relevant research on automatic grammar inference;
however the research has focused on context-free-grammar which cannot
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produce structured inputs having complex relationships between data
chunks and data fields (e.g., checksums, size-of, count-of, length-of etc).
Another possible avenue of future work is to bring the directed fuzzing
techniques to other application domains apart from file processing
applications. For instance, web applications require higher level of
interaction between application and users as well as application and
external systems. Another domain includes programs running inside OS
kernel (e.g., device drivers, file systems) which have complex dependencies
on the huge kernel code base.
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